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+====== Butler (1999) – experiência do tempo em Kojève ======
+Kojève’s view of the paradoxical ontological situation of human beings—not to be what it is (nature), and to be what it is not (consciousness or negation)—has the consequence that human beings are necessarily projected into time. The human “I” is a continual surpassing of itself, an anticipation of the being that it is not yet, as well as an anticipation of the nothingness that will emerge from whatever it at any moment happens to be: “the very being of this I will be becoming, and the universal form of this being will be not space, but time” (IH 5). Desire is a nothingness that is essentially temporalized: it is a “revealed nothingness” or an “unreal emptiness” which intends its own fulfillment, and, through this intending, creates a temporal future. In Kojève’s view, the experience of time is conditioned by the various projects instituted by human agents; time, like the Heideggerian notion of temporality, is relative to the human orientation through which it is experienced. By “time,” Kojève means lived time, the experience of time conditioned by the way agents, through their hopes, fears, and memories, create a specific experience of future, present, and past. The experience of desire, in particular, gives rise to futurity: “the movement engendered by the Future is the movement that arises from desire” (IH 134).
+(BUTLER, J. Subjects of desire: Hegelian reflections in twentieth-century France. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)
+{{tag>Butler}}