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apatheia
quinta-feira 25 de janeiro de 2024
gr. ἀπάθεια, apatheia: não afetado, sem pathe, impassível, impassibilidade [Peters ]. gr. ἀπαθής, apathés / apathes: impassível, insensível. Latim: impatiens. De páthos / pathos, paixão, fato de sofrer; e o prefixo privativo a-: sem paixão. eupátheia: emoção boa ou inocente.
À partir du moment où le raisonnement porte sur le monde sensible, il ne saurait être à proprement parler « pur », détaché du corps : il est tout imprégné de l’influence des affections, qui ne sont rien d’autre que l’effet de l’action du corps sur l’âme. Il est possible que Plotin ait ici en vue les Stoïciens pour qui, même dans l’action, il est toujours possible de purifier le principe directeur de l’âme, la raison, et de le rendre indépendant des passions. Voir par exemple Marc Aurèle : « que la partie directrice et souveraine de ton âme demeure inaltérée en présence du mouvement doux ou violent qui se produit dans la chair et qu’elle ne se mélange pas avec lui, mais qu’elle se délimite elle-même et qu’elle circonscrive ces affections dans les membres du corps » (Pensées V, 26, 1, trad. P. Hadot ). Une telle purification ne peut avoir lieu, aux yeux de Plotin, que par un détachement radical de tout ce qui concerne le corps. Plotino - Tratado 39,2 (VI, 8, 2) — A que faculdade da alma reportar o que depende de nós?
In a slightly later treatise 3.6 [26] 1-5 [v. Tratado 26], Plotinus makes a much more thoroughgoing attempt to exempt the soul from being affected by emotion or anything else. It is not affected when there is sense perception, 3.6 [26] 1—(1-4), memory 3.6 [26] 2 (42-6); 3.6 [26] 3 (27-9), or vice 3.6 [26] 2, because in all these cases, the soul is involved in activity (energeia), not in being affected. Plotinus exploits Aristotle ’s idea, DA 1.4, 408bl-15 that it is not the soul, but the man, who is moved by emotion, just as it is the not the soul, but the man who weaves or builds, cf. Plotinus 3.6 [26] 3 (7-11), and Aristotle’s further idea that the actualisation of the soul’s capacities, DA 2.5, 417b2-16, is preservative, not destructive, and so should not be described as a case of being affected or undergoing qualitative change, unless in a special sense, cf. Plotinus 3.6 [26] 2 (46-51); 3.6 [26] 4 (40-1). He also concedes to Aristotle that what he [Plotinus] calls the emotional part of the soul can be thought of in Aristotle’s way as form (eidos), in order to make the point that form acts rather than being acted on, 3.6 [26] 4 (30-8).
Like Porphyry after him (Sentences 18), Plotinus compares the soul, or rather its appetitive part, to a harmonia, here a tune rather than attunement, which plucks the strings. It is a form (eidos) and activity (energeia), which itself stays still (menein), and is not affected (paskhein), but is rather the cause (aition) of emotion. The passage 3.6 [26] 4 (41-52), as well as Porphyry, is translated under 6(a) above. Like Proclus after him, in Tim. 3.335-340, Plotinus insists that the substance (ousia) of the soul remains the same, 3.6 [26] 3 (30-4).
In the case of emotion, there are three levels 3.6 [26] 4 (13-26). There is an appearance (phantasia), which according to Plotinus we call opinion (doxa), which leaves the opining part unmoved (atrepton). From this (apo) what comes to the part of the soul which is (wrongly) said to fear is an unevaluated appearance (anepikritos phantasia) which is like a murky opinion (amudra hoion doxa). From these two there come the trembling or pallor of the body and inability to speak. In all this the parts of the soul act as causes; it is the body that is affected.
Plotinus recognises that if this leaves the soul so unaffected, the question arises how there can be room for purifying the soul. But he replies that purifying takes the form of re-directing the soul’s attention, 3.6 [26] 5 (15-19).
The discussion fits well with the adjacent treatise, where at 4.3 [27] 32 (1-11). Plotinus says that the refined citizen, who has risen after death as far as the heavens, but not yet to the intelligible would, will remember his country and family without emotion (apathos). But he concedes here that what is refined in the emotions passes eventually to the good (spoudaia) [part of the] soul, as Schniewind points out. [SorabjiPC1 :282-283]
apathés: impassível, insensível. Latim: impatiens.
De páthos, paixão, fato de sofrer; e o prefixo privativo a-: sem paixão.
O termo tem dois sentidos:
Sentido metafísico. Entre os pré-socráticos , "Anaxágoras — escreve Aristóteles — é o único que afirma que o Espírito é impassível" (De an., I, 2; III, 4). O próprio Aristóteles ensina que o intelecto separado (noûs khoristós) é impassível (ibid., III, 5). Plotino escreveu um tratado Da impassibilidade dos incorpóreos (asómata) (III, VI), onde defende a teoria de que a matéria sensível, como substrato dos corpos, é um incorpóreo, pois precede o corpo e faz dele um composto; ela é, portanto, impassível (III,VI, 7). Assim também, a alma do mundo é impassível (II, IX, 18).
Sentido moral. E encontrado especialmente nos estoicos (stoique, em francês, significa impassível). O filósofo torna-se sábio quando se livra das paixões (Epicteto , Leituras, III, XIII, 11; Manual, III, XXIX, 6-7). Plotino considera que os demônios podem sofrer por sua parcela irracional; o sábio alcança a insensibilidade (IV, IV, 43). [Gobry ]