gr. ψυχή, psyché ou psykhé (he): respiração de vida, fantasma, princípio vital, alma. Latim: anima. Princípio, de natureza vital ou espiritual; mais habitualmente, das duas ao mesmo tempo; princípio que anima o corpo.

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Brisson  

A natureza da alma é de ser princípio (arche) de movimento. Eternamente móvel, e deste fato imortal, ela é também a causa primeira de todos os movimentos (Fedro  ): dos movimentos físicos, quer se trate daqueles dos elementos ou daqueles, voluntários, dos seres vivos; e dos movimentos propriamente psíquicos que são a sensação e a reflexão (a intelecção). Esta primazia natural da alma a torna todavia difícil de conhecer: desta realidade intermediária entre o sensível e o inteligível, mal se pode dar uma representação (Luc Brisson).

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Sorabji  

For the definition of soul as a blend or harmony of physical qualities, or a self-moving number...

For Aristotle  ’s rejection of Plato’s description of the soul as a self-mover...

Plato describes the soul in Timaeus   34B-36D as composed out of divisible and indivisible forms of Sameness, Difference and Being. These are in turn split into two oppositely revolving circles of Sameness and Difference. Interpretations are offered in Plutarch   On the Creation of Soul in the Timaeus (Moralia 1012A-1032F) and in the commentaries on the Timaeus of Proclus   and Calcidius. See for a ‘yes and no’ answer to the question whether all soul is one, which tries to trade on the soul’s being composed of the divisible and the indivisible and of Sameness and Difference.

Aristotle, taking the apparently spatial character of Plato’s account literally, rejects it utterly and substitutes a highly commonsensical account. His general formula, that the soul is the form or actualisation (entelekheia) of an organic body (DA 2.1, 412a19 and b5), he recognises as being a very generalised sketch, which can be filled in by studying the life-manifesting capacities one by one (2.3, 414b25-8; b32-3; 415a12-13). The soul, for Aristotle, actually is these capacities, as I have argued (1974). The capacities which constitute soul are first the nutritive capacity for using food to maintain and reproduce a certain bodily structure, secondly in higher life forms, the further capacities to perceive and desire, and thirdly in humans the capacity to think. [SorabjiPC1:245]

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Heidegger  

Αἴτιον ἐνυπάρχον: “That which is also at hand therein” in such a way of being, in the function of the αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι. The ψυχή is such a being-character. To say that the soul is οὐσία is to say that it is a being-character that is at hand in a being in the aforementioned sense. The soul is also at hand therein in such a way that it also constitutes the specific being of that which we call living. It is responsible for, or constitutes, the specific being of a living thing, namely, of a way of being in the sense of being-in-a-world. The two basic aspects are κρίνειν and κινεῖν. A living thing is not simply at hand (as accessible to everyone), but is there in its being-at-hand in an explicit mode. It can see, do, move itself. The two aspects of this οὐσία are κρίνειν, “separating” from something other, orienting itself in a world; and κινεῖν, “moving itself therein,” being-involved-therein, going-around-and-knowing-its-way-around-therein.” Thus, when one speaks of Greek philosophy, one must be careful with the famous “substantiality” of the soul. Οὐσία means a mode of being, and if the soul is called οὐσία, it refers to a distinctive mode of being, namely the being of the living. [Heidegger, GA18:30-31]

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LÉXICO: PSYCHE; psique; alma; anima; animus; animismo