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Plotino - Tratado 47,12 (III, 2, 12) — A razão tem partes diferentes e o que produz é belo

sábado 28 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

  

Míguez

12- Si, pues, la razón misma se ha adaptado a la materia al producir estos seres —pensemos que la materia se compone de partes no semejantes, de acuerdo con el ser que le precede—, su obra, siendo como ella es, no podría resultar más bella. Porque la razón no se compone de partes, todas ellas semejantes e iguales, lo cual no ha de reprochársele, sino que es ella misma todos y cada uno de los seres, en este caso tomados aparte y por separado. Si hubiese traído al mundo otros seres que no proviniesen de ella, como por ejemplo almas, y hubiese forzado además a muchas de éstas a adaptarse a la creación, en contra de su naturaleza, ¿cómo podría haber actuado bien? Pero digamos que las almas son como partes de la razón, que no las violenta para que se adapten a la creación, sino que las dispone de manera digna y en el lugar que conviene a cada una.

Bouillet

XII. Puisque c’est la Raison [du monde]. qui a produit toutes choses en s’alliant à la mati  ère (92) et, en conservant sa nature propre, qui est d’être composée de parties différentes, et d’être déterminée par le principe dont elle procède [c’est-à-dire par l’Intelligence], l’oeuvre que la Raison a produite dans ces conditions ne saurait être surpassée en beauté. En effet, la liaison [du monde] ne pouvait être composée de parties homogènes et semblables ; il ne faut donc pas l’accuser parce qu’elle est toutes choses et que chacune de ses parties diffère des autres (93). Si elle avait introduit dans le monde des choses qu’elle ne renfermât pas auparavant dans son sein, des âmes par exemple, qu’elle les eût forcées d’entrer dans l’ordre du monde sans tenir compte de leur nature et qu’elle eût fait déchoir beaucoup d’entre elles, elle serait certainement blâmable. Aussi faut-il admettre que les âmes sont des parties de la Raison et que celle-ci les met en harmonie avec le monde sans les faire déchoir, en assignant à chacune d’elles la place qui lui convient (94).

Guthrie

IT IS REASONABLE FOR THE REASON TO ASSIGN SOULS TO DIFFERENT RANKS IN THE UNIVERSE.

12. Since it is the Reason (of the world) which produced all things by an alliance with matter, and by preserving its peculiar nature, which is to be composed of different parts, and to be determined by the principle from which it proceeds (that is, by Intelligence), the work produced by Reason under these conditions could not be improved in beauty. Indeed, the Reason (of the world) could not be composed of homogeneous and similar parts; it must, therefore, not be accused, because it is all things, and because all its parts differ from others. If it had introduced into the world things which it had not previously contained, as for instance, souls, and had forced them to enter into the order of the world without considering their nature, and if it had made many become degraded, Reason would certainly be to blame. Therefore, we must acknowledge that the souls are parts of Reason, and that Reason harmonizes them with the world without causing their degradation, assigning to each that station which is suitable to her.

MacKenna

12. Suppose this Universe were the direct creation of the Reason-Principle applying itself, quite unchanged, to Matter, retaining, that is, the hostility to partition which it derives from its Prior, the Intellectual Principle - then, this its product, so produced, would be of supreme and unparalleled excellence. But the Reason-Principle could not be a thing of entire identity or even of closely compact diversity; and the mode in which it is here manifested is no matter of censure since its function is to be all things, each single thing in some distinctive way.

But has it not, besides itself entering Matter, brought other beings down? Has it not for example brought Souls into Matter and, in adapting them to its creation, twisted them against their own nature and been the ruin of many of them? And can this be right?

The answer is that the Souls are, in a fair sense, members of this Reason-Principle and that it has not adapted them to the creation by perverting them, but has set them in the place here to which their quality entitles them.


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