What life has expressed concretely about itself is something that carries within itself its reasons. Aristotle   says at the end of Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 2: καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διóτι, [EN2 1095 b 6 seg] “when I am oriented to that [what life says about itself], no reference is needed to the διóτι—for this reason, because, since.” Life has spoken thus. Aristotle takes up the interpretation of the being-there of life in such a way that he takes it in a positive sense. On account of the fact that being-there, in how it speaks about itself, has addressed itself thus, it already carries its reasons. If I keep my attention fixed to the ὅτι, “that” life has spoken thus, and have understood it, then it requires no further διóτι [because]. Life has appropriated its possibilities and made them explicit, and specifically in three respects—the three βίοι. Aristotle explicitly postpones the discussion of the βίος θεωρητικóς (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10) [Cf. EN3 1096 a 4 seg]. He explicates this βίος as the genuine possibility of human existence. The two other βίοι give him the opportunity to establish two types of τέλη: (1) ἡδονή, (2) τιμή. [Heidegger  , GA18:77]