domingo 17 de outubro de 2021
gr. ὄργανον, organon. Segundo Platão (Alcibíades) o corpo é um instrumento (organon) da alma, embora esta definição talvez remonte a Demócrito. Aristóteles adota a mesma definição em Ética a Nicômaco. [Brisson e Pradeau ]
L’alternative distingue entre une définition platonicienne, celle du corps comme instrument (órganon) de l’âme, et toutes les autres possibilités. La définition du corps comme instrument remonte peut-être à Démocrite. Elle est reprise par Platon dans l’Alcibiade, mais aussi bien adoptée par Aristote (entres autres passages : Éthique à Nicomaque, VIII, 13 ou Partie des animaux, I, 1 ), ce qui lui confère une autorité suffisamment étendue pour que Plotin ne l’impute pas nommément et exclusivement à Platon (dans sa cotraduction de l’Alcibiade, dans cette même collection, voir p. 211, la note 122 de J.-F . Pradeau ). Plotino - Tratado 2,1 (IV,7,1) - somos inteira ou parcialmente imortais?
But, while every actual cognition (gnosis) is defined by the form of its object, not being affected by it but being active, and active not creatively but with judgement (kritikos) and understanding (sunetikos), the other cognitive activities obtain their perfection from their own being and project (proballesthai) the form (eidos) of their object of themselves, but that of perception requires also the object perceived which lies outside in order to project actively the form of that object. That is why it is said to be both subject to affection and receptive of forms which, as it were, enter from elsewhere, and to be perfected by other things. An indication of this is the  fact that, being the lowest form [of cognition], sense perception must use an organ, and in such a way that it neither is itself strong enough to be self-sufficient in its use nor has an organ sufficient for the life that uses it, but one that needs first to be affected in some way by the perceptible object, the vital activity being simultaneously aroused by the external effect (peisis). So the organ, being a body, has in the life of perception an activity that is affective, but the sense that uses it is active without being affected, projecting from within the concepts (logous proballein) of the objects perceived in correspondence (summetros) with the affective activity of the organ, by (kata) which concepts, as has been said, it understands and judges actively (suniesi kai kritikos energei). [166,17] It is consequently said to be receptive of forms and to be affected by what has colour or flavour or sound because its organ needs to be affected by these, having received an appearance of the forms in them. For as the activity in the agent is akin to the form that is produced, so the effect according to the forms makes clear the kinship with the agent; and, by the appearance of the form which enters the sense organ by the agency of the perceptible object not only does the life in [the sense organ] become active, but also the life that uses it projects its activity of judgement (kritike) pure according to the concepts which are akin to the affective activity in the sense organ; [and its activity is pure], since it is not affected nor does it receive the forms from outside. For the cognition (gnosis) is from within, and so also the state corresponding to the object of knowledge. But the sense is said to be affected and to become the form because the sense organ receives the formal appearances from outside, and not without activity; for it receives the forms without matter; since every perceptible object is not a form but enformed. [‘Simplicius ’ in De Anima 166,3-29; SorabjiPC1 :41-42]