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Plotino - Tratado 22,6 (VI, 4, 6) — A alma pertence ao corpo

Enéada VI, 4, 6

terça-feira 29 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Chap. 6. L’âme appartient au corps qui s’avance vers elle ; et chaque corps reçoit une âme différente.

    

Igal

6. Entonces, ¿por qué no pasa a otro cuerpo? Porque es el cuerpo el que, si puede, debe acercarse a ella; así, la recibirá y la poseerá. Pero, ¿qué es lo que decimos? Ese otro cuerpo posee también un alma   y esa alma es la misma en uno y otro cuerpo. Porque, ciertamente, ¿qué es lo que podría diferenciar a las almas? Diríase, sí acaso, que lo que se añade a una y a otra. Mas, ¿cómo es la misma el alma que está en la mano y en el pie, y no lo es en cambio el alma que se da en una y otra parte del universo  ? Contestaríamos que aquí se dan sensaciones diferentes y, por tanto, también afecciones diferentes. Y no es el mismo el juicio que se formula en uno y otro caso, aunque el principio juzgador sea el mismo; de lo que se trata, en realidad, es de conocer afecciones diferentes cuando no es el mismo el sujeto que recibe esas afecciones sino la naturaleza de un determinado cuerpo. Es lo que ocurre cuando un mismo principio juzga en nosotros el placer que se da en un dedo y el dolor que tiene lugar en la cabeza. ¿Por qué, pues, nos preguntaremos, un alma no se siente solidaria de los juicios de otra alma? Precisamente, por su condición de juicios y no de afecciones. Ya que el alma que ha juzgado no dice realmente lo que ha hecho; ella juzga tan sólo. Es lo que podríamos afirmar en nosotros de la vista y del oído: ambos sentidos se juzgan el uno al otro, pero sin darse a conocer su pensamiento, que está muy por encima de ellos y muestra, asimismo, divergencia con ellos. Con este mismo razonamiento se aprehenden los juicios de otro ser y se llegan a comprender sus propias afecciones. Pero ya se ha hablado de esto en otra parte.

Bouillet

VI. Pourquoi [si l’Ame universelle possède la grandeur que nous lui attribuons] ne s’approche-t-elle pas d’un autre corps [que de celui qu’elle anime, c’est-à-dire d’un corps particulier]? — C’est à ce corps à s’approcher de l’Ame universelle, s’il le peut; en s’approchant d’elle, il en reçoit quelque chose et se l’approprie (30). — Mais cet autre corps qui s’approche de l’Ame universelle ne la possède-t-il pas en même temps qu’il possède l’âme qui lui est propre, puisque ces âmes [l’Ame universelle et l’âme particulière] paraissent ne pas avoir de différence entre elles? — Nous répondrons que ces deux âmes différent par leurs attributions [puisque l’une est l’Ame du monde, et l’autre l’âme d’un individu (31)]. — Mais pourquoi admettons-nous que la même âme est présente dans la main et dans le pied, et en même temps que l’âme qui se trouve dans une partie de l’univers n’est point la même que l’âme qui se trouve dans une autre partie? — C’est que, comme les sensations sont différentes, les passions qui sont éprouvées doivent également différer (32). Les choses jugées sont diverses, mais le juge est le même principe placé successivement en présence des passions différentes, quoique ce ne soit pas lui qui les éprouve, mais bien le corps disposé de telle manière (33). C’est comme lorsque quelqu’un de nous juge également le plaisir éprouvé par le doigt et la douleur 318 éprouvée par la tête. — Pourquoi donc noire âme ne perçoit-elle pas le jugeaient porté par l’Ame universelle? — C’est que c’est un jugement et non une passion. En outre, la faculté qui a jugé la passion ne dit pas : J’ai jugé; elle s’est bornée à juger. Ainsi, en nous-mêmes, ce n’est pas la vue qui communique à l’ouïe son jugement, quoique chacun de ces deux sens ait jugé de son côté ; ce qui préside à ces deux sens, c’est la raison, qui constitue une faculté différente. Souvent aussi la raison connaît le jugement que porte un autre être et a conscience de la passion qu’il éprouve. Mais nous avons traité cette question ailleurs (34).

Guthrie

THE SOULS WILL DIFFER AS WILL THE SENSATIONS.

6. Why (if the universal   Soul possess the magnitude here attributed to her), does she not approach some other body (than that which she animates; that is, some individual body) ? It would be this body’s (privilege or duty) to approach the universal Soul, if it be able to do so; on approaching to her, it receives something, and appropriates it. But would this body, possess her simultaneously with the soul proper to itself, since these souls (the universal Soul, and the individual soul) do not appear to differ from each other? The fact is, that as their sensations differ, so must the passions that they experience likewise differ. The things are judged to be different, but the judge is the same principle successively placed in presence of different passions, although it be not he who experiences them, but the body disposed in some particular manner. It is as if when some one of us judges both the pleasure experienced by the finger, and the pain felt by the head. But why does not our soul perceive judgments made by the universal Soul ? Because this is a judgment, and not a passion. Besides, the faculty that judged the passion does not say, «I have judged,» but it limits itself to judging. Thus, in ourselves, it is not the sight which communicates its judgment to the hearing, although both of these senses made separate judgments; what presides over these two senses is reason, which constitutes a different faculty. Often reason cognizes the judgment made by some other (being), while being conscious simultaneously of the passion it experiences. But this question has been treated elsewhere.

HOW CAN THE SAME PRINCIPLE EXIST IN ALL THINGS?

Let us return to this question: How can the same principle exist in all things? This question amounts to asking how each of the sense  -objects which form a plurality and which occupy different places, can, nevertheless, participate in the same principle; for it is not allowable to divide unity into a multitude of parts; it would be more fitting to reduce the multitude of parts to unity, which could not approach them. But when these parts occupy different places, they have led us to believe that unity likewise is split up, as if the power which dominates and which contains were divided into as many parts as that which is contained. The hand itself (though corporeal), may hold an entire body, such as a piece of wood several feet in length, and other objects. In this case, the force that holds makes itself felt in the whole object that is felt, and does not distribute itself in as many parts as it may contain, though it be circumscribed by the limit of the reach of the hand. Nevertheless, the hand is limited by its own extension, and not by that of the body which is held or suspended. Add to the suspended body some other length, and admitting that the hand can carry it, its force will hold the entire body without dividing into as many parts as it may contain. Now suppose that the corporeal mass of the hand be annihilated, and, nevertheless, allow the force which, before, existed in the hand and held the weight, to persist; will not this same force, indivisible   in the totality, be equally indivisible in each of its parts?

MacKenna

6. But why does not one same soul enter more than one body?

Because any second body must approach, if it might; but the first has approached and received and keeps.

Are we to think that this second body, in keeping its soul with a like care, is keeping the same soul as the first?

Why not: what difference is there? Merely some additions [from the experiences of life, none in the soul itself].

We ask further why one soul in foot and hand and not one soul in the distinct members of the universe.

Sensations no doubt differ from soul to soul but only as do the conditions and experiences; this is difference not in the judging principle but in the matters coming to judgement; the judge is one and the same soul pronouncing upon various events, and these not its own but belonging to a particular body; it is only as a man pronounces simultaneously upon a pleasant sensation in his finger and a pain in his head.

But why is not the soul in one man aware, then, of the judgement passed by another?

Because it is a judgement made, not a state set up; besides, the soul that has passed the judgement does not pronounce but simply judges: similarly a man’s sight does not report to his hearing, though both have passed judgement; it is the reason above both that reports, and this is a principle distinct from either. Often, as it happens, reason does become aware of a verdict formed in another reason and takes to itself an alien experience: but this has been dealt with elsewhere.