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Plotino - Tratado 38,29 (VI, 7, 29) — O Bem procura uma forma de prazer

Enéada VI, 7, 29

domingo 27 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Capítulos 15-30: O Intelecto   e aquilo que está além dele: a natureza do Bem e as dificuldades que surgem ao redor dele.

  • Cap 15: O Intelecto e a vida inteligível não são senão uma imagem do Bem.
  • Cap 16-18: Em qual sentido o inteligível é uma imagem do Bem? Porque o Intelecto e as formas provêm do Bem.
  • Cap 19-20: Em qual sentido o Bem é um objeto de desejo para a alma  ?
  • Cap 21-23: A alma deseja o Intelecto que é uma imagem do Bem, e é nesta medida que ela tem acesso ao Bem.
  • Cap 24-25, 16: As dificuldades concernindo a definição do Bem como objeto de desejo da alma.
  • Cap 25, 16-18: O Bem não é tal porque é objeto de desejo.
  • Cap 25, 18-32: O Bem é o que se encontra no topo do real.
  • Cap 26: O Bem não é objeto de desejo porque é uma fonte de prazer.
  • Cap 27: O Bem é, para cada realidade, o que vem antes dela; eis o que explica que para o Bem supremo, que nada tem antes dele, não existe qualquer bem.
  • Cap 28: Pode haver um bem para a matéria?
  • Cap 29-30: O Bem procura uma forma de prazer que corresponde à mistura de prazer e inteligência da qual fala Platão no Filebo  .
    

Míguez

29. Ahora bien; si el placer no acompaña al Bien, y si hay en el Bien y anterior   al placer algo que origina el placer mismo, ¿cómo no iba a ser querido el Bien? Si decimos que es querido, decimos ya que es algo placentero. Pero, ¿es qué podría existir el Bien, podría ser posible si no fuese objeto de nuestro deseo? Si así fuese, tendríamos acaso el sentimiento de la presencia del Bien, pero no conoceríamos que está presente  . ¿Hay algo que nos impide conocerlo y dejar de unir un cierto movimiento a esta posesión? Esto podría ocurrir en un ser dotado de suma prudencia y liberado por completo de los deseos. Así en el Ser   Primero, y no tan sólo por ser simple, sino porque la posesión resulta agradable para aquel ser que tiene necesidad de algo.

Pero esto quedará debidamente aclarado cuando se haya   puesto luz en todo lo restante y se encuentre ya al descubierto esa obstinada razón que se nos opone. Y no es otra que la confusión reinante respecto a la posesión de la Inteligencia y a su participación en el Bien. Quien no se siente afectado al escuchar estas cosas es porque realmente no las comprende. No oye más que palabras, o da a las palabras un sentido que no tienen, o tal vez busca el Bien en las cosas sensibles y lo coloca en las riquezas o en cosas de este tipo. Habrá que decir a este hombre que, cuando desdeña los bienes que le ofrecemos, conviene al menos en que tiene en sí la noción del bien; mas, no pudiendo discriminar a qué objetos se aplica, ajusta el bien a esa noción que él mismo posee. Es claro que no podría decir que lo que se le presenta no son bienes, si careciese de experiencia y de noción del bien. Quizá suponga, por su parte, que el Bien se halla por encima de la inteligencia; y entonces, por su desconocimiento del Bien y de las nociones afines a El, parte de las nociones contrarias para llegar a su comprensión. Propondrá que no es un mal la falta de inteligencia, a pesar de que todos pretenden ser inteligentes y se manifiestan orgullosos de serlo. Tenemos una prueba con las sensaciones, que aspiran a ser un conocimiento. Si, pues, la Inteligencia y, de modo especial, la inteligencia primera es algo preciado y hermoso, ¿qué podremos imaginar de quien engendra la Inteligencia y es a la vez su padre  ? El que manifiesta desprecio a la vida testimonia contra sí mismo   y contra sus propios sentimientos. Si realmente se enoja con la vida mezclada de muerte  , habrá de enojarse con esta mezcla, pero no con la vida verdadera.

Bouillet

XXIX. Supposons que le plaisir n’accompagne pas le bien, mais qu’avant le plaisir il existe une chose qui le fasse naître ordinairement [parce qu’elle est bonne], pourquoi le bien ne serait-il pas alors aimable?—Mais en disant que le bien est aimable, nous avons déjà admis qu’il est accompagné de plaisir. — Supposons cependant que le bien puisse exister sans être aimable [par conséquent sans être accompagné de plaisir]. — Dans ce cas, même en présence du bien, l’être qui possède la sensibilité ne saura pas que le bien est présent. — Qui empêche cependant qu’un être ne connaisse la présence du bien sans éprouver aucune émotion lorsqu’il le possède, ce qui convient parfaitement à celui qui est tempérant et qui ne manque de rien? Il résulte de là que le plaisir ne saurait convenir au Premier, non-seulement parce qu’il est simple, mais encore parce que le plaisir a pour cause l’acquisition de ce qui manque.

Mais, pour que cette vérité apparaisse dans tout son jour, il faut que nous ayons auparavant écarté toutes les autres opinions, et surtout que nous ayons réfuté la doctrine qui nous est opposée. Voici la question qu’on nous pose : « Quel fruit recueillera celui qui a l’intelligence nécessaire pour acquérir un de ces biens [tels que l’existence et la vie], si, en les entendant nommer, il n’en est pas frappé parce qu’il ne les comprend pas, soit qu’il n’entende que des mots, soit qu’il regarde chacune de ces choses comme tout autre [que nous ne l’affirmons], soit qu’il cherche le bien et le fasse consister dans un objet sensible  , les richesses par exemple, ou quelque autre objet de ce genre? » — Nous répondrons à celui qui tient un pareil langage que, lorsqu’il méprise ces choses [l’existence et la vie], il reconnaît par là implicitement qu’il y en a lui un certain bien, mais que, sans savoir en quoi il consiste, il n’en juge pas moins de ces choses d’après la notion qu’il a du bien : car il est impossible dédire: «Cela n’est pas le bien, » si l’on n’a aucune espèce de connaissance et de conception du bien (103). Celui qui tient un pareil langage indique peut-être par une espèce de divination que le Bien en soi est au-dessus de l’intelligence. En outre, si en considérant le Bien en soi ou le bien qui en approche le plus il ne le discerne pas, il arrivera du moins à le concevoir par les contraires ; sans cela, il ne saura même pas que le défaut d’intelligence est un mal, quoique tout homme désire être intelligent et se glorifie de l’être, comme on le voit par les sensations qui aspirent à devenir des notions. Si l’intelligence, et surtout l’Intelligence première, est belle et vénérable, quelle admiration ne ressentirait donc pas celui qui pourrait contempler le principe générateur, le Père de l’Intelligence (104)? Par conséquent celui qui prétend mépriser l’existence et la vie reçoit un démenti de lui-même et de toutes affections qu’il éprouve. Si quelqu’un se dégoûte de la vie, c’est qu’il ne considère que celle à laquelle la mort est mêlée et non la vie véritable.

Guthrie

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GOOD FROM PLEASURE PROVED BY THE TEMPERATE MAN.

29. Supposing then that the pleasure does not accompany the good, but that anterior to pleasure there have existed something which would have naturally given rise to it (because of its goodness); why then might not the good be considered lovable? But the mere assertion that good is lovable, already implies that it is accompanied by pleasure. But supposing now that the good could exist without being lovable (and consequently not accompanied by pleasure). In that case, even in presence of the good, the being that possesses sensibility will not know that the good is present. What would however hinder a being from knowing the presence of the good without feeling any emotion at its possession, which would exactly represent the case of the temperate man who lacks nothing? The result would be that pleasure could not be suitable to the First (being), not only because He is simple, but also because pleasure results from the acquisition of what is lacking (and the First lacks nothing, therefore could not feel pleasure).

EVEN SCORN OF LIFE IMPLIES THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD.

But, in order that this truth may appear in its full light, we shall first have to clear away all the other opinions, and especially have to refute the teaching opposite to ours. This is the question asked of us: “What will be the fruit gathered by him who has the intelligence necessary to acquire one of these goods (such as existence and life), if on hearing them named, he be not impressed thereby, because he does not understand them, either because they seem to him no more than words, or because his conception of each of these things should differ (from our view of them), or because in his search for the Good he seeks some sense-object, such as wealth, or the like?” The person who thus scorns these things (existence and life), thereby implicitly recognizes that there is within him a certain good, but that, without knowing in what it consists, he nevertheless values these things according to his own notion of the Good; for it is impossible to say, “that is not the good,” without having some sort of knowledge of the good, or acquaintance therewith. The above speaker seems to betray a suspicion that the Good in itself is above Intelligence. Besides, if in considering the Good in itself, or the good which most approaches it, he do not discern it, he will nevertheless succeed in getting a conception of it by its contraries; otherwise, he would not even know that the lack of intelligence is an evil, though every man desire to be intelligent, and glory in being such, as is seen by the sensations which aspire to become notions. If intelligence, and especially primary Intelligence, be beautiful and venerable, what admiration might not then be felt by him who could contemplate the generating principle, the Father of Intelligence? Consequently, he who affects to scorn existence and life receives a refutation from himself and from all the affections he feels. They who are disgusted of life are those who consider not the true life, but the life which is mingled with death.

MacKenna

29. Suppose, however, that pleasure did not result from the good but there were something preceding pleasure and accounting for it, would not this be a thing to be embraced?

But when we say «to be embraced» we say «pleasure.»

But what if accepting its existence, we think of that existence as leaving still the possibility that it were not a thing to be embraced?

This would mean the good being present and the sentient possessor failing, nonetheless, to perceive it.

It would seem possible, however, to perceive and yet be unmoved by the possession; this is quite likely in the case of the wiser and least dependent - and indeed it is so with the First, immune not merely because simplex  , but because pleasure by acquisition implies lack.

But all this will become clear on the solution of our remaining difficulties and the rebuttal of the argument brought up against us. This takes the form of the question: «What gain is there in the Good to one who, fully conscious, feels nothing when he hears of these things, whether because he has no grasp of them but takes merely the words or because he holds to false values, perhaps being all in search of sense, finding his good in money   or such things?»

The answer is that even in his disregard of the good proposed he is with us in setting a good before him but fails to see how the good we define fits into his own conception. It is impossible to say «Not that» if one is utterly without experience or conception of the «That»; there will generally have been, even, some inkling of the good beyond Intellection. Besides, one attaining or approaching the good, but not recognising it, may assure himself in the light   of its contraries; otherwise he will not even hold ignorance an evil though everyone prefers to know and is proud of knowing so that our very sensations seek to ripen into knowledge.

If the knowing principle - and specially primal Intellectual-Principle - is valuable and beautiful, what must be present to those of power to see the Author and Father of Intellect? Anyone thinking slightingly of this principle of Life and Being brings evidence against himself and all his state: of course, distaste for the life that is mingled with death does not touch that Life Authentic.