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O’Meara (Plotinus:23) – realidade inteligível no mundo sensível

segunda-feira 31 de janeiro de 2022

      

In VI, 4, 2 Plotinus   connects the problem of soul’s presence in body with a larger issue, that of the presence of intelligible reality in the sensible   world. He is aware that in doing this he is confronting one of the most difficult problems facing any Platonist. Among the difficulties presented by Plato in his Parmenides   concerning the theory of Forms is that of the presence of a single Form in a multitude of particular sensible objects (131ac): how could one Form (for example, the Form of beauty) be present in many (beautiful) things without being divided up among them? The presence of the Form in a multitude seems to mean destruction of the Form as a whole, as a unity. This cannot be right. But to save the Form’s unity, one must abandon its presence in many things. This too is unacceptable. Plato himself gives no clear indication as to how one is to resolve this dilemma. Aristotle   considered it as yet another decisive reason for rejecting Plato’s theory of Forms (Metaphysics  , 1. 6). The problem remained unresolved, lying deep, as a possibly fatal flaw, in the heart of Platonic philosophy. The Middle Platonists were aware of it, but they contented themselves with references to the ‘mysterious’ relation between intelligible and sensible reality. Plotinus’ Ennead VI, 4-5 is the first Platonist text we have which faces the issue squarely. [O’Meara  :23]


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