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Plotino - Tratado 39,9 (VI, 8, 9) — Sequência da refutação do advir acidental do Bem

Enéada VI, 8, 9

domingo 19 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

      

Capítulo 9: Sequência da refutação do advir acidental do Bem

  • 1-10: O princípio de todas as coisas não poderia advir por acaso sem ser uma realidade   deficiente
  • 10-17: O Bem é único; ele é superior à necessidade   em sendo o que devia ser
  • 17-23: Imagem da aparição do rei
  • 23-35: Raciocínio   a fortiori: o advento   acidental do ser inteligível é impossível; por conseguinte o Bem, princípio do ser, pode ainda menos advir acidentalmente
  • 36-49: Dizer do Bem que ele é "assim" implica a determiná-lo.
      

Míguez

9. Si se dijese que es El mismo su propio accidente, no convendría entonces atenerse a la palabra misma, sino desentrañar lo que se quiere decir. Porque, ¿qué es lo que se piensa al afirmar   eso  ? Ciertamente, que es un principio por disponer de su naturaleza y de su potencia, y que si tuviese otra naturaleza distinta de la que tiene sería, con todo, lo que es, lo mismo que si ocupase un rango inferior   actuaría también según su propio ser. A esto deberíamos responder que no es posible que una cosa que surge por azar   sea principio de todas las cosas, y no desde luego porque sea inferior, sino porque en ese caso aparece como buena en otro sentido y no en sí, cual ocurriría con una cosa notoriamente deficiente. Conviene ciertamente que el principio de todas las cosas supere en efecto a todo lo que viene después que él; de modo que, como es lógico, será algo definido. Esta delimitación la explico por su soledad y la carencia de necesidad; porque indudablemente la necesidad se da tan sólo en los seres que siguen al principio, sin que esto suponga violencia de éste hacia aquéllos. El ser solitario saca todo de sí mismo; no podrá ser, pues, otra cosa, sino lo que ya es. Pero lo que es, no lo será por accidente, sino porque así debe serlo. Con este es preciso tenemos el principio de todos los demás. No pensemos, por tanto, que este ser será así como por accidente, sino precisamente porque así debe serlo, sin que entre aquí para nada el azar. Es de este modo lo que realmente tenía que ser.

Y aún no estará bien decir "lo que tenía que ser"; porque conviene que los demás seres esperen a conocer cómo se les aparecerá su rey. Es él quien determina lo que es, al manifestarse, no como un rey que aparece al azar, sino como un verdadero rey, como un verdadero principio y como el verdadero Bien. He aquí lo que es, y no un ser que actúa según el Bien, pues en este caso parecería depender de otro ser. Es, por tanto, un ser uno  , no conforme al Bien, sino el Bien mismo.

No deberá decirse del ser inteligible que llegó por accidente al ser. Porque es claro que se llega al ser, pero ello no quiere decir que el ser mismo sea un accidente. El ser que es lo que es no debe su ser al encuentro con alguna otra cosa, ya que lo que es no viene a él de otro ser, sino que está implícito en su misma naturaleza. ¿Cómo podríamos entonces imaginar que quien está más allá del ser haya   llegado al ser por accidente? ¡Si es a él a quien corresponde engendrar el ser! Es claro que esto no aconteció así y que el ser es por esencia lo que es y, además, una inteligencia. Porque en otro caso también podría decirse que la inteligencia es inteligencia por accidente, cual si lo que debe ser en un futuro   la inteligencia no sea ya de antemano la naturaleza misma de la inteligencia.

Lo que no se adelanta a sí mismo y, justamente, no se inclina fuera de sí, es de hecho lo que es en el verdadero sentido de la palabra. ¿Qué es si no lo que podríamos decir al elevarnos hasta este ser y contemplarle con el respeto debido? ¿Diremos acaso, al verle que es de manera determinada, que .es precisamente lo que es por alguna suerte de accidente? Es claro que ni ésta ni ninguna otra manera de ser le han acontecido por accidente. Es así, cabe decir de él, así, desde luego, y de ninguna otra manera.

Y no digamos siquiera que es así, porque esto equivaldría a delimitarle y precisarle. Para aquél que le ve no hay posibilidad de decir que sea o no sea así; pues con ello afirmaría que es uno de los seres a los que se aplica el término así. Lo que ocurre realmente es que se trata de algo diferente a todos esos seres así calificados. De ahí que, una vez contemplada su indeterminación, pueda hablarse ya de todos los seres que le siguen, pero advirtiendo que aquél no es ninguno de estos seres. Es algo, pues, verdaderamente omnipotente y señor de sí mismo; es lo que quiere ser, o mejor todavía, relega la voluntad al campo   de los demás seres, haciéndose de este modo mayor aún que la voluntad, a la que coloca sencillamente después que él. No le atribuyamos, por tanto, que ha querido ser como es, como si ésa fuese su intención; tampoco digamos que algún ser le ha hecho así, tal como es.

Bouillet

IX. Si quelqu’un cependant appliquait à Dieu   le terme de contingence, il ne faudrait pas s’arrêter au mot, mais s’attacher à bien comprendre quel sens y attache celui qui remploie. Que conçoit-il donc? Veut-il dire que le Premier est un principe qui a une telle nature et une telle puissance; que s’il avait eu une autre nature, il aurait encore été un principe conforme à la nature qu’il aurait eue; enfin que, s’il avait été moins parfait, il aurait agi conformément a son essence ? — A une pareille assertion nous répondrons qu’il était impossible que le Principe de toutes choses fût contingent, et non seulement qu’il fût moins parfait par accident, mais encore qu’il fût bon par accident, ou bon d’une autre manière, comme une chose moins complète. Le Principe de toutes choses doit être meilleur qu’elles, par conséquent, être déterminé: je dis déterminé, en ce sens qu’il est d’une manière unique (μοναχῶς), mais ce n’est pas par l’effet de la nécessité; car la nécessité n’existait pas avant lui. Elle ne se trouve que dans les êtres qui suivent le Premier principe, et encore celui-ci ne leur impose-t-il nulle contrainte. C’est par lui-même que le Premier est d’une manière unique. Il ne saurait être autre qu’il est : il est ce qu’il fallait qu’il fût ; il ne l’est point par accident; il l’est parce qu’il devait l’être ; or Celui qui est ce qu’il devait être est le principe des choses qui devaient exister. Il n’est donc pas ce qu’il est par accident, ni d’une manière contingente ; il est ce qu’il fallait qu’il fût; encore même le terme il fallait est-il impropre. Mais les autres êtres doivent attendre [pour s’en former une conception], que leur Roi leur apparaisse, et n’affirmer de lui que ce qu’il est, savoir : qu’il n’apparaît pas comme une chose fortuite, mais comme le vrai Roi, le vrai Principe, le vrai Bien. Il ne faut même pas dire de lui qu’il agit conformément au bien (car alors il semblerait subordonné à un autre principe), mais qu’il est uniquement ce qu’il est II n’est donc pas conforme au bien, il est le Bien même.

D’ailleurs, il n’y a rien de continrent, même [dans ce qui est au-dessous du Premier] dans l’Être en soi : car s’il y avait en lui quelque chose de contingent, il serait lui-même contingent; or l’Être ne saurait être contingent; ce n’est point fortuitement qu’il est ce qu’il est; il ne tient pas non plus d’autrui d’être ce qu’il est, parce que la nature de l’Être est d’être l’Être. S’il en est ainsi, comment Celui qui est au-dessus de l’Être serait-il conçu comme étant d’une manière fortuite ce qu’il est? Car il a engendré l’Être, et l’Être n’est point d’une manière fortuite ce qu’il est, puisqu’il existe de la même manière que l’Essence, laquelle est ce qu’est l’Essence et ce qu’est l’Intelligence (sans cela on pourrait dire aussi que l’Intelligence est contingente, comme si elle aurait pu être autre chose que ce qu’est sa nature), Ainsi, ce qui ne sort pas de soi, ce qui n’incline pas vers quoi que ce soit, est par excellence ce qu’il est.

Que dira donc celui qui s’élèvera au-dessus de l’Être et de l’Intelligence et qui contemplera leur principe ? Pensera-t-il, en le voyant, que ce qu’il le voit être est contingent? Non certes. Ce qu’est le Premier n’est point contingent il n’est contingent absolument d’aucune manière. Il est seulement ainsi [qu’il est] ; il n’est pas autrement, mais il est ainsi (οὕτως). Encore le terme même ainsi est-il impropre : car, en l’appliquant au Premier, on le déterminerait et l’on ferait de lui telle chose (τόδε τι). Quand vous avez eu l’intuition   du Premier, ne dites pas qu’il est ou qu’il n’est pas cela; sinon, vous le ferez descendre au nombre des choses dont on dit qu’elles sont ceci ou cela ; or le Premier est au-dessus de toutes ces choses. Quand vous aurez vu Celui qui est infini (ἀόριστον), vous pourrez nommer les choses qui sont après lui; mais ne le mettez pas au nombre de ces choses. Regardez-le comme la Puissance universelle véritablement maîtresse d’elle-même (δύναμις πάσα αὐτῆς ὄν  τως κυρία), qui est ce qu’elle veut, ou plutôt, qui a projeté sur les êtres ce qu’elle veut (ὁ θέλει ἀπορρίψασα εἰς τὰ ὄντα), mais qui est plus grande que toute volonté et qui place le vouloir au-dessous d’elle ; elle n’a donc pas même voulu [a proprement parler] être ce qu’elle est [elle ne s’est pas dit : Je serai cela], et aucun autre principe ne l’a fait être ce qu’elle est.

Guthrie

“CONTINGENCE” MIGHT BE APPLIED TO THE SUPREME, IF THE WORD BE RE-DEFINED.

9. If however anybody applied the term “contingency” to the Divinity, we should not dispute about the word, but go back of it to its underlying meaning. Do you, by it, mean that the First is a principle of particular nature and power; and that if He had had a different nature, He would still, as principle, have conformed to the nature He would have had? Also, that if He had been less perfect, He would still have actualized in conformity with His being? We should answer such an assertion thus: it was impossible for the higher Principle of all things to be contingent; or to be less perfect accidentally, or good in some other manner, as some higher thing that was less complete. As the principle of all things must be better than they, He must be determinate; and by this is here meant that He exists in an unique manner. This, however, not by necessity; for necessity did not exist before Him. Necessity exists only in the beings that follow the first Principle, though the latter impose no constraint upon them. It is by Himself that the First exists uniquely. He could not be anything but what He is; He is what He ought to have been; and not by accident. He is that; He had to be what He was. So “He who is what He ought to have been” is the principle of the things that ought to exist. Not by accident, nor contingently, therefore, is He what He is; He is what He had to be; though here the term “had to be” is improper. (If we be permitted to explain what we mean by an illustration, we may say that) the other beings have to await the appearance of their king — which means, that He shall posit Himself as what He really is, the true King, the true Principle, the true Good. Of Him it must not even be said that He actualizes in conformity with the Good, for then He would seem subordinate to some other principle; we must say only that He is what He is. He is not conformed to the Good, because He is the Good itself.

NOT EVEN ESSENCE IS CONTINGENT, LET ALONE SUPER-ESSENCE.

Besides, there is nothing contingent, even in (that which is beneath the First), namely, Essence-in-itself; for if any contingency inhered in it, it itself would be contingent. But Essence cannot be contingent, for not fortuitously is it what it is; nor does it derive what it is from anything else, because the very nature of Essence is to be Essence. This being the case, how could “He who is above Essence” be considered as being what He is fortuitously? For He begat Essence, and Essence is not what it is fortuitously, since it exists in the same manner as “Being,” which is what is “Being” and Intelligence — otherwise, one might even say that Intelligence was contingent, as if it could have been anything but what is its nature. Thus He who does not issue from Himself, and does not incline towards anything whatever, is what He is in the most special sense  .

THE SUPREME IS THE POWER REALLY MASTER OF HIMSELF.

What now could be said (to look down) from some (peak) overhanging (Essence and Intelligence), upon (their principle)? Could you describe what you saw from there as being what it is fortuitously? Certainly not! Neither His nature nor His manner would be contingent. He is merely (an absolute, unexplainable) existence (a “thus”). Even this term “thus,” however, would be improper, for, on applying it to the First, it would become determinate, and become “such a thing.” Whoever has seen the First would not say He was, or was not that; otherwise, you would be reducing Him to the class of things which may be designated as this or that; but the First is above all these things. When you shall have seen Him who is infinite (”indefinite”), you will be able to name all the things that are after Him (you will be able to name Him whom all things follow); but you must not classify Him among these. Consider Him as the universal   Power essentially master (of himself), which is what He wishes; or rather, who has imposed His will upon (all) beings, but who Himself is greater than all volition, and who classifies volition as below Himself. (To speak strictly therefore) He did not even will to be what He is (he did not even say, I shall be that); and no other principle made Him be what He is.

MacKenna

9. If we cannot but speak of Happening we must not halt at the word but look to the intention. And what is that? That the Supreme by possession of a certain nature and power is the Principle. Obviously if its nature were other it would be that other and if the difference were for the worse it would manifest itself as that lesser being. But we must add in correction that, as Principle of All, it could not be some chance product; it is not enough to say that it could not be inferior; it could not even be in some way good, for instance in some less perfect degree; the Principle of All must be of higher quality than anything that follows it. It is therefore in a sense determined - determined, I mean, by its uniqueness and not in any sense of being under compulsion; compulsion did not co-exist with the Supreme but has place only among secondaries and even there can exercise no tyranny; this uniqueness is not from outside.

This, then, it is; This and no other; simply what it must be; it has not "happened" but is what by a necessity prior to all necessities it must be. We cannot think of it as a chance existence; it is not what it chanced to be but what it must be - and yet without a "Must."

All the rest waits for the appearing of the king to hail him for himself, not a being of accident and happening but authentically king, authentically Principle, The Good authentically, not a being that acts in conformity with goodness - and so, recognisably, a secondary - but the total unity that he is, no moulding upon goodness but the very Good itself.

Even Being is exempt from happening: of course, anything happening happens to Being, but Being itself has not happened nor is the manner of its Being a thing of happening, of derivation; it is the very nature of Being to be; how then can we think that this happening can attach to the Transcendent of Being, That in whose power lay the very engendering of Being?

Certainly this Transcendent never happened to be what it is; it is so, just as Being exists in complete identity with its own essential nature and that of Intellectual-Principle. Certainly that which has never passed outside of its own orbit, unbendingly what it is, its own unchangeably, is that which may most strictly be said to possess its own being: what then are we to say when we mount and contemplate that which stands yet higher; can we conceivably say "Thus, as we see it, thus has it happened to be"? Neither thus nor in any mode did it happen to be; there is no happening; there is only a "Thus and No Otherwise than Thus." And even "Thus" is false; it would imply limit, a defined form: to know This is to be able to reject both the "Thus" and the "Not-Thus," either of which classes among Beings to which alone Manner of Being can attach.

A "Thus" is something that attaches to everything in the world of things: standing before the indefinable you may name any of these sequents but you must say This is none of them: at most it is to be conceived as the total power towards things, supremely self-concentred, being what it wills to be or rather projecting into existence what it wills, itself higher than all will, will a thing beneath it. In a word it neither willed its own "Thus" - as something to conform to - nor did any other make it "Thus."