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Utpaladeva: Section I. Knowledge — Chapter 3

Chapter III

terça-feira 24 de abril de 2018, por Cardoso de Castro

1. Agreed. However, that form of cognition which is memory, though arising from the latent impression deposited by the former direct perception, is restricted to itself (ātmanișțham) and does not know the original perception.

  •  Memory, though arising from the reawakening of the latent impression deposited by the former perception, because it is restricted to itself exclusively knows only its own form. It cannot be claimed that memory determines the object formerly perceived, since it [memory] does not penetrate the former direct perception. — 1 —

    2. A cognition is self-revealing (svābhāsaiva) and cannot be the object of another cognition, just as the cognition of taste is not known by that of shape. The fact that [memory] arises from latent impressions implies its similarity to the former perception, but not its cognition of that (tadgatih).

    [99] I 3.2 — Every cognitive act is by nature only aware of itself (svasamvedanaikarūpā) and does not become the object of another cognition: if the cognition of shape could grasp the cognition of taste and vice versa, then the one would perceive the object of the other and in this way every restriction on the activity of the individual senses would cease to exist. Since memory arises from the latent impression left by the former perception it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have direct cognition of the latter; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of this former perception (tadabhāvāt) not even the similarity to it can be maintained. — 2 —

    3. [Some might object that] memory appears erroneously (bhrāntyā) as having as its object something directly perceived (dŗșțālambanatā), being reduced, instead, to the only determinative activity directed at them (tadavasāyatah), despite the fact that they have never directly entered its cognitive sphere (atadvișayatve ’pi). But this objection, too, is inconsistent.

  •  And it cannot even be claimed that memory has these as its object only erroneously, in the sense that it makes the object of its own determinative activity (adhyavasyati) the former direct perception and its object, which in reality are not experienced, as happens when one states that one sees silver when faced with mother-of-pearl. — 3 —

    4. How is it possible to reduce the true nature of memory to this? (smrtitaiva katham tāvad). And how is it possible that the establishment [100] of objects (arthasthitih) should come about thanks to error? And, if such I 3.4 is the case, what sense is there in claiming dependence on the latent impressions left by the former direct perception?

  •  Memory cannot be identified with something that derives only from determinative knowledge (adhyavasāyamātrāt), the object of the former perception being absent (tadvișayasampramoșe) because it [the former perception] is not made manifest [in the memory, according to your conception]. Neither can the definite establishment of an object formerly perceived be taken to be due to error. And moreover, [if it is a question of ‘error’] why insist so much on the fact that memory — conceived of as error — arises from the latent impressions, when, on the contrary, it is different from the former direct perception from every point of view, (tadbhinnayogakșemāyāh), not coming into contact with it in any way? — 4 —

    5. If the determinative knowledge (avasāyasya) is error, how can it then, being insentient, establish objects? If on the contrary, it is [101] I 3.5 conceived of as being sentient, how can it, restricted as it is to itself and to its own ideation (nijollekhanișțhāt), establish objective reality?

  •  It is the determinative knowledge (adhyavasāyah) alone that — erroneously — establishes objects, and not its self-awareness (svasamvit).

    If such is the case, it is insentient and — being insentient — how can it cause the establishment of objects? Thus, even if one were to acknowledge it was insentient, [this should be understood in a limited way, that is, in the sense that] it would only be able to make manifest objects pertaining to the past, or illuminate only non-external objects — itself and its own ideation (abāhyasvātmollekhamātraprakāśah) — and, therefore, it could not equally be accepted as the cause of that establishment of objects we are dealing with. — 5 —

    6. Thus, the functioning of the human world — which stems precisely from the unification (anusamdhāna) of cognitions, in themselves separate from one another and incapable of knowing one another —would be destroyed...

    [102] - Cognitions are restricted to themselves only (svātmamātraparinișțhitāni) I 3.6 and cannot be the object of other cognitions (aparasamvedyāni) being by nature [exclusively] conscious of themselves. But then how would the dimension of human activity and behaviour (lokavyavahārah) — culminating in the teaching of the absolute reality — be possible, since this consists precisely in the interconnection between the objects of knowledge? (anyonyavișayasamghațțanāmayah). — 6 —

    7... if there were no Maheśvara who contains within himself all the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion.

  •  The mutual unification of all cognitions of things is [constituted by] the consciousness principle (cittattvam) whose form is all, since nothing distinct from it is admissible. The powers of knowledge etc. only pertain to this consciousness principle. It has been said: «From me derive memory, knowledge, exclusions — 7 —