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Plotino - Tratado 38,8 (VI, 7, 8) — Os animais devem existir no inteligível

Enéada VI, 7, 8

sábado 26 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Míguez

8. Esto es lo que cabe decir de la facultad sensitiva. ¿Cómo explicar, sin embargo, que el caballo inteligible o cualquier otro animal inteligible no quieran dirigir sus miradas hacia los animales de este mundo? Porque, para que se produzca aquí un caballo o cualquier otro animal, la inteligencia tendrá que descubrir su noción. ¿Cómo concebir, sin embargo, que no tenga la noción del caballo y que haya que supeditar ésta al caballo querido por ella? Es claro que cuando ella quiere producir un caballo, posee ya la noción del caballo; no es posible que tenga su noción tan sólo para producirlo, sino que el caballo que no ha sido engendrado precede necesariamente al caballo que ha de venir después. Existe, pues, este caballo antes de la generación, y no ha sido pensado, precisamente, para que la generación tenga lugar; y la inteligencia que posee el caballo inteligible lo posee por sí misma sin necesidad de mirar a las cosas de aquí abajo; no posee esa noción y las otras para producir las cosas de este mundo. Existen por tanto los inteligibles y las cosas de aquí abajo son una consecuencia necesaria de ellos, porque no es posible detenerse en los inteligibles. Además, ¿quién sería capaz de detener a una potencia que puede permanecer en sí y emitir fuera de sí? Mas, ¿cómo es que existen tales animales en el mundo inteligible? ¿Cómo imaginárnoslos en la divinidad? Aceptado que se trate de animales razonables, ¿qué respeto nos pueden merecer estas manadas de bestias? ¿No tendríamos hacia ellas el sentimiento contrario? Parece conveniente que la unidad de la inteligencia sea múltiple, ya que es claro que sucede al uno absoluto; de otro modo, no se daría después de él, sino que sería él mismo. Como viene después de él no puede ser en modo alguno más unidad que él y alguna inferioridad acusará; pues si lo que es perfecto es uno, convendrá que ella sea más que unidad, dado que la multitud encierra deficiencia.

¿Qué impide que la inteligencia sea una diada? Cada uno de los dos términos de esta diada no podría ser uno en absoluto; tendrían que ser cuando menos dos y otro tanto ocurriría con los nuevos términos. Por otra parte, en la diada primera se daban ya el movimiento y el reposo, y esta misma diada contenía la inteligencia y la vida, la inteligencia perfecta y la vida perfecta. No sería justo hablar de una sola inteligencia, sino mejor de una inteligencia universal que contiene a todas las inteligencias particulares y que es tan grande, e incluso más que todas ellas. Su vida no es la vida de una sola alma, sino la de todas las almas; y tiene una potencia superior: la de producir cada una de las almas. Es, pues, lo que llamaremos el animal perfecto y no contiene solamente al hombre; si así no fuese, sólo existiría el hombre en este mundo.

Bouillet

VIII. Voilà ce que nous avions à dire sur la sensibilité. [Passons maintenant à l’autre question que nous avons posée.]

Comment se fait-il que tous les animaux qui sont (comme le cheval même) contenus dans l’Intelligence divine n’inclinent pas vers les choses d’ici-bas [en les engendrant] ?—Sans doute, pour engendrer ici-bas le cheval ou tout autre animal, l’Intelligence divine a dû en avoir la conception ; cependant il ne faut pas croire qu’elle ait eu d’abord la volonté de produire le cheval, puis la conception de cet animal. Évidemment, elle n’a pu vouloir produire le cheval que parce qu’elle en avait déjà la conception, et elle n’en a pas eu la conception parce qu’elle avait à le produire : ainsi, le cheval qui n’a pas été engendré a précédé le cheval qui devait être engendré postérieurement. Puisque le premier cheval est antérieur à toute génération et n’a pas été conçu pour être engendré, ce n’est pas parce que l’Intelligence divine incline vers les choses d’ici-bas ni parée qu’elle produit, qu’elle a en elle le cheval intelligible et les autres essences. Les intelligibles existaient déjà dans l’Intelligence [avant qu’elle engendrât] et les choses sensibles ont été engendrées ensuite par une conséquence nécessaire : car il était impossible que la procession s’arrêtât aux intelligibles. Qui en effet aurait arrêté cette puissance [de l’Intelligence] capable tout à la fois de procéder et de demeurer en soi (41)?

Mais pourquoi ces animaux [privés de raison] existent-ils dans l’Intelligence divine? On comprend que les êtres doués de raison se trouvent en elle ; mais cette multitude d’êtres privés de raison a-t-elle rien de vénérable? Ne semble-t-elle pas plutôt quelque chose de messéant à l’Intelligence divine? — Évidemment l’Être qui est un doit être aussi multiple, puisqu’il est postérieur à l’Un absolument simple ; sinon, au lieu de lui être inférieur, il se confondrait avec lui. Étant postérieur à l’Un, il ne saurait être plus simple, il l’est donc moins. Or Celui qui est excellent étant l’Un, l’Être devait être plus d’un, puisque la multiplicité est le caractère de l’infériorité. — Pourquoi donc l’Être ne serait-il pas Dyade seulement ? — C’est que chacun des deux éléments de la Dyade ne peut non plus être absolument un, et doit être au moins Dyade; il en est de même de chacun des nouveaux éléments [dans lesquels se décomposeraient les premiers éléments de la Dyade]. En outre, la première Dyade renferme à la fois Mouvement et Stabilité (42) ; elle est aussi Intelligence et Vie parfaite, L’Intelligence a pour caractère non d’être une, mais d’être universelle : elle renferme donc toutes les intelligences particulières; elle est toutes les intelligences et en même temps elle est quelque chose de plus grand. Elle possède la vie non comme Ame une, mais comme Ame universelle, ayant la puissance supérieure de produire les âmes particulières. Elle est enfin l’Animal universel; par conséquent, elle ne doit pas renfermer l’homme seul [mais encore toutes les autres espèces d’animaux]; sinon, l’homme seul existerait sur la terre.

Guthrie

INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY ARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE.

8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it happen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained in divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here below (by generating them)? Doubtless, to beget a horse, or any other animal here below, divine Intelligence must hold its conception; nevertheless it must not be believed that it first had the volition of producing the horse, and only later its conception. Evidently, it could not have wished to produce the horse, but because it already had the conception thereof; and it could not have had the conception thereof but because it had to produce the horse. Consequently, the Horse who was not begotten preceded the horse who later was to be begotten. Since the first Horse has been anterior to all generation, and was not conceived to be begotten, it is not because the divine Intelligence inclines towards the things here below, nor because it produces them, that it contains the intelligible Horse and the other beings. The intelligible entities existed already in Intelligence (before it begat) and the sense-things were later begotten by necessary consequence; for it was impossible that the procession should cease with the intelligibles. Who indeed could have stopped this power of the (Intelligence) which is capable of simultaneous procession, and of remaining within itself?

IRRATIONAL ANIMALS MUST EXIST WITHIN INTELLIGENCE, UNLESS MAN ALONE WAS TO EXIST.

But why should these Animals (devoid of reason) exist in the divine Intelligence? We might understand that animals endowed with reason might be found within it; but does this multitude of irrational animals seem at all admirable? Does it not rather seem something unworthy of the divine Intelligence? Evidently the essence which is one must be also manifold, since it is posterior to the Unity which is absolutely simple; otherwise, instead of being inferior to it, it would fuse with it. Being posterior to that Unity, it could not be more simple, and must therefore be less so. Now as the unity was the One who is excellent, essence had to be less unitary, since multiplicity is the characteristic of inferiority. But why should essence not be merely the “pair” (instead of the manifold)? Neither of the elements of the Pair could any longer be absolutely one, and each would itself become a further pair; and we might point out the same thing of each of the new elements (in which each element of the primary Pair would have split up). Besides, the first Pair contains both movement and stability; it is also intelligence and perfect life. The character of Intelligence is not to be one, but to be universal; it therefore contains all the particular intelligences; it is all the intelligences, and at the same time it is something greater than all. It possesses life not as a single soul, but as a universal Soul, having the superior power of producing individual souls. It is besides the universal living Organism (or, Animal); consequently, it should not contain man alone (but also all the other kinds of animals); otherwise, man alone would exist upon the earth.

MacKenna

8. So much for the thing of sense; but it would appear that the prototype There of the living form, the universal horse, must look deliberately towards this sphere; and, that being so, the idea of horse must have been worked out in order there be a horse here?

Yet what was that there to present the idea of the horse it was desired to produce? Obviously the idea of horse must exist before there was any planning to make a horse; it could not be thought of in order to be made; there must have been horse unproduced before that which was later to come into being. If, then, the thing existed before it was produced - if it cannot have been thought of in order to its production - the Being that held the horse as There held it in presence without any looking to this sphere; it was not with intent to set horse and the rest in being here that they were contained There; it is that, the universal existing, the reproduction followed of necessity since the total of things was not to halt at the Intellectual. Who was there to call a halt to a power capable at once of self-concentration and of outflow?

But how come these animals of earth to be There? What have they to do within God? Reasoning beings, all very well; but this host of the unreasoning, what is there august in them? Surely the very contrary?

The answer is that obviously the unity of our universe must be that of a manifold since it is subsequent to that unity-absolute; otherwise it would be not next to that but the very same thing. As a next it could not hold the higher rank of being more perfectly a unity; it must fall short: since the best is a unity, inevitably there must be something more than unity, for deficiency involves plurality.

But why should it not be simply a dyad?

Because neither of the constituents could ever be a pure unity, but at the very least a duality and so progressively [in an endless dualization]. Besides, in that first duality of the hypothesis there would be also movement and rest, Intellect and the life included in Intellect, all-embracing Intellect and life complete. That means that it could not be one Intellect; it must be Intellect agglomerate including all the particular intellects, a thing therefore as multiple as all the Intellects and more so; and the life in it would nat be that of one soul but of all the souls with the further power of producing the single souls: it would be the entire living universe containing much besides man; for if it contained only man, man would be alone here.