On this point, Aristotle   says that there must be, in this manifoldness of concerns, such a τέλος that is δι᾽ αὑτó. It is impossible that we, within the circle of all possible concerns in relation to one another, “take hold of one on account of another. For, in this way, one goes into the unlimited; in this manner, one obtains no πέρας, and so the ὄρεξις, being after something, becomes κενὴ καὶ ματαία, empty and vain.” Πέρας determines the being-there of what is concerned. In concern about something, there is already implicit the fact that it concerns something. The completion of concern is only possible in that what is concerned is there, that the concern is not grasping at straws, that concern has the character of the πέρας. Only in this way is it possible for a concern in general to come into its being. This is what was meant previously in the sense of being: being-there is being-limited. About this, Aristotle said that the manifoldness of concerns that constitute the being-there of human beings as being-with-one-another must have a πέρας. But this means that insofar as the concerns are related to each other in a guiding context, the πέρας is constituted through a τέλος δι᾽ αὑτó, a τέλος with which we are concerned “for its own sake.”

What we should take away from this general consideration of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθóν is this: it is that which is there as the τέλος δι᾽ αὑτó in the consideration of the being-there of human beings, what περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων [τέλη]. The τέλος that is made a topic in πολιτική must be in such a way that it “encompasses the others, encloses them in itself.” You see from this type of consideration that it immediately provides no specific determination whatsoever with respect to what the τέλος of human beings is. Aristotle only says that it follows from the being-structure of being-with-one-another that there must be a τέλος δι᾽ αὑτó. This τέλος δι᾽ αὑτó is necessarily the topic of πολιτική. The question is: what are the characters of this τέλος, this ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθóν as τέλος δι᾽ αὑτó? What belongs to the character of the ἀγαθóν as τέλος δι᾽ αὑτó for the being-with-one-another of human beings? [Heidegger  , GA18:72-73]

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