The συμφέρον is σκοπὸς. Aristotle   characterizes the συμβουλεύεσθαι in Book 6, Chapter 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics as ζητεῖν τι καὶ λογίζεσθαι, a “searching for something in the mode [καί is explicative here] of deliberating”—λογίζεσθαι. It is in this way that I “bring to language” that which I look toward in deliberating, that which is conducive to the end of concern. In πρᾶξις there is an end, that which is conducive is brought to its end, in every concern an end is fixed in advance. The λογίζεσθαι is the genuine mode of the fulfillment of deliberating, of the bringing-to-language of the συμφέρον. Thus, when that which is conducive is brought to language, this means that the τέλος is also there in this bringing-to-language. That which is conducive has in itself the reference to the end. The λóγος, the λογίζεσθαι is fulfilled in the basic structure of the “if-then”; if such and such is the end of a concern, then such and such must be undertaken, brought to language. The manner of fulfillment of this “if-then,” the talking-through of the συμφέρον, is the συλλογισμóς. It is λóγοι together, fastened to one another. And, indeed, τὸ ὠφέλιμον, which here means the same thing as τὸ συμφέρον, is brought more precisely to language. That is, κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὣς καὶ ὅτε; that which is conducive is talked through with respect to “what is required” for the bringing-to-the-end of a concern, as well as “how” and “when” the concern is to be carried through. In this bringing-to-language of the συμφέρον, of the world insofar as it is concretely there, the world is first brought genuinely into the there. [Heidegger  , GA18:58-59]