For conviction (pistis) is always a consequence (hepesthai) of the latter [opinion], for a person who has an opinion (doxa) about something always assents (sunkatatithesthai) to its being so as well. For opinion about something is an assent by that person to its being so, and assent is accompanied by conviction (pistis), since opinion is rational assent accompanied by judgement (krisis). But not every case of being appeared to (phantasia) is accompanied by conviction. For there are many non-rational animals, at any rate, who have [the ability to] be appeared to, but not conviction; but if they do not have conviction, then they do not have assent accompanied by judgement either. Furthermore, every opinion involves composition — for it is either affirmative or negative — while not every case of being appeared to is such. For this reason, what is true and [what is] false are not similar in both cases, just as they are not in perception and opinion either.