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Accueil > Oriente > The essential ground of the egoic notions


The essential ground of the egoic notions


lundi 30 avril 2018

Jaideva Singh

Introduction to the 4th verse :

The followers of Buddha Bouddha
say that we see that joy?, Depression, etc, are only different altered forms of one single consciousness. On the strength of this argument they hold that the continuum of jñāna or knowledge? alone is Reality, (i.e. there is no jñātā-knower or experient apart from jñāna or knowledge). The Mimāṃsakas hold that, that which is known in the consciousness of ‘I’ eclipsed by the conditions of pleasure etc is the Self. Both are refuted by a single verse (which follows)


I am? happy, I am miserable, I am attached—these and other cognitions have their being evidently in another in which the states of happiness, misery etc. are strung together.


The same I who am happy, am miserable, am attached, being connected with affection which rests in pleasure, am full of hatred, being connected with dislike which is associated with pain—these cognitions or experiences abide in another which is the possessor of these states (avasthātari), which, in other words, is the permanent principle of Self. They rest inwardly in that evidently i.e. with one’s Self as witness. Otherwise the interconnection (anusandhāna) of the ephemeral cognitions and the ideas born of their residual traces will not be possible, for those cognitions disappear as soon as they arise and cannot leave behind any traces. Thus the vikalpas (ideas) supposed to arise out of them cannot actually arise. Not being perceived in experience, they cannot lead to any activity?. [1]

The particles ‘ca’ used with equal fitness (with all the three) express their inter-connexion. Anyatra means in another. Of what kind is this other ? Sukhādyavasthānusyūta qualifies anyatra (the other) and means that other in which states of pleasure, pain, etc. which arise and subside are interwoven i.e. are strung together i.e. that in which pleasure, pain, etc. stay inwardly as flowers are strung together in the form of a wreath in a string.

Tāḥ i.e. the previously experienced states when set in a congruous connection refer to their recollection. According to the view of the philosophers who believe in the momentariness of cognitions, memory is born of the residual traces of the previous experience, and is, as such, only a form tinged with the previous experience. Thus it can only be similar to the previous experience. It cannot bring back to consciousness the thing as it was actually experienced in the past. [2] (Let such philosophers please themselves with such a view of memory. It cannot be accepted by others).

The author suggests that when there is a permanent experient who abides inwardly in the consciousness of all, every thing is set aright. Enough of these subtleties which will only prove to be unpleasant to students of tender heart. Seekers after such subtleties may look into Pratyabhijñā. [3] Since the author has referred to this reasoning, I have tried to explain it briefly. Let intelligent people not blame me for this brevity.

(Second explanation of the text)

In order to refute the Mimāṃsaka, this H.e. the word Ātman or Self) should be interpreted in this way.

Those experiences such as ‘I am happy.’ I am miserable exist anyatra i.e. in another. ‘In another’ in this case should be interpreted as ‘in the puryaṣṭaka Experient’. So the experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. exist in the puryaṣṭaka experient who is suffused with these experiences. Sphuṭam or ‘evidently’ means ‘to which popular belief bears witness.’ Anyatra in their case does not mean ‘in Śaṃkara’ who is compact mass of light? and bliss and who is our own essential nature? as is accepted by us. Therefore, this Self is not always tarnished by the conditions of pleasure, pain, etc, but is rather of the nature of consciousness. When He by His own impurity to be described later conceals his essential nature and appears in that state, then He is in the Puryaṣṭaka state, and has the experience of happiness, etc. It has already been said that even in that state, pleasure etc. cannot obstruct His real nature. He is never concealed by pleasure, etc.

The real purport in saying ‘I am happy ; I am miserable’ etc. by abandoning such beliefs as I am thin ; I am fat etc is this. One recognises one’s essential nature as Siva by submerging his Puryaṣṭaka state which is full of experiences like pleasure, etc. in the inner essential Self and also by dissolving along with it the external aspect consisting of the body, jar, etc. Thus one should always make an earnest effort for allaying the Puryaṣṭaka.


The first point to be borne in mind? is the significance of the use of plural in saṃvid. Saṃvid in plural (saṃvidah) means perception, cognitions, experiences. They are not the same saṃvid which is one identical, uniform consciousness underlying all other saṃvids. As Rāmakaṇṭha puts it :

“Saṃvit or Consciousness in its highest sense is really one, the Experient of all, flashing forth as ‘I’. On account of the absence? of that awareness brought about by māyā-śakti it becomes the cognizer of such impermanent incidental experience as ‘I am happy, I am miserable, etc., Really speaking these are the states of buddhi (inner determinative consciousness which assumes the role of the self or the Experient, and the real Experient on account of its co-relation with buddhi etc. misconceives these states as his own. It is because of this that the word saṃvid has been used in plural. They really belong to the pseudo-experient buddhi, not to the underlying Saṃvit, the Self, the unchanging, identical Experient.

The other important point to be borne in mind is that though these states are not of the Self, though they do not belong to the essential nature of the Self, they are held together into the unity of one experience by that unchanging identical Experient that runs like a thread through them all. This is what is meant by saying : “Those states have their ratio essendio in another Experient that runs like a thread through them all. Rāmakaṇṭha explains the status of this experient beautifully in the following words :

‘‘He (the Experient) pervades all the preceding and the succeeding states throughout which is well-known even to all empirical selves : he provides that synthetic unity which serves as the foundation of all pragmatic life, which being unchanging, permanent Experient ever shines as one and the same.”

It is this important truth which the great German philosopher Kant Kant Emmanuel Kant (Immanuel en allemand), philosophe allemand expressed after nearly one thousand years, in his famous concept of the ‘synthetic unity of apperception’.

Lastly, this philosophic truth must lead to yogic practice which Kṣemarāja describes in the last section of his commentary.

Knowing that changing states like pleasure, pain belong to the puryaṣṭaka i.e. the psychological or the empirical self, one should establish oneself in his essential Self which is the real Experient, which is the nature of Śiva Shiva
le Seigneur
Śiva e Śakti, Deus e seu Poder, formam uma unidade sem dualidade.

Mark Dyczkowski

Now (an opponent may well ask) : how is it possible to maintain that (the subject) does not deviate from his own nature as the perceiver in the waking and other particular states ? (How, in other words, can it be that he never deviates) (page 25) from his own (sva) state of being (bhāva), that is, the experience he has of himself (svānubhava) as the perceiver who knows himself (to be constantly) one and the same, if notions (pratyaya) of the sort noted below occur to the experiencing subject in these states ? Thus there are (the notions) associated with the body, such as : ‘I am a man’ or ‘I am fat.’ (Then) there are those (notions) associated with the intellect, such as : ‘I am happy’ or ‘I am suffering.’ Associated with the vital breath (prāna) are those of the type : ‘I am thirsty’ or ‘I am hungry.’ The notion of emptiness (corresponding to object?-free consciousness) comes to the subject (in deep sleep) devoid of perceptions (śūnyata-pramātṛ). It can be perceived through an act of self-awareness (pratyavamarśa) by one who awakes from deep sleep (and reflects that) : ‘I knew nothing at all.’

All these (notions) whether bodily or otherwise, are transitory, therefore the notion of oneself (ahampratyaya) associated with them must also be such. So, how is it that (you) have said that one does not deviate from one’s own nature as the perceiving subject ? Thus (in response to this question) he says (page 26) :



He (the Subject) threads through all the states (of consciousness). He connects them together (in the continuity of the experience that) ‘I am the same (person) who is happy and sad, or who later becomes attached.’ (They all reside) ‘elsewhere,’ in that state independent (of all transitory perceptions). As scripture (declares) :

...He Who is one’s own nature is considered to be the highest reality.

the extensive explanation Such perceptions as : ‘I am happy,’ ‘reside elsewhere’ therefore the (subject) does not deviate from his unique nature. (The author) refers here (in this verse only to) the principle (types of) of perceptions associated with the intellect because they are (the most) internal. The (words) ‘such as’ refer (to all) the previously described perceptions associated with the pscho-physical body. The point here is that all these perceptions reside ‘elsewhere,’ that is, in the subject who experiences ‘happiness’ and the other states previously described and (yet) is independent of them. (These diverse perceptions disappear into the subject and) there abide as one and attain a single nature (tadātmya with each other and the subject), the differences between them having fallen away as do (those between) rivers (when they reach the) sea. (What the author means when he says that) they ‘clearly (reside elsewhere)’ is that this is evidently so because we can perceive this through our own experience of ourselves (svānubhava). Thus consciousness (saṃvit), the perceiving subject, is one only and ultimately real (paramārthikī). It shines radiantly as the ego (aham?) but, due to the power of Māyā, (the individual soul) fails to reflect that his own nature is such. Thus (his consciousness) descends to the level of intellectual and other similar states and, assuming the guise of the subject of such transitory things as pleasure, (he identifies with them and is swayed by notions) (page 27) such as ‘I am happy’ or ‘I am sad.’ Thus (consciousness—saṃvit) is referred to (here) in the plural (as saṃvidah) (with reference to the subject’s many individual) ‘notions’ (saṃvidah).

But, if by its association with its many objects of perception, such as happiness and the rest, consciousness were also to really (paramārthatah) consist of many (diverse) egos just (as there are many diverse states of) happiness, etc., then memory and recognition or any such determinative assessment (anusamdhāna that links perceptions together) would not exist. This would entail the undesirable consequence that the entire business of daily life (would) cease.

(The author) then goes on to specify the nature of that reality which he indicates (as being) ‘elsewhere’. What is ‘elsewhere’ (set apart from perception) in which, (at the same time), these perceptions reside ? (The author) explains that it is that which ‘threads through (all) the states of pleasure and the rest.’ Every particular state of happiness, sadness or delusion is transitory, inherent as it is in their very nature (dharma) to arise and fall away. Again, they behave like sound or any other sense object because they are all equally objects of perception. Within them abides the ‘I’ (consciousness) which pervades them all with its unique nature as the perceiving subject. This is so because two realities are manifest in notions (pratyaya) of the type : ‘I am happy’ or ‘(I am) sad,’ as they emerge (out of undifferentiated consciousness). One is the object of perception (page 28), for example, ‘happiness’ which, precisely because it is an object of perception like a jar, is understood to be diverse and transitory. The other (reality) is ‘I’ (consciousness). It is the experiencing subject, self-evident (prasiddha) to all perceivers as pervading both the previous and subsequent states (of perception). It is the agent (who implements) the determinative assessment (anusamdhāna of perceptions that links them together) and is the cause of all daily transactions (vyavahāra). Moreover, because it is nothing but the perceiving subject alone, it is permanent and manifests as one.

Thus, (the subject) is one, and his inherent character remains unchanged (abhinnasvalakṣaṇa) even when the diversity (of states) brought about by (his) waking, etc., extends (through his consciousness). Similarly, he is one and persists unchanged when distinctions operate engendered by the flux of perceptions of ‘happiness’, etc. in the waking and other states. Thus (all these) states are perceived to be connected together by the one subject who ascertains and synthesises perceptions (ekānusaṃdhātṛ), for one (perceives) even here (in the course of daily life) that ‘I am the same one who became happy and is now unhappy or attached.’ Therefore, one’s own nature, which is the pure perceiving subject alone, is not altered in the least by any state (of consciousness) in the flux (of perceptions experienced) by the infinite multitude of humanity. Thus one’s own true nature (svasvabhāva) is self-evident (svayamsiddha) (page 29). It is Śankara Shankara
(Himself) and is in no circumstance conditioned (by anything) because its nature is perpetually unobscured.

The author of the Brief Explanation commences his commentary (with the words)

He (the subject) threads through all the states of consciousness,

and comes to the conclusion that :

...He Who is one’s own nature is considered to be the highest reality.

Voir en ligne : SPANDA-KĀRIKĀS

[1The idea is that when jñāna (perception or cognition) disappears as soon as it arises, it cannot leave behind any traces. Thus on this theory of the momentariness of perception, memory, will not be possible.

[2This means to say that similarity of the past experience which is all that the Buddhists can maintain on the basis of their theory of the momentariness of cognitions cannot lead to the belief that it is the same thing which was actually experienced in the past. Similarity is not sameness. Without the belief in the sameness of the past experience, memory is not possible. And without an identical pramātā or experient who can connect the past experience with the present, there cannot be any sameness of experience. Thus without an identical pramātā or experient, memory would be impossible.

[3This refers to Īśvara-pratyabhijñā of Utpaladeva.