gr. συμπάθεια, sympátheia: afeição a, simpatia cósmica, compaixão, interação. O compassio latino, calcado sobre o termo grego, e que corresponde a nossa "compaixão" e à nossa "simpatia", recobre somente, como estes últimos, uma parte do sentido grego, àquela da "participação nos sofrimento dos outros": não atende ao sentido de interdependência universal das coisas da antiga filosofia grega.

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The idea in Plato’s First Alcibiades  , repeated by Aristotle  , that we know ourselves as reflected through others, reverses Descartes  ’ view that we know ourselves first and make an inference to other minds. Augustine   rejects the ‘through others’ idea and moves in Descartes’ direction, when he says that nothing is so present to the soul as itself. See the Stoic Hierocles for the view that the newborn chick’s knowledge of how to secure its own person involves knowledge of the likely behaviour of bull and hawk.

Plotinus  ’ general account of sympathy with other minds appeals not to bodies, but to the unity of all souls, 4.3 [27] 8 (1-5), while Themistius  , appealing to Plato Gorgias 481C5-D1 on the similarity of human experience, explains mutual understanding by the unity of the human productive intellect, in DA 403,32-104,16. Philoponus   assumes that knowledge of other minds is through other bodies. He speaks of changes in the body which accompany thinking and enable us to see whether someone has understood, in DA 332,12-17 and in Phys. 7, translated from Arabic 771,21-772,3 (cf. Philo   Vit. Contempt. 77). See the idea that the beast-like soul creates for itself either a beast’s, or a beast-like, body. But elsewhere, Philoponus   Contra Proclum 77,15-24; in Cat. 14,2-5, thinks that fleshly bodies are what prevent us apprehending each other’s thoughts. So too Augustine in de Gen. c. Man. 2.21.32. Philoponus’ claims are compatible, for it is the concealment introduced by bodies that makes us rely on facial expressions and speech.

In Confessions 10.2.2-10.2.3, Augustine cites 1 Corinthians 2.11, to show that our lack of knowledge of other minds will prevent other people from knowing whether his confession is true, but 1 Corinthians 13.7, to show that through love people can believe him. God, of course, knows Augustine’s mind. Moreover, City of God 22.29, Elisha saw in his heart the sin of his wicked servant, in his absence, and could have seen other things by his spirit (spiritus) with his eyes shut.

According to Simplicius   in Cat. 24,9-13, a human understands speech by projecting (proballesthai) concepts (ennoiai) to match the words he is hearing. [SorabjiPC1  :242]

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LÉXICO: simpatia; interação; compaixão