gr. μεταβολή, metabolé (he): mudança, modificação, transformação. Latim: mutatio. Em filosofia, a metabolé distingue o ser sensível, fadado à mudança, do ser inteligível, perpetuamente o mesmo. Termo moderno de fisiologia: metabolismo, conjunto de transformações energéticas do organismo.

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gr. alloíôsis: mudança, mudança qualitativa, alteração. De állos / allos: outro. Uma das formas da mudança (metabole) em Aristóteles  . Definição: "Uma mudança nas afecções de um substrato (hypokeimenon) que continua idêntico e perceptível" (De gen., IV).

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Damascius   disagrees, arguing that the soul does undergo substantial change. Its substance is affected when it projects lives that are liable to emotion, and this is not just the fault of the body. Carlos Steel has argued that in this Damascius follows Iamblichus  , whose views are represented in Priscian (and in ‘Simplicius  ’ = Priscian). Part of Damascius’ argument was presented, since he threatened that Proclus   would have to accept Plotinus  ’ undescended soul, if he postulated a soul exempt from substantial change.

Damascius’ argument concerns time, among other things. Human souls cannot, like divine souls, embrace the whole of time at once, so their participation and non-participation in Being, affirmed in Plato’s Parmenides  , must be realised at different times, and this affects the substance of soul which, pace Proclus, is temporal. I. Hadot   finds Simplicius agreeing with Damascius in his [Simplicius’] Commentary on Epictetus  ’ Handbook ch. 27, line 273 Hadot. And Brennan and Brittain in their English translation refer to ch. 1, lines 36-9 and ch. 14, lines 31-2 for the view that the rational soul may be moved by the body. [SorabjiPC1  :291]

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Despite the substantial changes, the soul for Damascius preserves its identity, since the change is more nuanced than an Aristotelian substantial change. One way in which the soul is enabled to preserve its identity is that it changes not its substantial existence, but in its participation in substance. This echoes Plato Phaedo   93A-94A, and the Platonists reported by Aristotle Cat. 8, 10b26-11a5. The idea there is that there are no degrees of soul, or of justice, but there are degrees of participation in soulhood or justice. [SorbajiPC1:292]