Plotino - Tratado 23,2 (VI, 5, 2) — É necessário discutir do inteligível

2. La razón, al tratar de justificar lo que hemos dicho, aduce que ella no es una unidad, sino algo divisible, y, asimismo, que toma para su búsqueda la naturaleza corpórea y sus principios, dividiendo la sustancia inteligible a la manera como haría con un cuerpo. De este modo llega a desconfiar de la unidad de esa sustancia por no partir para la búsqueda de los principios que son apropiados para ella.

En cuanto a nosotros, para referimos a la unidad que se da en todas partes, hemos de adoptar principios que nos la hagan creíble. Por eso, y como se trata de un ser inteligible, echaremos mano de principios inteligibles relacionados con el ser verdadero. Contamos con el ser, afectado por toda clase de cambios y dividido en el espacio, al que conviene más llamar devenir y no ser; y existe, además, el ser eterno indivisible, que siempre se aparece de la misma manera, que no nace, ni perece, no exige espacio, ni lugar, ni situación. Este último ser no sale de un lugar para penetrar en otro, sino que permanece en sí mismo. Cuando hablamos de las cosas primeras, esto es, del ser móvil, razonamos a partir de su naturaleza y de las cosas que tienen relación con ella; nuestros razonamientos, que apoyan en lo verosímil, son también verosímiles. Mas, cuando nos referimos a los seres inteligibles, hemos de tomar la naturaleza del ser que nos ocupa para obtener los principios adecuados al razonamiento. No olvidaremos esta naturaleza para dirigirnos a otra, sino que, al contrario, partiremos de ella para llegar precisamente a su comprensión. Porque, en todas partes, la esencia ha de considerarse como el principio, y así se dice que con una buena definición se procura el conocimiento de la mayoría de los accidentes. En mayor grado ocurre esto todavía con los seres que tienen todo lo que les pertenece en su esencia; a ella es a la que conviene atenerse, dirigiendo hacia aquí nuestra atención y refiriéndole a la vez todas las cosas.

II. Comme la raison humaine qui entreprend d’examiner 343 la question soulevée ici n’est pas une, mais divisée, et qu’elle consulte dans ses recherches la nature des corps, en lui empruntant des principes, elle divise aussi l’Essence intelligible, parce qu’elle la croit semblable aux corps, et elle arrive ainsi à douter de son unité : il n’en saurait être autrement, puisqu’elle ne débute pas dans son investigation par les principes convenables. Nous devons donc, dans notre discussion sur l’Être un et universel, prendre des principes capables d’obtenir la foi, des principes qui soient intellectuels, c’est-à-dire qui se rattachent aux intelligibles et à l’Essence véritable. En effet, l’être sensible est agité par un mouvement continuel, soumis à des changements de toute sorte, divisé entre toutes les parties de l’espace : aussi s’appelle-t-il génération et non essence. L’Être éternel, au contraire, n’est pas divisé (7); il subsiste toujours de la même manière et dans le même état, ne naît ni ne périt, n’occupe ni place ni espace, ne réside pas en un lieu déterminé, n’entre ni ne sort, mais demeure en lui-même. Quand on discute sur la nature des corps, on peut, en partant de cette nature et des choses qui lui conviennent, en tirer des démonstrations probables à l’aide de syllogismes également probables. Mais, quand il s’agit des intelligibles, il faut prendre pour point de départ la nature de l’essence dont on traite, y puiser légitimement ses principes, puis, sans l’abandonner par mégarde pour une autre nature, emprunter à l’essence intelligible même la conception qu’on s’en forme : car partout on prend pour. principe l’essence (ou la quiddité, τό τί ἐστι), et l’on dit que la définition d’un objet, quand elle est bien faite, en fuit connaître beaucoup d’accidents (8). Donc, quand il s’agit 344 des choses où l’essence est tout, on doit à plus forte raison appliquer à cette essence toute son attention, s’y attacher constamment et tout lui rapporter.

“BEING” IS THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT IN THINGS PARTICIPATING IN BEING.

2. As the human reason which undertakes to examine the question here raised is not one, but divided, it makes use of corporeal nature in its researches, by borrowing its principles. That is why reason, thinking it intelligible being, similar to bodies, divides it, doubting its unity. It could not be otherwise, because its investigation was not founded on the proper immanent principles. We must, therefore, in our discussion about the one universal Essence, choose principles capable of enlisting support, principles that would be intellectual, that is, would connect with intelligible entities, and veritable being. For since our sense-nature is agitated by continual flux, being subject to all kinds of changes, trending towards all directions of space; it should consequently be called not “being,” but generation, or becoming. The eternal Essence, on the contrary, is not divided; it subsists ever in the same manner and in the same state, neither is born, nor perishes; occupies neither place nor space; does not reside in any determinate location; neither enters, nor issues, but remains in itself. A discussion about the nature of bodies begins with this (physical) nature, and the things that are related to it, which (deductively) give rise to probable proofs by the aid of syllogisms equally probable. But when we deal with intelligible entities, our starting-point must be the nature of the being considered; principles have to be legitimately derived therefrom; and then, without surreptitiously substituting any other nature (inductively), borrow from the intelligible Being itself the conception formed about it; for being, or whatness, is everywhere taken as principle; and it is said that the definition of an object, when well made, sets forth many of its accidents. Therefore, when we are dealing with things where being is everything, we must, so much the more, apply our whole attention to this being; base all our (arguments) thereon, and refer everything to it.

2. Now the reasoning faculty which undertakes this problem is not a unity but a thing of parts; it brings the bodily nature into the enquiry, borrowing its principles from the corporeal: thus it thinks of the Essential Existence as corporeal and as a thing of parts; it baulks at the unity because it does not start from the appropriate principles. We, however, must be careful to bring the appropriately convincing principles to the discussion of the Unity, of perfect Being: we must hold to the Intellectual principles which alone apply to the Intellectual Order and to Real Being.

On the one hand there is the unstable, exposed to all sorts of change, distributed in place, not so much Being as Becoming: on the other, there is that which exists eternally, not divided, subject to no change of state, neither coming into being nor falling from it, set in no region or place or support, emerging from nowhere, entering into nothing, fast within itself.

In dealing with that lower order we would reason from its own nature and the characteristics it exhibits; thus, on a plausible foundation, we achieve plausible results by a plausible system of deduction: similarly, in dealing with the Intellectual, the only way is to grasp the nature of the essence concerned and so lay the sure foundations of the argument, not forgetfully straying over into that other order but basing our treatment on what is essential to the Nature with which we deal.

In every entity the essential nature is the governing principle and, as we are told, a sound definition brings to light many even of the concomitants: where the essential nature is the entire being, we must be all the more careful to keep to that, to look to that, to refer all to that.