Plotino - Tratado 45,6 (III, 7, 6) — Comentário das fórmulas platônicas, que caracterizam a eternidade como...

6. Como esta naturaleza, tan hermosa y eterna, vive inmediata al Uno, y viene de El y marcha hacia El, no apartándose nunca de El, sino, por el contrario, permaneciendo siempre junto a El y viviendo su vida, podría confirmarse, según creo, lo que ya dijo Platón con palabras hermosas y gran profundidad de pensamiento: esto es, que "la eternidad permanece en el Uno" [1]. Con esta referencia al Uno no sólo llevamos la eternidad a sí misma, sino que mantenemos la vida del ser en el Uno. Y esto es lo que buscamos: que lo que permanece inmediato al Uno, posee la eternidad. Porque, realmente, lo que permanece inmediato al Uno es el acto de una vida que también permanece y se dirige por sí misma al Uno, que existe en sí y no se ve frustrado en su ser y vida verdaderos, con lo cual podrá decirse que posee la eternidad. Este acto posee verdaderamente el ser y no puede dejar de ser o ser de otra manera; es, pues, siempre así y no puede llegar a ser diferente. No contiene ahora una cosa y luego otra, ni hay en él intervalo, evolución, progreso o extensión, no pudiendo, por tanto, aprehenderse su antes y su después. Pero si no hay en él un antes y un después, y si lo más verdadero que puede decirse de él es que es, y es precisamente asi, por ser sustancia dotada de vida, de nuevo volvemos a lo que decimos, esto es, a ver ahí la eternidad. Cuando afirmamos que es siempre, y que no hay un momento en que sea y otro en que no sea, conviene entender que hablamos así en bien de l’a evidencia. Sin embargo, no empleamos aquí la palabra siempre en su sentido absoluto, sino que designamos con ella la incorruptibilidad del ser, aunque pueda extraviar nuestro ánimo llevándole a descender hacia algo mayor que podría todavía faltar en alguna ocasión. Quizá resulte mejor, por tanto, llamarle sólo lo que es. Pero, si bien con lo que es se designa suficientemente la esencia, dado que se ha creído también que las cosas sujetas a la generación son sustancias, se ha juzgado conveniente, para comprender esta expresión, añadirle la palabra siempre. Porque lo que es no es una cosa, y lo que es siempre, otra; lo mismo que el filósofo no es una cosa y el verdadero filósofo otra. Si acaso, porque podría usurparse el hábito de la filosofía, se prefiere añadirle el calificativo de verdadero. Del mismo modo, a lo que es se añade la palabra siempre, y a siempre la expresión lo que es, de manera que se dice lo que siempre es; lo cual debe tomarse en el sentido de lo que es verdad érame nte, aunque restringiendo el uso de siempre al sentido de potencia indivisible, que de nada necesita para existir y se basta con lo que ya tiene, porque lo tiene todo.

Esa potencia es lo que es, y lo es todo. De nada carece, ni está completa en un sentido e incompleta en otro. Un ser incluido en el tiempo, por muy perfecto que sea, como por ejemplo, un cuerpo determinado por un alma, necesita, a pesar de todo, de un después, ya que, falto del tiempo, tiene necesidad de él. Si ha de estar ligado al tiempo y unido a él, es, realmente, un ser incompleto, al que sólo por homonimia podemos llamar perfecto. En cambio, un ser que no necesita de un después, ni de un después medido por el tiempo o extendido indefinidamente a lo ilimitado, ese ser, decimos, que cuenta con todo lo que debe tener, es el ser al que nosotros aspiramos. Su existencia no depende de una determinada magnitud, sino que es anterior a toda magnitud. Y si no tiene magnitud alguna, es claro que tampoco deberá unirse a ella, para que su vida no se vea dividida y no pierda su pura indivisibilidad, que habrá de conservarse como su esencia. En cuanto a la afirmación de que (el demiurgo) "era bueno" 1 dice relación al universo sensible, indicando que, en razón a lo que está más allá de él, el universo no depende de un determinado tiempo. De manera que el mundo no puede tener un comienzo en el tiempo, ya que, por ser causa, el ser se ofrece con anterioridad. Sin embargo, (Platón) habla así para una mayor claridad, aunque luego se censure a sí mismo por el empleo de una expresión que no juzga totalmente correcta respecto a los seres que se dicen y se piensan como eternos [2].

VI. Quand nous parlons ainsi de l’éternité, est-elle pour nous une chose étrangère et au sujet de laquelle nous soyons obligés de consulter le témoignage d’autrui ? Comment cela serait-il possible? Comment en effet connaîtrions-nous ce que nous ne saurions percevoir ? Comment pourrions-nous percevoir une chose qui nous serait étrangère ? Il faut donc que nous participions nous-mêmes à l’éternité (32). Mais comment le pouvons-nous, puisque nous sommes dans le temps ? Pour comprendre comment on peut être à la fois dans l’éternité et dans le temps, il faut déterminer la nature de ce dernier. Il faut donc que nous descendions de l’éternité pour étudier le temps. Pour trouver l’éternité, nous avons été obligés de nous élever au monde intelligible ; maintenant, nous sommes obligés d’en descendre pour traiter du temps, non d’en descendre complètement, mais autant que le temps en est descendu lui-même.

Si les anciens sages, ces hommes bienheureux, n’avaient point déjà parlé du temps, nous n’aurions qu’à rattacher à l’idée de l’éternité ce que nous avons à dire de l’idée de temps, et à exposer notre opinion sur ce point, en tâchant de la mettre d’accord avec la notion que nous nous sommes déjà formée de l’éternité. Mais il est maintenant nécessaire d’examiner les opinions les plus raisonnables qui ont été professées au sujet du temps, et de voir si notre propre opinion est conforme à quelqu’une d’entre elles.

Avant tout, nous diviserons en trois classes les opinions professées au sujet du temps : on considère le temps ou comme le mouvement, ou comme le mobile, ou comme quelque chose du mouvement. Soutenir que le Temps est le repos, l’être en repos, ou quelque chose du repos, serait trop contraire à la notion du temps : car il est incompatible avec l’identité [par conséquent avec le repos et ce qui est en repos].

Ceux qui considèrent le temps comme le mouvement admettent qu’il est, soit toute espèce de mouvement, soit le mouvement de l’univers ; ceux qui le regardent comme le mobile ont en vue la sphère de l’univers ; enfin ceux qui croient que le temps est quelque chose du mouvement le considèrent, soit comme l’intervalle du mouvement, soit comme sa mesure, soit comme quelque conséquence du mouvement en général ou du mouvement régulier.

TO STUDY TIME WE HAVE TO DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.

6. (7). Speaking thus of eternity, it is not anything foreign to us, and we do not need to consult the testimony of anybody but ourselves. For indeed, how could we understand anything that we could not perceive? How could we perceive something that would be foreign to us? We ourselves, therefore, must participate in eternity. But how can we do so, since we are in time? To understand how one can simultaneously be in time and in eternity, it will be necessary to study time. We must therefore descend from eternity to study time. To find eternity, we have been obliged to rise to the intelligible world; now we are obliged to descend therefrom to treat of time; not indeed descending therefrom entirely, but only so far as time itself descended therefrom.

B. TIME.

THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT TIME MUST BE STUDIED.

If those blessed ancient philosophers had not already uttered their views about time, we would only need to add to the idea of eternity what we have to say of the idea of time, and to set forth our opinion on the subject, trying to make it correspond with the already expressed notion of eternity. But we now must examine the most reasonable opinions that have been advanced about time, and observe how far our own opinion may conform thereto.

TIME CONSIDERED EITHER AS MOTION; AS SOMETHING MOVABLE; OR SOMETHING OF MOTION.

To begin with, we may divide the generally accepted opinions about time into three classes: time as movement, as something movable, or as some part of movement. It would be too contrary to the notion of time to try to define it as rest, as being at rest, or as some part of rest; for time is incompatible with identity (and consequently with rest, and with what is at rest). Those who consider time as movement, claim that it is either any kind of movement, or the movement of the universe. Those who consider it as something movable are thinking of the sphere of the universe; while those who consider time as some part of movement consider it either as the interval of movement, or as its measure, or as some consequence of movement in general, or regular movement.

VI. Do we, therefore, bear witness to the things of which we now speak, as to things foreign from our nature ? But how is this possible ? For how can intellectual perception be effected, except by contact ? And how can we come into contact with things that are foreign to us ? It is necessary, therefore, that we also should participate of eternity. Since, however, we exist in time, how is this possible ? But we shall know what it is to be in time, and what it is to be in eternity, when we have discovered what time is. We must, therefore, descend from eternity to time, and the investigation of time. For there, indeed, the progression was to that which is above, but we must now speak descending, yet not profoundly, but our descent most be such as that of time. If, indeed, nothing had been said concerning time by ancient and blessed men, it would be necessary that connecting from the beginning what follows with eternity, we should endeavour to speak what appears to us to be the truth on this subject, and to adapt our opinion to the conception of it which we possess. Now, however, it is necessary first to assume those assertions which especially deserve attention, and to consider if what we say is concordant with some one of them. But perhaps the assertions concerning time, ought in the first place to receive a threefold division. For time may be said to be either motion, or that which is moved, or something pertaining to motion. For to say that it is either permanency, or that which is stable, or something pertaining to permanency, will be perfectly remote from the conception of time, since it is in no respect the same [and therefore, can never accord with that which is stable]. Of those, however, who say that time is motion, some indeed assert that it is every motion; hut others, that it is the motion of the universe. But those who say it is that which is moved, assert it to he the sphere of the universe. And of those who say it is something pertaining to motion, or the interval of motion; some assert that it is the measure of motion, hut others that it is an attendant on it, and either on every motion, or on that which is arranged. (breve 14911)

6. Now the Principle this stated, all good and beauty, and everlasting, is centred in The One, sprung from It, and pointed towards It, never straying from It, but ever holding about It and in It and living by Its law; and it is in this reference, as I judge, that Plato - finely, and by no means inadvertently but with profound intention - wrote those words of his, "Eternity stable in Unity"; he wishes to convey that Eternity is not merely something circling on its traces into a final unity but has [instantaneous] Being about The One as the unchanging Life of the Authentic Existent. This is certainly what we have been seeking: this Principle, at rest within rest with the One, is Eternity; possessing this stable quality, being itself at once the absolute self-identical and none the less the active manifestation of an unchanging Life set towards the Divine and dwelling within It, untrue, therefore, neither on the side of Being nor on the side of Life - this will be Eternity [the Real-Being we have sought].

Truly to be comports never lacking existence and never knowing variety in the mode of existence: Being is, therefore, self-identical throughout, and, therefore, again is one undistinguishable thing. Being can have no this and that; it cannot be treated in terms of intervals, unfoldings, progression, extension; there is no grasping any first or last in it.

If, then, there is no first or last in this Principle, if existence is its most authentic possession and its very self, and this in the sense that its existence is Essence or Life - then, once again, we meet here what we have been discussing, Eternity.

Observe that such words as "always," "never," "sometimes" must be taken as mere conveniences of exposition: thus "always - used in the sense not of time but of incorruptibility and endlessly complete scope - might set up the false notion of stage and interval. We might perhaps prefer to speak of "Being," without any attribute; but since this term is applicable to Essence and some writers have used the word "Essence" for things of process, we cannot convey our meaning to them without introducing some word carrying the notion of perdurance.

There is, of course, no difference between Being and Everlasting Being; just as there is none between a philosopher and a true philosopher: the attribute "true" came into use because there arose what masqueraded as philosophy; and for similar reasons "everlasting" was adjoined to "Being," and "Being" to "everlasting," and we have [the tautology of] "Everlasting Being." We must take this "Everlasting" as expressing no more than Authentic Being: it is merely a partial expression of a potency which ignores all interval or term and can look forward to nothing by way of addition to the All which it possesses. The Principle of which this is the statement will be the All-Existent, and, as being all, can have no failing or deficiency, cannot be at some one point complete and at some other lacking.

Things and Beings in the Time order - even when to all appearance complete, as a body is when fit to harbour a soul - are still bound to sequence; they are deficient to the extent of that thing, Time, which they need: let them have it, present to them and running side by side with them, and they are by that very fact incomplete; completeness is attributed to them only by an accident of language.

But the conception of Eternity demands something which is in its nature complete without sequence; it is not satisfied by something measured out to any remoter time or even by something limitless, but, in its limitless reach, still having the progression of futurity: it requires something immediately possessed of the due fullness of Being, something whose Being does not depend upon any quantity [such as instalments of time] but subsists before all quantity.

Itself having no quantity, it can have no contact with anything quantitative since its Life cannot be made a thing of fragments, in contradiction to the partlessness which is its character; it must be without parts in the Life as in the essence.

The phrase "He was good" [used by Plato of the Demiurge] refers to the Idea of the All; and its very indefiniteness signifies the utter absense of relation to Time: so that even this Universe has had no temporal beginning; and if we speak of something "before" it, that is only in the sense of the Cause from which it takes its Eternal Existence. Plato used the word merely for the convenience of exposition, and immediately corrects it as inappropriate to the order vested with the Eternity he conceives and affirms.