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Plotino - Tratado 38,21 (VI, 7, 21) — A alma deseja o Intelecto

Enéada VI, 7, 21

domingo 27 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulos 15-30: O Intelecto e aquilo que está além dele: a natureza do Bem e as dificuldades que surgem ao redor dele.

  • Cap 15: O Intelecto e a vida inteligível não são senão uma imagem do Bem.
  • Cap 16-18: Em qual sentido o inteligível é uma imagem do Bem? Porque o Intelecto e as formas provêm do Bem.
  • Cap 19-20: Em qual sentido o Bem é um objeto de desejo para a alma?
  • Cap 21-23: A alma deseja o Intelecto que é uma imagem do Bem, e é nesta medida que ela tem acesso ao Bem.
  • Cap 24-25, 16: As dificuldades concernindo a definição do Bem como objeto de desejo da alma.
  • Cap 25, 16-18: O Bem não é tal porque é objeto de desejo.
  • Cap 25, 18-32: O Bem é o que se encontra no topo do real.
  • Cap 26: O Bem não é objeto de desejo porque é uma fonte de prazer.
  • Cap 27: O Bem é, para cada realidade, o que vem antes dela; eis o que explica que para o Bem supremo, que nada tem antes dele, não existe qualquer bem.
  • Cap 28: Pode haver um bem para a matéria?
  • Cap 29-30: O Bem procura uma forma de prazer que corresponde à mistura de prazer e inteligência da qual fala Platão no Filebo  .

Míguez

21. ¿Cuál es, por tanto, el carácter único en todas estas cosas y que hace que cada una de ellas sea un bien"? Tengamos el atrevimiento de decirlo: la Inteligencia y la vida del mundo inteligible tienen la forma del Bien, y son por ello, por poseer esta forma, objeto del deseo. Digo que tienen la forma del Bien dando a entender que la vida es el acto del Bien, o mejor todavía, un acto que proviene del Bien. La Inteligencia es este acto cuando ha recibido un límite.

La vida y la inteligencia están en sí mismas ahitas de claridad. Son buscadas por el alma porque el alma proviene de ellas y tiende hacia ellas como a algo propio, pero no porque sean bienes. Si, por otra parte, poseen la forma del bien, razón de más para no desdeñarlas. Lo bueno para un objeto es ser propio del alma; porque si no es un bien, el alma huye de él, y ocurre incluso que el alma se deje llevar hacia objetos alejados de los suyos propios e inferiores a ellos. Entonces, el amor vehemente que el alma siente por estos objetos no se justifica sólo con su ser sino por la adición de algo que les viene del Bien. Al igual que la luz mezclada a la sustancia de los cuerpos necesita de otra luz para hacerse visible, así también los seres inteligibles, por mucha luz que se dé en ellos, precisan todavía de una luz superior para poder presentarse ante sí mismos y ante los demás.

Bouillet

XXI. Quelle est donc la chose une et identique dont la présence dans la Vie, l’Intelligence et l’Idée fait que ce sont des biens? — Ne craignons pas de le dire : l’Intelligence et la Vie première portent la forme du Bien ; c’est à ce titre seul qu’elles sont désirables : elles portent la forme du Bien sous ce rapport que la Vie première est l’acte du Bien, ou plutôt l’acte qui procède du Bien, et que l’Intelligence est cet acte déjà déterminé. Elles sont pleines d’éclat, et l’âme les recherche parce qu’elles viennent du Bien; cependant, si l’âme aspire à elles, c’est parce qu’elles lui sont propres, ce n’est pas qu’elles soient des biens par elles-mêmes. D’un autre côté, l’âme ne saurait les dédaigner, parce qu’elles portent en elles la forme du Bien : car lorsqu’une chose nous est seulement propre, qu’elle n’est pas en outre un bien, nous pouvons la dédaigner (76). Nous nous laissons attirer il est vrai par des objets éloignés et inférieurs; nous éprouvons même pour eux un amour passionné; mais c’est lorsqu’ils ne sont pas seulement ce qu’il est dans leur nature d’être, et qu’ils y joignent encore quelque perfection qui leur vient d’en haut. De même que les corps, tout en contenant une lumière mêlée à leur substance, ont cependant besoin d’être éclairés par une autre lumière pour que leur couleur devienne visible (77), de même les intelligibles, malgré la lumière qu’ils contiennent, ont besoin de recevoir une autre lumière plus puissante afin de devenir visibles soit pour eux-mêmes, soit pour d’autres êtres.

Guthrie

THE GOOD IS INTELLIGENCE AND PRIMARY LIFE.

21. What then is the one and only cause to whose presence is due the goodness (of life, intelligence and idea)? Let us not hesitate to say: Intelligence and primary Life bear the form of Good; it is on this account alone that they are desirable; they bear the form of Good in this respect, that the primary Life is the actualization of the Good, or rather the actualization that proceeds from the Good, and that intelligence is determination of this actualization. (Intelligence and primary Life) are fascinating, and the soul seeks them because they proceed from the Good; nevertheless the soul aspires to them (only) because they fit her, and not because they are good in themselves. On the other hand, the soul could not disdain them because they bear the form of good; though we can disdain something even though it be suitable to us, if it be not a good besides. It is true that we permit ourselves to be allured by distant and inferior objects, and may even feel for them a passionate love; but that occurs only when they have something more than their natural condition, and when some perfection descends on them from on high. Just as the bodies, while containing a light mingled with their (substance), nevertheless need illumination by some other light to bring out their colors, so the intelligible entities, in spite of the light that they contain, need to receive some other more powerful light, so as to become visible, both for themselves, and for others.

MacKenna

21. Now what in all these objects of desire is the fundamental making them good?

We must be bold:

Intellectual-Principle and that life are of the order of good and hold their desirability, even they, in virtue of belonging to that order; they have their goodness, I mean, because Life is an Activity in The Good, - Or rather, streaming from The Good - while Intellectual-Principle is an Activity already defined Therein; both are of radiant beauty and, because they come Thence and lead Thither, they are sought after by the soul-sought, that is, as things congenial though not veritably good while yet, as belonging to that order not to be rejected; the related, if not good, is shunned in spite of that relationship, and even remote and ignobler things may at times prove attractive.

The intense love called forth by Life and Intellectual-Principle is due not to what they are but to the consideration of their nature as something apart, received from above themselves.

Material forms, containing light incorporated in them, need still a light apart from them that their own light may be manifest; just so the Beings of that sphere, all lightsome, need another and a lordlier light or even they would not be visible to themselves and beyond.