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Plotino - Tratado 38,17 (VI, 7, 17) — O Intelecto e as formas provêm do Bem

domingo 27 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  

Míguez

17. Pero, ¿cómo explicaríamos estos seres e incluso la Inteligencia, si no se dan en el Bien que los llena ni en esa Inteligencia que aparece como plena? Desde luego, cuando no estaba llena, la Inteligencia no los poseía. Porque no es necesario al ser que da, poseer lo que da, sino que lo que,conviene en estos casos es que el ser que hace donación sea superior a lo que da. Tal es el proceso de la generación en los seres: primero se necesita un ser en acto, luego, el ser que siga, será ya en potencia lo que aquel es en acto. El ser primero está muy por encima de los seres que le suceden e, igualmente, de todo lo que el da; es algo superior a todo eso. Si hay, pues, algo anterior al acto, estará también más allá del acto y, por consiguiente, más allá de la vida. Si la vida la situamos en la inteligencia, no cabrá duda alguna que quien dio la vida poseerá más belleza y más honores que la vida misma. La Inteligencia posee la vida y ello sin que necesite variedad el principio que se la otorga. Porque la vida es como una huella de este principio, pero no vida de él. Es ilimitada desde el momento que dirige sus miradas hacia ese principio; mas se limita una vez que lo ha visto, sin que por esto adquiera el principio límite alguno. Por esta contemplación del Uno la Inteligencia adquiere un límite inmediato y, con la limitación, su propia determinación y su forma. La forma es algo que ella recibe, en tanto el principio productor permanece amorfo. Y el límite, a su vez, no viene de fuera, como puede ocurrir a lo que da contorno a una magnitud, sino que constituye lo que delimita la vida universal, que es múltiple e infinita, como salido lleno de luz de la naturaleza del Bien. No se trata aquí y ahora de la vida de un ser particular, que sería desde luego limitada como tal vida individual. El límite de la vida se explica como limitación de una vida múltiple. Cada elemento de la multiplicidad tiene su límite, ya que, precisamente por la multiplicidad de la vida, recibe ese límite y por él es en verdad algo único.

¿Qué decir entonces de esta unidad que resulta del límite? ¿La situaremos en la Inteligencia? Porque la inteligencia no es otra cosa que una vida limitada. Mas, ¿cómo entenderemos su multiplicidad? Diremos que se trata de una multiplicidad de inteligencias. Todo resulta ser inteligencia, y hay, naturalmente, una inteligencia universal y luego las inteligencias particulares. Pero cabría preguntarse: ¿acaso la inteligencia universal, que contiene a las inteligencias particulares, abarca sólo inteligencias identificadas en una? De contestar afirmativamente, admitiríamos una sola inteligencia. Pero sí se da una multiplicidad de inteligencias, debemos contar con alguna diferencia entre ellas. ¿Cómo, sin embargo, explicaríamos cualquier diferencia? Digamos que por ser una unidad total, la inteligencia universal difiere de las otras inteligencias. Esta totalidad no manifiesta identidad con ninguna de las inteligencias particulares.

Concluimos, por tanto, con esta procesión: primero tenemos la vida en su calidad de potencia universal; luego una visión proveniente del Uno y que contiene a todos los seres en su potencia; por último, la Inteligencia que, al nacer, hace que aparezcan todos los seres. La Inteligencia asienta en los seres, no para encontrar en ellos un lugar donde instalarse, sino para justificar la forma de los seres primeros por la visión que ella tiene de lo que carece de forma.

La Inteligencia se vuelve hacia el alma y le da su luz en la misma forma que el Uno extiende su luz hacia ella.

Y cuando sirve de límite al alma no hace otra cosa que proveerla de razón y dejar en ella una huella de lo que posee. Pero la Inteligencia ya es una huella del Uno, de ese Uno que es amorfo, pues es evidente que la Inteligencia es una forma que se pierde en una multiplicidad. Sólo así puede el Uno producir la forma. Porque si El fuese ya una forma, la Inteligencia sería tan sólo su verbo. Conviene, pues, que lo Primero carezca en absoluto de multiplicidad; ya que, si fuese múltiple, tendría que depender de algo distinto y anterior.

Bouillet

XVII. Comment les essences peuvent-elles se trouver dans l’Intelligence et la constituer, si elles n’étaient ni dans ce qui a donné, ni dans ce qui a reçu cette plénitude, puisque, avant de recevoir du Bien sa plénitude, l’Intelligence ne possédait pas les essences ? — II n’est point nécessaire qu’un principe possède lui-même ce qu’il donne : il suffit, dans les choses intelligibles, de regarder celui qui donne comme supérieur, celui qui reçoit comme inférieur: c’est en cela que consiste la génération dans l’ordre des êtres véritables (66). Ce qui occupe le premier rang doit être en acte; les choses postérieures doivent être en puissance ce qui les précède. Ce qui occupe le premier rang est supérieur à ce qui occupe le second rang; ce qui donne est également supérieur à ce qui est donné, parce qu’il est meilleur. S’il y a donc un principe antérieur à l’acte, il doit être supérieur à l’acte et à la vie; quoiqu’il ait donné la vie à l’Intelligence, il est plus beau, plus vénérable encore que la vie. Ainsi l’Intelligence a reçu la vie, sans que le principe dont elle l’a reçue ait dû renfermer lui-même quelque variété. La vie est l’empreinte de Celui qui l’a donnée, mais elle n’est pas sa vie. Au moment où l’Intelligence a tourné ses regards vers lui, elle était indéterminée ; dès qu’elle a attaché son regard sur lui, elle a été déterminée par lui, quoiqu’il n’eût pas lui-même de détermination. Aussitôt en effet qu’elle a considéré l’Un, elle a été déterminée par lui, elle a reçu de lui sa détermination, sa limite, sa forme. La forme se trouve dans ce qui reçoit ; Celui qui donne n’en a pas lui-même. Cette détermination n’a pas été imposée du dehors à l’Intelligence comme cela a lieu pour la limite imposée à une grandeur ; c’est la détermination propre à cette Vie, qui est universelle, multiple et infinie, parce qu’elle a rayonné de la nature suprême : cette Vie n’était pas encore la vie de tel ou tel principe ; sinon, elle aurait été déterminée comme vie individuelle. Cependant elle a été déterminée, et en vertu de cette détermination elle est la vie d’une unité multiple. Chacune des choses qui constituent sa multiplicité a été également déterminée. En effet, la Vie a été déterminée comme multiplicité d’essences à cause de sa propre multiplicité ; comme unité, à cause de la détermination même qu’elle a reçue. Qu’est-ce qui a été déterminé comme unité? L’Intelligence, parce qu’elle est la vie déterminée. Qu’est-ce qui a été déterminé comme multiplicité? La multiplicité des intelligences. Tout est ainsi intelligence : seulement, l’Intelligence qui est une est universelle; les intelligences qui forment multiplicité sont individuelles.

Si l’Intelligence universelle comprend toutes les intelligences individuelles, s’en suit-il que chacune de ces dernières soit identique aux autres?— Non : car alors il n’y en aurait qu’une seule. La multiplicité des intelligences implique donc une différence entre elles (67). — Mais comment chacune diffère-t-elle des autres ? — Elle en diffère en cela même qu’elle est une : car il n’y a point identité entre l’Intelligence universelle et une intelligence particulière quelconque. Ainsi, dans l’Intelligence, la vie est puissance universelle ; l’intuition qui en émane est la puissance de toutes choses ; enfin l’Intelligence elle-même, quand elle est formée, nous manifeste toutes ces choses. Au sommet des essences est Celui qui est leur principe : elles ne lui servent pas de fondement; c’est lui au contraire qui est le fondement de la Forme des formes sans avoir lui-même de forme. L’Intelligence joue à l’égard de l’Ame le rôle que le Premier joue à son propre égard : elle verse sur l’Ame sa lumière, et, pour la déterminer, elle la rend raisonnable en lui communiquant ce dont elle est elle-même le vestige. L’Intelligence est donc le vestige du Premier, et tandis qu’elle est une forme qui se développe en pluralité, le Premier n’a aucune espèce de forme (ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδος), afin de donner la forme à tout le reste. S’il était lui-même une forme, l’Intelligence ne serait plus que la Raison [l’Ame] (68). Ιl fallait donc que le Premier ne renfermât aucune multiplicité ; sinon, sa multiplicité aurait dû être elle-même rapportée à un principe supérieur.

Guthrie

ALL IS INTELLIGENCE; BUT THIS IS DIFFERENTIATED INTO UNIVERSAL AND INDIVIDUAL.

17. How can (these beings) exist within Intelligence, and constitute it, if they were neither in that which has given, nor in that which has received this fulness, since, before receiving its fulness from the Good, Intelligence had not yet received (these beings)? It is not necessary that a principle should itself possess what it gives; in intelligible things, it suffices to consider the giver superior, and the receiver inferior; that (giving and receiving) is the content of generation in the order of veritable beings. What occupies the front rank must be in actualization; posterior things must be in potentiality of what precedes them. What occupies the front rank is superior to what occupies the second rank; the giver, likewise is superior to the gift, because it is better. If then there be a Principle anterior to actualization, it must be superior both to actualization and to life; and because it gave life to Intelligence it is more beautiful, still more venerable than Life. Thus Intelligence received life, without necessity for the principle from which it received life having had to contain any variety. Life is the impress of Him who gave it, but it is not his life. When Intelligence glanced towards Him, it was indeterminate; as soon as it fixed its glance on Him, it was determined by Him, although He himself had no determination. As soon indeed as Intelligence contemplated the One, Intelligence was determined by Him, and from Him it received its determination, limit and form. The form exists in the receiver; the giver has none of it. This determination has not been imposed from without on Intelligence as is the case for the limit imposed on some magnitude; it is the determination characteristic of that Life, which is universal, multiple and infinite, because it has radiated from the supreme Nature. That Life was not yet the life of any particular principle; otherwise, it would have been determined as an individual life. Nevertheless it has been determined, and by virtue of that determination it is the life of a multiple unity. Each one of the things that constitute its multiplicity has likewise been determined. Indeed, life has been determined as multiplicity (of beings) because of its own multiplicity; as unity, because of the very determination it has received. What has been determined as unity? Intelligence, because it is the determined life. What was determined as multiplicity? The multiplicity of intelligences. Everything therefore is intelligence; only, the Intelligence that is one is universal; while the intelligences which form multiplicity are individual.

MULTIPLICITY OF INTELLIGENCES IMPLIES THEIR MUTUAL DIFFERENCES.

If universal Intelligence comprises all the individual intelligences, might not the latter all be identical? No, for then there would be but one of them. The multiplicity of the intelligences implies therefore a difference between them. But how does each differ from the others? Its difference resides in its being one; for there is no identity between the universal Intelligence, and any particular intelligence. Thus, in Intelligence, life is universal power; the vision which emanates from it is the power of all things; and then Intelligence itself, when it is formed, manifests all these things to us. He who is seated above all of them is their principle, though they do not serve Him as foundation; for, on the contrary, He is the foundation of the form of the first forms, without Himself having any forms. In respect to the Soul, Intelligence plays the part that the First plays in respect to Intelligence; Intelligence sheds its light on the Soul, and, to determine her, rationalizes her by communicating that of which itself is the trace. The Intellect, therefore, is the trace of the First; and while it is a form which develops in plurality, the First has no shape nor form, so as to give form to all the rest. If itself were a form, Intelligence would be nothing more than the “reason” (the soul). That is why the First could not have contained any multiplicity; otherwise, its multiplicity itself would have had to be traced to some superior principle.

MacKenna

17. But in what mode are these secondaries, and Intellectual-Principle itself, within the First? They are not in the Filling Principle; they are not in the filled since before that moment it did not contain them.

Giving need not comport possessing; in this order we are to think of a giver as a greater and of a gift as a lower; this is the meaning of origin among real Beings. First there must be an actualized thing; its laters must be potentially their own priors; a first must transcend its derivatives; the giver transcends the given, as a superior. If therefore there is a prior to actuality, that prior transcends Activity and so transcends Life. Our sphere containing life, there is a Giver of Life, a principle of greater good, of greater worth than Life; this possessed Life and had no need to look for it to any giver in possession of Life’s variety.

But the Life was a vestige of that Primal not a life lived by it; Life, then, as it looked towards That was undetermined; having looked it had determination though That had none. Life looks to unity and is determined by it, taking bound, limit, form. But this form is in the shaped, the shaper had none; the limit was not external as something drawn about a magnitude; the limit was that of the multiplicity of the Life There, limitless itself as radiated from its great Prior; the Life itself was not that of some determined being, or it would be no more than the life of an individual. Yet it is defined; it must then have been defined as the Life of a unity including multiplicity; certainly too each item of the multiplicity is determined, determined as multiple by the multiplicity of Life but as a unity by the fact of limit.

As what, then, is its unity determined?

As Intellectual-Principle: determined Life is Intellectual-Principle. And the multiplicity?

As the multiplicity of Intellectual-Principles: all its multiplicity resolves itself into Intellectual-Principles - on the one hand the collective Principle, on the other the particular Principles.

But does this collective Intellectual-Principle include each of the particular Principles as identical with itself?

No: it would be thus the container of only the one thing; since there are many Intellectual-Principles within the collective, there must be differentiation.

Once more, how does the particular Intellect come to this differentiation?

It takes its characteristic difference by becoming entirely a unity within the collective whose totality could not be identical with any particular.

Thus the Life in the Supreme was the collectivity of power; the vision taking place There was the potentiality of all; Intellectual-Principle, thus arising, is manifested as this universe of Being. It stands over the Beings not as itself requiring base but that it may serve as base to the Form of the Firsts, the Formless Form. And it takes position towards the soul, becoming a light to the soul as itself finds its light in the First; whenever Intellectual-Principle becomes the determinant of soul it shapes it into Reasoning Soul, by communicating a trace of what itself has come to possess.

Thus Intellectual-Principle is a vestige of the Supreme; but since the vestige is a Form going out into extension, into plurality, that Prior, as the source of Form, must be itself without shape and Form: if the Prior were a Form, the Intellectual-Principle itself could be only a Reason-Principle. It was necessary that The First be utterly without multiplicity, for otherwise it must be again referred to a prior.


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