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dignidade

quinta-feira 25 de janeiro de 2024

  
Aristóteles  

Os que são sofisticados, contudo, e se dedicam à acção prática supõem, antes, ser a honra [timé]. Na verdade, a honra quase que é o fim último da vida dedicada à acção política [politike]. Este bem que perseguem não deixa, contudo, de ser um bem mais superficial do que aquele [1095b25] de que estamos à procura. Parece ainda que a honra pertence mais aos que a concedem do que àquele que a recebe; ora nós pressentimos, por outro lado, que o bem terá de ser algo de próprio, e que, uma vez obtido, dificilmente será retirado. Por fim, parece que os homens perseguem a honra para se convencerem de que são bons. Pelo menos, procuram ser honrados pelos sensatos [phronesis] e por aqueles que os conhecem, e, de facto, honrados em vista da excelência [arete]. [1095b30] É evidente que, pelo menos para estes, a excelência é mais poderosa do que a honra. Talvez, pois, se possa supor que a excelência seja mais propriamente o objectivo final da vida política. Ainda assim, ela própria parece ser incompleta. De facto, parece ser possível, mesmo a dormir, deter a excelência, ou detê-la sem a pôr em prática [1096a1] ao longo da vida; acresce a isto que pode ser-se excelente e sofrer-se tremendamente ou ser-se extremamente infeliz. Ninguém pensará que quem assim viver será feliz, a não ser para defender uma qualquer posição teórica a qualquer preço. Mas ficamos por aqui, porque isto já foi suficientemente discutido nos escritos para os círculos mais alargados. [Ética a Nicômaco, Livro I Capítulo V. Tr. António Caeiro  ]


Heidegger  

Οἰ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν. [EN3 1095 b 22 seg] “By contrast, the educated and those who go into practical affairs, into a profession, posit the τέλος in τιμή.” They say that in concrete being-there as being-with-one-another, what one ultimately depends on is the “reputation” one has vis-à-vis others. On this point, Aristotle says that with the determination of the τέλος as τιμή, the ἀγαθóν is not with the one who is after reputation, but rather is with those who esteem the others; for they are the ones who have the ἀγαθóν at their disposal, while the others are after τιμή “in order to secure and convince themselves that their being-there is an ἀγαθóν.” [EN3 1095 b 27 seg] Thus τιμή is not at all something in my own being-there as such; τιμή is not οἰκεῖον ἀγαθóν. I have τιμή by the grace of others. This is even more transparent in the case of ἡδονή, where Aristotle is not showing that this ἀγαθóν is brought to human beings from without; it is no δυσαφαίρετον, nothing “inevitable.” Even this higher τέλος as τιμή is not a τέλος that would be seen as an ultimate possession in being-there itself. But even the further determination as ἀρετή is κατὰ τούτους. [EN3 1095 b 29 seg] “It is possible to be a competent fellow and yet sleep through one’s being-there, have bad luck, fail to succeed” [EN3 1095 b 32 seg]—two determinations: being-awake and succeeding. Thus further determinations are required if one is to flesh out ἀρετή, “competence.” [Heidegger, GA18:76]


Ad 2. The second candidate already has more going for it, insofar as it appears that in τιμή there is a distinctive possibility of being-with-one-another, of finding-oneself-among-others, insofar as I, particularly when I have a reputation vis-à-vis others, occupy a distinctive position in the world. Having a reputation vis-à-vis others is a distinctive disposition, which is, however, dependent on others. It is up to those with respect to whom I have a reputation whether to lend me a reputation or not. The others have the ἀγαθóν and give it to me as a present, but could just as well refuse it to me. It does not belong to my being as such. Thus insofar as it belongs to others, τιμή is not ἀγαθóν οἰκεῖον, not such as to “be at home” with my being and because of my being. Thus because the others are able to refuse it just as well, it is detachable; not only is it not at home with being-there, it also is not δυσαφαίρετον. An ἀγαθóν that is, in the genuine sense, the ἀγαθóν of being-there, must be at home in this being as such, and cannot be detachable. [Heidegger, GA18:78]

LÉXICO: dignidade