This determination, that ultimately the being of being-there is that which constitutes per se being-there in its there, is echoed in the Kantian definition of the human being: the rational essence exists as an end in itself. This definition is, at the same time, the ontological condition of the possibility of the categorical imperative. Insofar as the rational essence is something that is open to law in the basic determination of respect, and at the same time is in such a way that its being is by itself oriented toward the end to a certain extent, and so has no further why, this law is in itself the ultimate; the ought is categorical, not hypothetical. For the being of human beings, there is no if, but rather an ultimate then. Since the idea of law comes into play, the foundation and opening up of this context has a different look. The idea of law is oriented toward the lawfulness of nature, by which law is yet further apprehended. However, nature is, here, the manner of being-there, and thus in the sense of φύσις (Aristotle  ). It is remarkable to observe that Kant   apprehends the concept of the law of nature in the further, almost Aristotelian, sense. “Act in such a way that the maxim of your action could be a universal law of nature.” The maxim is not supposed to be a law of nature as explicit law, but rather as a mode of being-there per se. [Heidegger  , GA18:95-96]

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LÉXICO: lei; legalidade

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HEIDEGGER: Gesetz / lei / loi / law