PhiloSophia
Utpaladeva: Section I. Knowledge — Chapter 2Raffaele Torella
1-2. [Objection] There is one type of cognition in which the particular reality (svalakșana) appears and another type of cognition, [89] I 2.1-2 called mental elaboration (vikalpa), inseparably connected with discourse (sābhilāpam), which appears in manifold forms. For neither of the two is there any necessity to posit any stable perceiving subject, since he does not appear in them. Also the notion of ‘I’ (ahampratītih) has in reality as referent the body etc...
[90] 3. [Reply] How could we explain memory, which conforms to direct I 2.3 perception when the latter is no longer present, if there were not a permanent self, who is the subject of the perception ?
4. [Objection] Even if we do acknowledge the existence of a self, memory is still not explained, given that the perception no longer exists and that only through it [the perception] does memory have access to the objects formerly perceived. [Reply]. But memory acts on those very things that were the object of the perception...
5. ...insofar as the occurrence of memory is due to the latent impressions left by direct perception. [Objection] If that is how things stand, what need is there for this useless burden of a permanent self?
[91] I 2.5 From direct perception there derives a latent impression (samskārah); the memory arising from this conforms to that former perception and makes that perception — in which the object is immersed — manifest. If things are explained in these terms, why is it necessary to assume a useless permanent subject, since even the supporter of the existence of the self acknowledges the existence of the latent impression and this alone is enough to account for memory? — 5 —
6. If the qualities are separate [extrinsic to the self], then, since the nature of the self remains unaltered, the latent impressions are sufficient to explain the phenomenon of memory. The subject of memory is therefore only a mental construct (kalpitah), as was the subject of the perception.
[92] 7. If cognition were conscious (citsvarūpam) then it ought to be permanent I 2.7 like the self ; if on the contrary, it were not sentient, how could it illuminate objects?
8. [Reply]. Just as the intellect assumes the form of the object, so it assumes the sentience (caitanyam) of the self. [Objection]. In that case it is not insentient, for if it were so, it could not illuminate the object.
[93] I 2.8 The intellect (buddhih) is cognition. Though it is itself insentient, just as it assumes the reflection of the form of the object, so, in the same way, it also assumes the reflection of the sentience pertaining to the self. Thus [in assuming them both], it can illuminate the object. However, [it is replied] it follows that it must be sentient by nature.
Therefore cognition, though it exists, is not related to anything else [i.e. to a subject], because this has been recognized as untenable. Action, on the other hand, neither exists in itself, nor as related to anything else. — 8 —
9. Also action fas a separate reality is logically inadmissible as it] consists in the coming into being of bodies etc. in different places etc. (tattaddeśādijātatā) and nothing more, since nothing more is perceived; nor is it tenable that it — being one and also characterized by succession — may be related to a unitary reality.
10. The various things come into being in concomitance with the presence of certain other things: this is what is experienced and nothing more. There is no relation (sambandhah) other than that of cause and effect.
11. [A relation (sambandha), however conceived, is inadmissible] [95] I 2.11 since, as it rests on the two related terms, it cannot be unitary in nature; since a thing that is [already] accomplished (siddhasya) cannot ’require’ (apekșanāt) another and dependence (pāratantrya) etc. are not logically tenable. Thus the agent, too, is merely a mental construct.
[96] I 2.11 - A relation is based on two terms (dvișțhah) and it is not logically tenable for it to rest on both and preserve its unitary nature. Neither is a relation conceivable in the form of a reciprocal requirement (anyonyāpekșā) between two things which are already accomplished nor in the form of a dependence (pāratantrya) of two self-contained things. On the grounds of what has been said, just as the state of cognizer is a mental construct, the same holds good for the agent.
[97] I 2.11 Thus how is it possible to claim that the Self is the Lord of all? — 11 —
B.N. Pandit (only verses, without the commentaries)
[The Vijnānavādin says:]
Just see. There is one variety of perceptual knowledge that brings to light the basic thing as it is in itself [without the imposition of any name or form on it]. The other [variety of knowing] is that which is variously accompanied by word-images and is known as knowledge with definite or indefinite ideation [that is, conceptual knowledge]. Neither of these two is related [or belongs] to any permanently existing knowing subject, because he is apparently absent in both of them. Even the idea of ‘I-ness’ rests only on the physical body, etc.
[The Saiva philosopher replies:]
How could memory, agreeing essentially with previous direct perception, become at all possible after such |direct] knowing comes to its end, if the Atman, the experiences were not accepted as a constantly existing entity?
[The Buddhist objects:]
Even if the existence of Ātman is accepted, how can the recollection of an object, known through mental experience, become possible long after such experience has already come to its end? If, however, it is argued that a particular memory takes the same object as the object of the concerned previous experience—since it has risen according to the impressions laid (on Ātman] by the [previous] experience—then it can be asked: What would be the advantage of a permanently existent Ātman, lying there uselessly, like a lump, in between?
[The Buddhist further states:]
Since the character of the Ātman does not change at all during its different functional activities [such as perception, conception, and so on], and since memory can occur [solely] with the help of impressions, the recollector [the Ātman] is also an imaginary entity like the experiencer.
[It is argued further:]
If knowledge has the nature of Consciousness, one can ask if, like the Ātman, it is eternal, or if it is non-eternal in character. [That is,] one self-dependent entity cannot be taken as dependent on another such entity. Otherwise, if it [knowledge] is taken as unconscious by nature, then how can it illuminate anything?
If it is then argued that buddhi (the understanding sense or intellect) bears in it the consciousness of the Ātman, just as it bears the reflection of an object, then it may either become sentient itself or continue to remain insentient, in which case it cannot illuminate anything.
Even an action of the body, etc., is simply its contact with different places, etc., in space. [The action] is not any special entity different from [the body, etc.] because it is not seen as such. Besides, it is not a single sequential entity and cannot suitably be an attribute of a single substance.
[The Vijnānavādin says:]
What is seen [when elements appear to be in relation to each other] is the rise of some particular objects preceded by some other [similar] ones, and nothing beyond that. Only such [succession] is the relation between cause and effect.
[The Vijnānavādin continues:]
The concept of a doer is also based on imagination because: (1) a connection between two [substances! must involve more than one form; (2) an established entity does not require dependence on anything other than itself: and (3) mutual dependence [between two established objects or facts] is not an appropriate [concept] at all.