Categoria: Plotino (séc. III)
Site PLATONISMO
-
-
-
1. Pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion, where have these affections and experiences their seat? Clearly, either in the SOUL alone, or in the SOUL as employing the body, or in some third entity deriving from both. And for this third entity, again, there are two possible modes: it might be either…
-
Every living thing is a combination of SOUL and body-kind: the celestial sphere, therefore, if it is to be everlasting as an individual entity must be so in virtue either of both these constituents or of one of them, by the combination of SOUL and body or by SOUL only or by body only. Enneads…
-
As for Things of Process or for Eternal Existents whose Act is not eternally invariable we must hold that these are due to Cause; Causelessness is quite inadmissible; we can make no place here for unwarranted “slantings,” for sudden movement of bodies apart from any initiating power, for precipitate spurts in a SOUL with nothing…
-
1. In the Intellectual Kosmos dwells Authentic Essence, with the Intellectual-Principle [Divine Mind] as the noblest of its content, but containing also souls, since every SOUL in this lower sphere has come thence: that is the world of unembodied spirits while to our world belong those that have entered body and undergone bodily division. Enneads…
-
1. What can it be that has brought the souls to forget the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and entirely of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It? The evil that has overtaken them has its source in self-will, in the entry into the sphere of process, and in the…
-
With regard to time, if it is to be thought of as a measure, we must determine what it is that applies this measure. It must clearly be either SOUL or the Present Moment. If on the contrary we take time to be something measured and regard it as being of such and such extension…
-
Que l’un ou l’autre soit vrai, il en résulte que Dieu possède des vertus, fussent-elles différentes des nôtres. Si donc on accorde que nous pouvons ressembler à Dieu, même par des vertus différentes des siennes (car s’il en est autrement dans les autres vertus, nous avons du moins des vertus qui ne sont pas semblables…
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-