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Plotino - Tratado 38,30 (VI, 7, 30) — Mistura de prazer e inteligência

Enéada VI, 7, 30

domingo 27 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Capítulos 15-30: O Intelecto   e aquilo que está além dele: a natureza do Bem e as dificuldades que surgem ao redor dele.

  • Cap 15: O Intelecto e a vida inteligível não são senão uma imagem do Bem.
  • Cap 16-18: Em qual sentido o inteligível é uma imagem do Bem? Porque o Intelecto e as formas provêm do Bem.
  • Cap 19-20: Em qual sentido o Bem é um objeto de desejo para a alma  ?
  • Cap 21-23: A alma deseja o Intelecto que é uma imagem do Bem, e é nesta medida que ela tem acesso ao Bem.
  • Cap 24-25, 16: As dificuldades concernindo a definição do Bem como objeto de desejo da alma.
  • Cap 25, 16-18: O Bem não é tal porque é objeto de desejo.
  • Cap 25, 18-32: O Bem é o que se encontra no topo do real.
  • Cap 26: O Bem não é objeto de desejo porque é uma fonte de prazer.
  • Cap 27: O Bem é, para cada realidade, o que vem antes dela; eis o que explica que para o Bem supremo, que nada tem antes dele, não existe qualquer bem.
  • Cap 28: Pode haver um bem para a matéria?
  • Cap 29-30: O Bem procura uma forma de prazer que corresponde à mistura de prazer e inteligência da qual fala Platão no Filebo  .
    

Míguez

30. ¿Conviene, por tanto, que mezclemos el placer al bien y que consideremos la vida como imperfecta? ¿O nos conviene ver ahora, aplicándonos por completo al Bien, si la vida es la contemplación de las cosas divinas y de su principio? 1

Cuando pensamos que el Bien descansa en la inteligencia como sujeto y en el sentimiento del alma   como resultado de la actividad inteligente, no queremos afirmar con ello que el fin o el bien sea la reunión de ambos, esto es, que la Inteligencia sea el Bien y que nosotros nos alegremos con la posesión del Bien. Es ésta meramente una opinión sobre el Bien. Pero hay otra todavía según la que el placer se mezcla a la Inteligencia para dar como resultado un sujeto único. Entonces poseeremos el Bien si nos procuramos o contemplamos esa Inteligencia. Solo y aislado, nada podría existir o ser   deseado como un bien.

Sin embargo, ¿cómo se mezcla la inteligencia con el placer para llegar a producir una sola naturaleza? Porque no-podríamos pensar   aquí en el placer del cuerpo; esto es de toda evidencia. Ni podríamos pensar asimismo en los placeres del alma que no fuesen razonables 2 . En verdad, parece conveniente que a toda actividad, disposición y vida siga y se una algo añadido a ellas; e incluso es necesario que ese elemento   contraríe la naturaleza y que encadene la vida y le sirva de contrario al mezclarse a ella, impidiendo de este modo que la vida se pertenezca a sí misma. En otros casos, habrá de hacer la actividad pura y clara, consiguiendo para la vida una resplandeciente disposición; así alcanzará una condición de la inteligencia grata y deseable, condición para la que se reserva el nombre de placer porque se carece de otra palabra apropiada. Lo mismo acontece con otras expresiones que designan cosas amadas por nosotros y que empleamos metafóricamente: «embriagado de néctar, se dirige al festín, y sonrió el padre   de los dioses» 3 y otras mil de que hacen uso los poetas.

He aquí, pues, un estado   realmente grato, en extremo amable y anhelado. Y no porque lo hagamos descansar en un movimiento, pues sabido es que tiene su causa   en algo que le proporciona color  , luz y brillo. De ahí que (Platón  ) añada a esa mezcla la verdad y ponga antes de ella lo que le da medida: «la proporción y la belleza de la mezcla -dice- vienen desde allá hasta lo bello» 4 . De tal modo que, según lo bello y en lo bello tenemos nosotros participación en el Bien. Y lo que realmente debemos desear no es otra cosa que remontar por nosotros mismos hacia lo que hay de mejor en nosotros, esto es, a la proporción, a la belleza, a la forma bien dispuesta, y a la vida clara, inteligente y bella.

Bouillet

XXX. Maintenant, nous élevant au bien par la pensée, nous devons examiner s’il faut que le plaisir soit mêlé au bien, pour que la vie ne demeure pas imparfaite, contemplât-on d’ailleurs les choses divines et même Celui qui est leur principe.

Quand Platon paraît croire que le bien est composé de l’intelligence, qui en est la substance, et de l’affection que la sagesse fait éprouver à l’âme (105), il n’affirme pas que ce composé [de l’intelligence et du plaisir] soit la fin [de l’âme] ni le Bien en soi ; il veut seulement dire que l’intelligence est le bien et que nous nous réjouissons de la posséder. Voilà une première manière de concevoir l’opinion [de Platon] sur le bien. Une autre manière de l’interpréter, c’est de mélanger le plaisir à l’intelligence en faisant de ces deux choses une seule substance, de telle sorte qu’en acquérant ou en contemplant une pareille intelligence nous possédions le bien : car [disent les partisans de cette opinion] une de ces deux choses ne saurait exister dans l’isolement, ni, supposé qu’elle existât, être désirable à titre de bien. Comment donc [leur demanderons-nous] l’intelligence peut-elle être mêlée au plaisir de manière à ne plus former avec lui qu’une seule nature? Personne ne saurait croire que le plaisir du corps puisse être mélangé à l’intelligence ; ce plaisir est incompatible même avec les joies de l’âme.

Ce qui est vrai, c’est qu’à toute action, à toute disposition, à toute vie, vient toujours se joindre et s’unir ce qui en est l’accessoire, [le plaisir ou la peine] : en effet, il est des fois que l’action rencontre un obstacle à son accomplissement naturel, et qu’à la vie vient se mêler un peu de son contraire, qui altère son indépendance; mais, d’autres fois, l’action se produit sans que rien en trouble la pureté et la sérénité, et la vie alors a un cours tranquille. Ceux qui regardent cet état de l’intelligence comme désirable et comme préférable à tout disent qu’il est mêlé de plaisir, dans l’impuissance où ils se trouvent de mieux rendre leur pensée. Tel est également le sens des expressions employées par ceux qui appliquent aux choses divines les termes destinés à désigner la joie ici-bas, et qui disent : « Enivré de nectar (106) ; On se rend au festin; Jupiter   sourit, etc. » Cet heureux état de l’intelligence est ce qu’il y a de plus agréable, de plus digne de nos souhaits et de notre amour; il n’est pas d’ailleurs passager, et ne consiste pas dans un mouvement; son principe est ce qui colore l’intelligence, l’illumine et la fait jouir d’une douce sérénité. C’est pourquoi Platon ajoute la vérité au mélange, et met au-dessus ce qui donne la mesure (107). Il dit encore que la proportion et la beauté qui sont dans le mélange passent de là dans le beau (108). Voilà le bien qui nous appartient, voilà le lot qui nous est propre. C’est là l’objet suprême du désir, objet que nous atteindrons à condition que nous nous ramenions nous mêmes à ce qu’il y a de meilleur en nous. Or cette chose pleine de proportion et de beaulé, cette l’orme composée [des éléments dont nous venons de parler] n’est autre qu’une vie pleine d’éclat, d’intelligence et de beauté.

Guthrie

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATO’S OPINION ABOUT THE GOOD.

30. Now, rising in thought to the Good, we must examine whether pleasure must be mingled with the Good to keep life from remaining imperfect, even if we should, besides, contemplate the divine things, and even Him who is their principle. When (Plato) seems to believe that the good is composed of intelligence, as subject, and also of affection which wisdom makes the soul experience, he is not asserting that this blend (of intelligence and pleasure) is either the goal (of the soul), or the Good in itself. He only means that intelligence is the good, and that we enjoy its possession. This is a first interpretation of (Plato’s) opinion about the Good. Another interpretation is that to mingle intelligence with pleasure is to make a single subject of both of them, so that in acquiring or in contemplating such an intelligence we possess the good; for (according to the partisans of this opinion), one of these things could not exist in isolation, nor, supposing that it could so exist, it would not be desirable as a good. But (shall we ask them), how can intelligence be mingled with pleasure so as to form a perfect fusion therewith? Nobody could be made to believe that the pleasure of the body could be mingled with Intelligence; such pleasure is incompatible even with the joys of the soul.

PLEASURE IS INDEED AN ACCESSORY TO ALL GOODS OF THE SOUL.

The element of truth in all this, however, is that every action, disposition and life is joined by some accessory (pleasure or pain) that unites with it. Indeed, sometimes action meets an obstacle to its natural accomplishment, and life is affected by the mixture of a little of its contrary, which limits its independence; sometimes, however, action is produced without anything troubling its purity and serenity, and then life flows along a tranquil course. Those who consider that this state of intelligence is desirable, and preferable to everything else, in their inability to express their thoughts more definitely, say that it is mingled with pleasure. Such likewise is the meaning of expressions used by those who apply to divine things terms intended to express joy here below, and who say, “He is intoxicated with nectar! Let us to the banquet  ! Jupiter smiles!” This happy state of intelligence is that which is the most agreeable, the most worthy of our wishes, and of our love; nor is it transitory, and does not consist in a movement; its principle is that which colors intelligence, illumines it, and makes it enjoy a sweet serenity. That is why Plato adds to the mixture truth, and puts above it that which gives measure. He also adds that the proportion and the beauty which are in the mixture pass from there into the beautiful. That is the good that belongs to us, that is the fate that awaits us. That is the supreme object of desire, an object that we will achieve on condition of drawing ourselves up to that which is best in us. Now this thing full of proportion and beauty, this form composed (of the elements of which we have spoken), is nothing else but a life full of radiance, intelligence and beauty.

MacKenna

30. Whether pleasure must enter into the good, so that life in the contemplation of the divine things and especially of their source remains still imperfect, is a question not to be ignored in any enquiry into the nature of the good.

Now to found the good upon the Intellect and upon that state of soul or mind   which springs from wisdom does not imply that the end or the absolute good is the conjunction [of Intellect and state]: it would follow merely that Intellect is the good and that we feel happy in possession of that good. That is one theory; another associates pleasure with Intellect in the sense   that the Good is taken to be some one thing founded upon both but depending upon our attaining or at least contemplating an Intellect so modified; this theory would maintain that the isolated and unrelated could be the good, could be an object of desire.

But how could Intellect and pleasure combine into one mutually complementary nature?

Bodily pleasure no one, certainly, would think capable of blending in with Intellect; the unreasoning satisfactions of soul [or lower mind] are equally incompatible with it.

Every activity, state, and life, will be followed and as it were escorted by the over-dwelling consciousness  ; sometimes as these take their natural course they will be met by hindrance and by intrusion of the conflicting so that the life is the less self-guided; sometimes the natural activity is unmixed  , wholly free, and then the life goes   brilliantly; this last state is judged the pleasantest, the most to be chosen; so, for lack of an accurate expression, we hear of «Intellect in conjunction with pleasure.» But this is no more than metaphor, like a hundred others drawn by the poets from our natural likings - «Drunk with nectar,» «To banquet and feast,» «The Father smiled.» No: the veritably pleasant lies away in that other realm, the most to be loved and sought for, not something brought about and changing but the very principle of all the colour and radiance and brightness found here. This is why we read of «Truth introduced into the Mixture» and of the «measuring standard as a prior condition» and are told that the symmetry and beauty necessary to the Mixture come Thence into whatever has beauty; it is in this way that we have our share in Beauty; but in another way, also, we achieve the truly desirable, that is by leading our selves up to what is best within us; this best is what is symmetry, beauty, collective Idea  , life clear, Intellective and good.