Alcinous: doxa

      

This latter [reason (logos  )], too, has two aspects: one concerned with the objects of intellection, the other with the objects of sensation  . Of these, the former, that concerning the objects of intellection, is science (episteme  ) and [34] scientific reason (epistemonikos logos), while that concerning sense  -objects is opinion (doxa  ), and opiniative reason (doxastikos logos). [Alcinous   Didaskalikos ch  . 4, 154,25-9]

---

And in turn, since of sense-objects some are primary, such as qualities, e.g. colour, or whiteness, and others accidental, such as ‘white’ or ‘coloured’, and following on these the bundle (athroisma  ), such as fire or honey [cf. Plato   Theaetetus   156D-157C], even so there will be one sort of sense perception concerned with the primary objects, called ‘primary’, and another concerned with secondary, called ‘secondary’. [Alcinous Didaskalikos 156,1-6]

---

The primary and secondary sensibles are judged (krinein  ) by sense-perception not without the aid of opiniative reason (doxastikos logos), while the bundle (athroisma) is judged by opiniative reason, not without the aid of sense-perception [cf. Plato Timaeus   28A]. [Alcinous Didaskalikos 156,8-11]

---

Opinion is the combination of memory and perception. For when we first encounter some perceptible, and from it we get a perception, and from that a memory, and later we encounter the same perceptible again, we connect the pre-existing memory with the subsequent perception and say within ourselves ‘Socrates  !’, ‘Horse!’, ‘Fire!’, etc. And this is called opinion (doxa) - our connecting (suntithenai) the pre-existing perception with the newly produced perception. [Alcinous Didaskalikos 154,40-155,5] [SorabjiPC1  ]