DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENSATION AND INTELLIGENCE.
Aristo (there were two philosophers by this name, one a Stoic, the other an Aristotelian) attributes to the soul a perceptive faculty, which he divides into two parts. According to him, the first, called sensibility, the principle and origin of sensations, is usually kept active by some one of the sense-organs. The other, which subsists by itself, and without organs, does not bear any special name in beings devoid of reason, in whom reason (…)
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Guthrie / Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie
Matérias
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Guthrie (Porfírio) – Das faculdades da alma
19 de julho de 2023, por Cardoso de Castro -
Guthrie – Ennead I, 1 (53): estrutura do tratado
20 de fevereiro de 2022, por Cardoso de CastroCapítulo 1: Distinções psicológicas na alma
Capítulo 2: A alma como um agregado composto A alma não é essência
Capítulo 3: A alma usa o corpo como instrumento Separação da alma do corpo Relação primitiva entre alma e corpo
Capítulo 4: Consequências da mistura de alma e corpo Mistura de alma e corpo Hipóteses aristotélicas consideradas
Capítulo 5: O organismo vivente Refutação da teoria das emoções Nem todas as afeições comum para alma e corpo Desejo, não simultâneo com apetite (…) -
Guthrie – Ennead III, 5 (50): estrutura do tratado sobre o amor
20 de fevereiro de 2022, por Cardoso de CastroTradução Guthrie
Plano detalhado do tratado
Capítulo 1: Amor enquanto deus, guardião e paixão Amor passional é duplo Amor é reconhecimento de afinidade oculta Beleza terrena é uma imagem da beleza inteligível A Beleza é imortal Amor passional pode ser elevador embora aberto a tentações enganadoras
Capítulo 2: O mito platônico do amor Interpretação do mito platônico Amor, como alma superior, ou luz, é inseparável de sua fonte Quem é a Vênus celestial
Capítulo 3: O Amor possui o ser (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: actuality
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(10). The soul penetrates the whole body, while an entire body cannot penetrate another entire body. Further, if the soul is corporeal, and pervades the whole body, she will, with the body, form (as Alexander of Aphrodisia pointed out) a mixture, similar to the other bodies (that are constituted by a mixture of matter and quality, as the Stoics taught). Now as none of the bodies that enter into a mixture is in actualization the soul, instead of being in actualization in the bodies, would be (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: birth
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIf everything that happens has a cause, it is possible to discover such fact’s proximate causes, and to them refer this fact. People go downtown, for example, to see a person, or collect a bill. In all cases it is a matter of choice, followed by decision, and the determination to carry it out. There are, indeed, certain facts usually derived from the arts; as for instance the re-establishment of health may be referred to medicine and the physician. Again, when a man has become rich, this is (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: actualities
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIs form a quality? No: form is a reason. Now what is constituted by (material) substance, and reason? (In the warm body) it is neither what burns, nor what is visible; it is quality. If, however, it be said that combustion is an act emanating from reason, that being hot and white are actualities, we could not find anything to explain quality. [Ennead II,6 (17) 2]
The purpose of the preceding considerations was to determine the meaning of the statement that intelligibles are actual; to (…) -
Guthrie-Plotinus: health
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAs has already been said above this hypothesis is inadmissible for several reasons. To begin with, the soul is prior (to the body), and the harmony is posterior thereto. Then the soul dominates the body, governs it, and often even resists it, which would be impossible if the soul were only a harmony. The soul, indeed, is a “being,” which harmony is not. When the corporeal principles of which we are composed are mingled in just proportions, their temperament constitutes health (but not a (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: actualized
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called habit, then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would have arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit became soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were became soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it; this is an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do not have their soul exposed (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: sound
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the whole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case, the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple, and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound. Only the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will possess no beauty; (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: Adrastea
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe mutual wrongs of human beings may however very easily all be caused by the desire of the Good (as had been thought by Democritus). But, having strayed because of their inability to reach Him, they turned against each other. They are punished for it by the degradation these evil actions introduced within their souls, and, after death, they are driven into a lower place, for none can escape the Order established by the Law of the universe (or, the law of Adrastea). Order does not, as some (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: liberty
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIn this case, even if we possessed the power of doing something by ourselves, we would not be any the less than the remainder of the universe subjected to necessity, because Fate, containing the whole series of causes, necessarily determines each event. Now since Fate includes all causes, there is nothing which could hinder the occurrence of that event, or alter it. If then everything obeys the impulsion of a single principle, nothing is left to us but to follow it. Indeed, in this case, the (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: adumbration
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroIn this choric ballet, the soul sees the source of life, the source of intelligence, the principle of being, the cause of the good, and the root of love. All these entities are derived from the One without diminishing Him. He is indeed no corporeal mass; otherwise the things that are born of Him would be perishable. However, they are eternal, because their principle ever remains the same, because He does not divide Himself to produce them, but remains entire. They persist, just as the light (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: adumbrations
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroHow shall we start, and later arrive at the contemplation of this ineffable beauty which, like the divinity in the mysteries, remains hidden in the recesses of a sanctuary, and does not show itself outside, where it might be perceived by the profane? We must advance into this sanctuary, penetrating into it, if we have the strength to do so, closing our eyes to the spectacle of terrestrial things, without throwing a backward glance on the bodies whose graces formerly charmed us. If we do (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: aei
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAs the existence of begotten things consists in perpetually acquiring (something or another), they will be annihilated by a removal of their future. An attribution of the future to the (intelligible) entities of a nature contrary (to begotten things), would degrade them from the rank of existences. Evidently they will not be consubstantial with existence, if this existence of theirs be in the future or past. The nature (“being”) of begotten things on the contrary consists in going from the (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: aeon
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroHow shall we define the aeon (or, eternity)? Shall we say that it is the intelligible “being” (or, nature) itself, just as we might say that time is the heaven and the universe, as has been done, it seems, by certain (Pythagorean) philosophers? Indeed, as we conceive and judge that the aeon (eternity) is something very venerable, we assert the same of intelligible “being,” and yet it is not easy to decide which of the two should occupy the first rank; as, on the other hand, the principle (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: aeons
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOne does not become a good man merely by scorning the divinities, the world, and the beauties it contains. Scorn of the divinities is the chief characteristic of the evil. Perversity is never complete until scorn of the divinities is reached; and if a man were not otherwise perverse, this vice would be sufficient to make him such. The respect which the (Gnostic) pretend to have for the intelligible divinities (the aeons) is an illogical accident. For when one loves a being, he loves all that (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: aerial
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroLet us now examine how it happens that the soul descends into the body, and in what manner this occurs; for it is sufficiently astonishing and remarkable. For a soul, there are two kinds of entrance into a body. The first occurs when the soul, already dwelling in a body, undergoes a transmigration; that is, passes from an aerial or igneous body into a terrestrial body. This is not usually called a transmigration, because the condition from which the soul comes is not visible. The other kind (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: affairs
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe subject that perceives a sense-object must itself be single, and grasp this object in its totality, by one and the same power. This happens when by several organs we perceive several qualities of a single object, or when, by a single organ, we embrace a single complex object in its totality, as, for instance, a face. It is not one principle that sees the face, and another one that sees the eyes; it is the “same principle” which embraces everything at once. Doubtless we do receive a (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: affect
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroTo begin with, even if we do admit such atomic principles, their existence does not in any way inevitably lead to either the necessity of all things, or fatality. Let us, indeed, grant the existence of atoms; now some will move downwards — that is, if there is an up and down in the universe — others obliquely, by chance, in various directions. As there will be no order, there will be nothing determinate. Only what will be born of the atoms will be determinate. It will therefore be impossible (…)
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Guthrie-Plotinus: affected
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNeither do beauty or justice possess extension, I suppose; and their conception must be similar. These things can be cognized or retained only by the indivisible part of the soul. If the latter were corporeal, where indeed could virtues, prudence, justice and courage exist? In this case, virtues (as Critias thought), would be no more than a certain disposition of the spirit, or blood (as Empedocles also thought). For instance, courage and temperance would respectively be no more than a (…)