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Plotino - Tratado 19,5 (I, 2, 5) — O estado da alma a se separar do corpo

Enéada I, 2, 5

sábado 29 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Capítulo 5. O estado   da alma   que empreende de se separar do corpo.

  • 1-5: Até onde pode ir a purificação?
  • 6-11: A alma impassível não retém senão as sensações necessárias
  • 12-16: Cólera  , temor
  • 17-20: Desejo
  • 21-31: A alma pura não conhece tensão entre sua parte irracional e sua parte racional
    

nossa tradução

da versão de Armstrong  

5. Mas devemos declarar a extensão   da purificação; desta forma, ficará claro com que deus   somos assemelhados e identificados. A questão é substancialmente esta; como a purificação lida com a paixão e o desejo e todo o resto, a dor   e seus congêneres, e até que ponto é possível a separação   do corpo? Poderíamos dizer que a alma   se junta a si mesma em uma espécie de lugar próprio  , longe do corpo, e não é totalmente afetada, e só toma consciência   dos prazeres quando necessário, usando-os como remédios e alívios para evitar sua atividade   sendo impedida; ela se livra das dores ou, se não pode, as suporta tranquilamente e as faz menor por não sofrer   com o corpo. Ela se livra da paixão o mais completamente   possível, integralmente se puder, mas se não puder, pelo menos não compartilha de sua excitação emocional; o impulso involuntário   pertence a algo outro, e também é pequeno e fraco. Ela elimina completamente o medo, pois não tem nada a temer - embora o impulso involuntário também entre aqui - exceto, isto é, onde o medo tem uma função corretiva. E o desejo? Obviamente, não desejará nada de ruim; ela mesma não terá o desejo de comida e bebida para o alívio do corpo, e certamente tampouco de prazeres sexuais. Se ela tiver algum desses desejos, eles serão, penso eu, naturais, sem nenhum elemento   de impulso involuntário neles; ou se tiver outros tipos, apenas no que diz respeito à imaginação  , que também é propensa a eles.

A alma será pura de todas essas maneiras   e desejará tornar pura também a parte irracional, para que essa parte não seja perturbada; ou, se for, não muito; seus choques serão apenas leves, facilmente aplacados pela vizinhança da alma: assim como um homem   que vive ao lado de um sábio   tiraria proveito da vizinhança do sábio, tornando-se como ele ou olhando-o com tanto respeito que não ousaria fazer qualquer coisa que o homem bom não aprovaria. Portanto, não haverá conflito: a presença   da razão   será suficiente; a pior   parte irá respeitá-la de tal maneira que mesmo esta pior parte ficará chateada se houver algum movimento  , porque não ficou quieta na presença de seu mestre, e repreenderá sua própria fraqueza  .

Bouillet

Jusqu’où conduit la purification? telle est la question que nous avons à résoudre pour savoir à quel Dieu [1] l’âme peut se rendre semblable et s’identifier. La résoudre, c’est examiner jusqu’à quel point l’âme peut réprimer la colère, les appétits et les passions de toute espèce, triompher de la douleur et des autres sentiments semblables, enfin se séparer du corps. Elle se sépare du corps lorsque, abandonnant les divers lieux où elle s’était en quelque sorte répandue, elle se retire en elle-même, lorsqu’elle devient entièrement étrangère aux passions, qu’elle ne permet au corps que les plaisirs nécessaires ou propres à le guérir de ses douleurs, à le délasser de ses fatigues, à l’empêcher d’être importun; lorsqu’elle devient insensible aux souffrances, ou que, si cela n’est pas en son pouvoir, elle les supporte patiemment et les diminue en ne consentant pas à les partager ; lorsqu’elle apaise la colère autant que possible, et même, si elle le peut, la supprime entièrement, ou que du moins, si cela ne se peut pas, elle n’y participe en rien, laissant à la nature animale l’emportement irréfléchi, et encore réduisant et affaiblissant le plus possible les mouvements irréfléchis ; lorsqu’elle est absolument inaccessible à la crainte, n’ayant plus rien à redouter; lorsqu’elle comprime tout brusque mouvement, à moins que ce ne soit un avertissement de la nature à l’approche d’un danger. L’âme purifiée ne devra évidemment désirer rien de honteux : dans le boire et le manger, elle ne recherchera que la satisfaction d’un besoin, tout en y restant étrangère ; elle ne recherchera pas davantage les plaisirs de l’amour, ou, si elle les désire, elle n’ira   pas au delà de ce qu’exige la nature, résistant à tout emportement irréfléchi, ou même ne dépassant pas les élans involontaires de l’imagination [2]. En un mot, l’âme sera pure de toutes ces passions et voudra même purifier la partie irrationnelle de notre être de manière à la préserver des émotions, ou du moins à diminuer le nombre et l’intensité de ces émotions et à les apaiser promptement par sa présence. C’est ainsi qu’un homme placé auprès d’un sage profite de ce voisinage, soit en lui devenant semblable, soit en craignant de rien faire que ce sage puisse désapprouver. Cette influence de la raison s’exercera sans lutte et sans contrainte : il suffit en effet qu’elle soit présente ; le principe inférieur la respectera au point de se fâcher contre lui-même et de se reprocher sa propre faiblesse, s’il éprouve quelque agitation qui puisse troubler le repos de son maître.

Guthrie

THE LIMIT OF PURIFICATION IS THAT OF THE SOUL’S SELF-CONTROL.

5. The limit of purification decides to which (of the three hypostases of) divinity the soul may hope to assimilate and identify herself; therefore we shall have to consider that limit. To decide that would be to examine the limit of the soul’s ability to repress anger, appetites, and passions of all kinds, to triumph over pain and similar feelings — in short, to separate her from the body. This occurs when, recollecting herself from the various localities over which she had, as it were, spread herself, she retires within herself; when she estranges herself entirely from the passions, when she allows the body only such pleasures as are necessary or suitable to cure her pains, to recuperate from its fatigues, and in avoiding its becoming importunate; when she becomes insensible to sufferings; or, if that be beyond her power, in supporting them patiently, and in diminishing them by refusing to share them; when she appeases anger as far as possible, even suppressing it entirely, if possible; or at least, if that be impossible, not participating therein; abandoning to the animal   nature all unthinking impulses, and even so reducing to a minimum all reflex movements; when she is absolutely inaccessible to fear, having nothing left to risk; and when she represses all sudden movements, except nature’s warning of dangers. Evidently, the purified soul will have to desire nothing shameful. In eating and drinkingv she will seek only the satisfaction of a need, while remaining foreign to it; nor will she seek the pleasures of love; or, if she does, she will not go beyond the exactions of nature, resisting every unconsidered tendency, or even in remaining within the involuntary flights of fancy.

THE INFLUENCE OF REASON IS SUGGESTIVE.

In short, the soul will be pure from all these passions, and will even desire to purify our being’s irrational part so as to preserve it from emotions, or at least to moderate their number and intensity, and to appease them promptly by her presence. So would a man, in the neighborhood of some sage, profit thereby, either by growing similar to him, or in refraining from doing anything of which the sage might disapprove. This (suggestive) influence of reason will exert itself without any struggle; its mere presence will suffice. The inferior principle will respect it to the point of growing resentful against itself, and reproaching itself for its weakness, if it feel any agitation which might disturb its master’s repose.

MacKenna

5. So we come to the scope of the purification: that understood, the nature of Likeness becomes clear. Likeness to what Principle? Identity with what God?

The question is substantially this: how far does purification dispel the two orders of passion- anger, desire and the like, with grief and its kin- and in what degree the disengagement from the body is possible.

Disengagement means simply that the soul withdraws to its own place.

It will hold itself above all passions and affections. Necessary pleasures and all the activity of the senses it will employ only for medicament and assuagement lest its work be impeded. Pain it may combat, but, failing the cure, it will bear meekly and ease it by refusing assent to it. All passionate action it will check: the suppression will be complete if that be possible, but at worst the Soul will never itself take fire but will keep the involuntary and uncontrolled outside its precincts and rare and weak at that. The Soul has nothing to dread, though no doubt the involuntary has some power here too: fear therefore must cease, except so far as it is purely monitory. What desire there may be can never be for the vile; even the food and drink necessary for restoration will lie outside of the Soul’s attention, and not less the sexual appetite: or if such desire there must be, it will turn upon the actual needs of the nature and be entirely under control; or if any uncontrolled motion takes place, it will reach no further than the imagination, be no more than a fleeting fancy.

The Soul itself will be inviolately free and will be working to set the irrational part of the nature above all attack, or if that may not be, then at least to preserve it from violent assault, so that any wound it takes may be slight and be healed at once by virtue of the Soul’s presence, just as a man living next door to a Sage would profit by the neighbourhood, either in becoming wise and good himself or, for sheer shame, never venturing any act which the nobler mind would disapprove.

There will be no battling in the Soul: the mere intervention of Reason is enough: the lower nature will stand in such awe of Reason that for any slightest movement it has made it will grieve, and censure its own weakness, in not having kept low and still in the presence of its lord.

Taylor

V. We must, however, show how far purification proceeds. For thus it will be evident to whom the similitude is made, and with what God the soul becomes the same. But this is especially to enquire how far it is possible to be purified from anger and desire, and all the other perturbations, such as pain, and things of a kindred nature, and to separate the soul from the body. And perhaps, indeed, to separate the soul from the body, is for the soul to collect itself as it were, from different places, so as to become entirely impassive, and to make the necessary sensations of pleasures to be only remedies and liberations from pain [3], in order that the soul may not be disturbed [in its energies]. It likewise consists in taking away pain, and if this is not possible, in bearing it mildly, and diminishing its power, in consequence of [the rational part] not being co-passive with it. And besides this also, in takiug away anger to the utmost of our ability, and if possible, entirely ; but if not, the rational part must not at the same time be angry, but the anger must be the passion of another part, and unaccompanied with deliberation. And this sudden impulse must be small and imbecile. Fear, however, must be entirely removed; for the purified soul will fear nothing. Here, also, the energy must be unattended with deliberation, except it be requisite to admonish. With respect to desire, it is evident that there must not be a desire of any thing base. And as to the desire of meats and drinks for the sake of a remission of pain, the soul herself will be without it. This likewise will be the case with the venereal appetite. But if the soul is desirous of connection, it will be I think in the natural way, and this not unattended with deliberation. If, however, it should be an unadvised impulse, it will only be so far as it is accompanied with a precipitate imagination [4]. But, in short, the [rational] soul herself will be purified from all these. She will also wish to render the irrational part pure, so that it may not be agitated. And if it is, that the agitation may not be vehement, but small, and immediately dissolved by proximity to the rational part. Just as if some one being near to a wise man, should partake of his wisdom by this proximity, or should become similar to him, or through reverence should not dare to do any thing which the good man is unwilling to do. Hence, there will be no contest. For reason being present will be sufficient, which the inferior part will reverence, so as even to be itself indignant, if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present; and it will on this account blame its own imbecility.


Ver online : ENÉADAS I-II (Gredos)


[1Ce qui motive cette question de Plotin, c’est qu’il distingue en Dieu trois hypostases : le Bien, l’Intelligence, l’Âme universelle. Dans ce livre il examine principalement la ressemblance que l’âme humaine peut avoir avec l’Intelligence divine.

[2Tout ce passage se trouve reproduit presque littéralement et éclairci par Porphyre dans ses Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά, § 34.

[3Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, says, that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and satisfy the indigence of nature, but perfect no energy of the rational part of the soul.

[4In the original protypous; but it should doubtless be as in the above translation, propetous. For this is the word used by Marinus, in his Life of Proclus, when speaking of the cathartic virtues of that philosopher, and alluding to this passage in Plotinus.