Míguez
8. No hay necesidad, sin embargo, de conservar en la memoria [mneme] todo lo que se ve, ni de confiar a la imaginación [phantasia] todas las circunstancias que rodean la visión. Si un objeto es más claro para la inteligencia [noesis] que para los sentidos, no hay por qué, para el caso de que ese objeto se realice en el mundo sensible, prescindir de su conocimiento intelectual para fiarlo todo al conocimiento de los sentidos, salvo que se trate de gobernarlo o de dirigirlo. Porque, (…)
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MacKenna / Stephen MacKenna
Matérias
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Plotino - Tratado 28,8 (IV, 4, 8) — Os astros (2)
15 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro -
Plotino - Tratado 1,6 (I,6,6) - A purificação da alma
18 de setembro de 2021, por Cardoso de CastroBaracat
6. Pois, como diz o antigo ensinamento, a temperança, a coragem e toda virtude é purificação, inclusive a própria sabedoria. Por isso os mistérios corretamente enigmam que o não purificado, indo ao Hades, jazerá na lama, porque o que não é puro é amigo da lama por sua maldade : como os porcos, não puros de corpo, se comprazem com esse tipo de coisa . Que seria, então, a verdadeira temperança senão o não associar-se aos prazeres do corpo, fugir deles por não serem puros nem próprios (…) -
Plotino - Tratado 27,32 (IV, 3, 32) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (2)
14 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de CastroMíguez
32. ¿Y cómo recordamos a nuestros amigos, a nuestros hijos y a nuestra mujer? ¿Cómo también recordamos a nuestra patria y todo lo que un hombre inteligente puede recordar sin que el hecho resulte insólito? Digamos que el alma (inferior) recuerda con algún sentimiento, cosa que no ocurre al hombre, insensible en muchos de sus recuerdos. Porque, tal vez al principio el hombre experimente alguna emoción, junto con sus recuerdos; en tal caso, el alma superior misma podrá experimentar (…) -
Plotino - Tratado 53,11 (I, 1, 11) — Isso que somos e isso que somos responsáveis (2)
20 de fevereiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castrotraduzindo MacKenna
11. Na infância a principal atividade é na Parelha e há pouca irradiação dos princípios superiores de nosso ser; mas quando estes princípios superiores agem de modo fraco ou raro sobre nós sua ação é voltada para o Supremo; eles trabalham sobre nós apenas quando permanecem no ponto central.
Mas não inclui o "Nós", esta fase de nosso ser que se encontra acima do ponto central?
Não, a não ser que o apreendamos: nossa natureza por inteiro não é nossa todos os momentos (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Princípio Intelectivo
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroOur fire, however, is a thing of limited scope: given powers that have no limitation and are never cut off from the Authentic Existences, how imagine anything existing and yet failing to receive from them? It is of the essence of things that each gives of its being to another: without this communication, The Good would not be Good, nor the Intellectual-Principle an Intellective Principle, nor would Soul itself be what it is: the law is, "some life after the Primal Life, a second where there (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: intellections
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe question still remains to be examined in the matter of the intellections - whether these are to be assigned to the Soul - and as to Pure-Pleasure, whether this belongs to the Soul in its solitary state. Enneads I,1,2
We cannot hold its self-intellections to be acts of memory; this is no question of something entering from without, to be grasped and held in fear of an escape; if its intellections could slip away from it [as a memory might] its very Essence [as the Hypostasis of inherent (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intelecções
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThus we have marked off what belongs to the Couplement from what stands by itself: the one group has the character of body and never exists apart from body, while all that has no need of body for its manifestation belongs peculiarly to Soul: and the Understanding, as passing judgement upon Sense-Impressions, is at the point of the vision of Ideal-Forms, seeing them as it were with an answering sensation (i.e, with consciousness) this last is at any rate true of the Understanding in the (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: intellective act
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroNo: The Divine Mind in its mentation thinks itself; the object of the thought is nothing external: Thinker and Thought are one; therefore in its thinking and knowing it possesses itself, observes itself and sees itself not as something unconscious but as knowing: in this Primal Knowing it must include, as one and the same Act, the knowledge of the knowing; and even the logical distinction mentioned above cannot be made in the case of the Divine; the very eternity of its self-thinking (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: soul (Enneads II)
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroEvery living thing is a combination of SOUL and body-kind: the celestial sphere, therefore, if it is to be everlasting as an individual entity must be so in virtue either of both these constituents or of one of them, by the combination of SOUL and body or by SOUL only or by body only. Enneads II,1,2
Of course anyone that holds body to be incorruptible secures the desired permanence at once; no need, then, to call on a SOUL or on any perdurable conjunction to account for the continued (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: intellective nature
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(C) When we exercise intellection upon ourselves, we are, obviously, observing an intellective nature, for otherwise we would not be able to have that intellection. Enneads III,9,3
Thus its substantial existence comes from the Intellectual-Principle; and the Reason within it becomes Act in virtue of its contemplation of that prior; for its thought and act are its own intimate possession when it looks to the Supreme Intelligence; those only are soul-acts which are of this intellective (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: soul (Enneads V)
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro1. What can it be that has brought the souls to forget the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and entirely of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It? The evil that has overtaken them has its source in self-will, in the entry into the sphere of process, and in the primal differentiation with the desire for self ownership. They conceived a pleasure in this freedom and largely indulged their own motion; thus they were hurried down the wrong path, and in the end, drifting (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Natureza intelectiva
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castrointellective nature
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MacKenna-Plotinus: soul (Enneads VI)
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroWith regard to time, if it is to be thought of as a measure, we must determine what it is that applies this measure. It must clearly be either SOUL or the Present Moment. If on the contrary we take time to be something measured and regard it as being of such and such extension a year, for example then we may consider it as a quantity: essentially however time is of a different nature; the very fact that we can attribute this or that length to it shows us that it is not length: in other (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: intellective subject
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroWe can imagine the Soul as a double light, a lesser corresponding to the soul proper, a purer representing its intellective phase; if now we suppose this intellective light equal to the light which is to be its object, we no longer distinguish between them; the two are recognised as one: we know, indeed, that there are two, but as we see them they have become one: this gives us the relation between the intellective subject and the object of intellection [in the duality and unity required by (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: Soul
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThe Third Hypostasis of the Divinity - the All-Soul, the Universal Life-Principle - includes, and is, all the souls: the human soul is, therefore, the All-Soul: but it is the All-Soul set into touch with the lower: it is the All-Soul particularized for the space, at least, of the mortal life of man.
This particularization is necessarily a limitation: it sets bounds: it comports a provisory application to this rather than that; we may, therefore, discern phases of the All-Soul in us. These (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: intellective life
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro(18) But how does the soul enter into body from the aloofness of the Intellectual? There is the Intellectual-Principle which remains among the intellectual beings, living the purely intellective life; and this, knowing no impulse or appetite, is for ever stationary in that Realm. But immediately following upon it, there is that which has acquired appetite and, by this accruement, has already taken a great step outward; it has the desire of elaborating order on the model of what it has seen (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: soul (Enneads III)
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAs for Things of Process or for Eternal Existents whose Act is not eternally invariable we must hold that these are due to Cause; Causelessness is quite inadmissible; we can make no place here for unwarranted “slantings,” for sudden movement of bodies apart from any initiating power, for precipitate spurts in a SOUL with nothing to drive it into the new course of action. Such causelessness would bind the SOUL under an even sterner compulsion, no longer master of itself, but at the mercy of (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: intellective power
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroAll that is Intellectual-Principle has its being - whole and all - in the place of Intellection, what we call the Intellectual Kosmos: but there exist, too, the intellective powers included in its being, and the separate intelligences - for the Intellectual-Principle is not merely one; it is one and many. In the same way there must be both many souls and one, the one being the source of the differing many just as from one genus there rise various species, better and worse, some of the more (…)
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MacKenna-Plotinus: soul (Enneads IV)
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de Castro1. In the Intellectual Kosmos dwells Authentic Essence, with the Intellectual-Principle [Divine Mind] as the noblest of its content, but containing also souls, since every SOUL in this lower sphere has come thence: that is the world of unembodied spirits while to our world belong those that have entered body and undergone bodily division. Enneads IV,1,1
But there is a difference: The Intellectual-Principle is for ever repugnant to distinction and to partition. SOUL, there without (…) -
MacKenna-Plotinus: Intelectivo
1º de fevereiro, por Cardoso de CastroThis activity is screened not from the man entire but merely from one part of him: we have here a parallel to what happens in the activity of the physical or vegetative life in us which is not made known by the sensitive faculty to the rest of the man: if our physical life really constituted the "We," its Act would be our Act: but, in the fact, this physical life is not the "We"; the "We" is the activity of the Intellectual-Principle so that when the Intellective is in Act we are in Act. (…)