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Plotino - Tratado 44,19 (VI, 3, 19) — A qualidade: novos problemas

Enéada VI, 3, 19

sábado 18 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Igal

19 Con las cualidades hay que coordinar, como pensábamos, los cualificados por ellas en cuanto hay cualidad en ellos, sin tener en cuenta los sujetos mismos, sino remontándonos de los sujetos a la cualidad por la que se denominan. Ahora bien, si «no blanco» significa un color distinto del blanco, es cualidad. Pero si es mera negación, no es otra cosa que una voz, o un nombre o un enunciado de lo que sucede en la cosa misma. Pero si es una voz, es un movimiento; si es un nombre o un enunciado, es relación en cuanto significativo. Mas si clasificación por géneros no consiste en una mera enunciación de las cosas, sino que debe tener en cuenta también los significados y los significantes, de qué género es significativo cada uno, diremos que algunos de éstos son, por sí mismos y por su sola denotación, afirmativos, y otros negativos. Aunque tal vez sería mejor no tener en cuenta los enunciados negativos, puesto que no tenemos en cuenta los afirmativos por ser compuestos.

—Y las privaciones ¿qué son?

—Si las cosas de que son privaciones son cualidades, también ellas son cualidades, por ejemplo «desdentado» o «ciego». En cambio, ni «desnudo» ni «vestido» son cualidades, sino más bien modos; entran, pues, en la relación relativa a otro. La pasión consistente en estar padeciendo todavía, no es cualidad, sino un movimiento, mientras la consistente en haber padecido y seguir padeciendo una pasión ya permanente, es cualidad. Mas si el sujeto ya no la padece pero se dice «haberla padecido», eso quiere decir «haber estado en movimiento», y esto es lo mismo que «estuvo en movimiento». Pero hay que considerar sólo el movimiento, prescindiendo del tiempo, pues no conviene poner en cuenta ni siquiera el «ahora».

La calificación «hermosamente» y otras por el estilo deben ser reducidas a un solo concepto: el del género. Cabe preguntarse si al cualificado es reductible el ruboroso, pero no ya el ruborizado; porque el ruborizarse no es reductible, y con razón: eso es pasión o movimiento en general. No obstante, si está, no ya ruborizándose, sino ruborizado, ¿por qué no ha de ser tenido por cualificado? El cualificado no debe ser definido por el tiempo (¿por qué cantidad de tiempo?), sino por su cualidad; ahora bien, al llamarlo «ruborizado», lo cualificamos. De lo contrario, habría que decir que sólo los hábitos son cualidades, pero no ya las disposiciones.

En conclusión, será cualificado el caliente, pero no el que se está calentando, y el que está enfermo, pero no el que se está poniendo enfermo.

Bouillet

XIX. Dans le genre de la qualité rentrent encore, comme nous l’avons déjà indiqué, les êtres qui sont dits qualifiés [les qualitatifs], en tant qu’il y a en eux une qualité [l’homme beau, par exemple, en tant qu’il est doué de beauté (80)]. Ces êtres n’appartiennent cependant pas proprement à ce genre (sans quoi il y aurait ici deux catégories) ; il suffit à leur égard dé ramener à la qualité ce qui fait dire d’eux qu’ils sont tels ou tels.

Le non-blanc, s’il indique une couleur autre que le blanc, est une qualité; s’il n’exprime qu’une négation ou une énumération, ce n’est qu’un mot, un nom, un terme qui rappelle l’objet : si c’est un mot, il constitue un mouvement [en tant qu’il est produit par l’organe vocal] ; si c’est un nom ou un terme, il constitue un relatif en tant qu’il est significatif. Si les choses ne sont pas seules classées par genres, si l’on admet que les assertions et les expressions énoncent aussi chacune un genre, nous dirons que les unes affirment les choses en les énonçant seulement, et que les autres les nient. Il vaut peut-être mieux ne pas comprendre les négations dans le même genre que les choses elles-mêmes, puisque souvent nous n’y comprenons pas les affirmations, pour éviter de mélanger plusieurs genres.

Passons aux privations. Si les choses dont il y a privation sont des qualités, les privations sont alors elles-mêmes des qualités, comme édenté, aveugle (81). Mais nu et [son contraire] vêtu ne sont ni l’un ni l’autre des qualités ; ils constituent plutôt des habitudes et rentrent dans les relatifs.

286 La passion, au moment où elle est éprouvée, ne constitue pas une qualité, mais un mouvement ; lorsqu’elle a été éprouvée et qu’elle est devenue durable, elle forme une qualité (82); enfin, si l’être qui a éprouvé la passion n’en a rien gardé, il faut dire de lui qu’il a été mû, ce qui revient à avoir été en mouvement. Il faut seulement concevoir alors le mouvement abstraction faite du temps : car il ne convient pas de joindre à la conception du mouvement celle du présent (83).

Enfin, [l’adverbe] bien et les autres termes analogues rentrent dans la simple notion du genre de la qualité.

Il nous reste à examiner s’il faut rapporter au genre de la qualité être rouge sans y ramener aussi rougissant (84) : car rougir n’y rentre pas, parce que celui qui rougit pâtit ou est mû. Mais s’il cesse de rougir, s’il a rougi, il a une qualité : car la qualité ne dépend pas du temps, mais consiste à être de telle ou telle sorte ; d’où suit qu’ayant rougi est une qualité. De cette manière, nous regarderons comme qualités seulement les habitudes et non les simples dispositions (85) : étant chaud, par exemple, et non s’échauffant, étant malade, et non devenant malade.

Guthrie

VARIOUS DERIVATIVES OF THE CATEGORY OF QUALITY.

19. As has been indicated above, the genus of quality contains the (beings) which are said to be qualified (qualitative entities), inasmuch as they contain some quality (as, for instance, the handsome man, so far as he is endowed with beauty). These (beings) however do not properly belong to this genus, for otherwise there would here be two categories. It suffices to reduce them to the quality which supplies their name.

So non-whiteness, if it indicate some color other than white, is a quality; if it express merely a negation, or an enumeration, it is only a word, or a term which recalls the object; if it be a word, it constitutes a movement (so far as it is produced by the vocal organ); if it be a name or a term, it constitutes, so far as it is a significative, a relative. If things be classed not only by genera, if it be admitted that each assertion and expression proclaim a genus, our answer must be that some affirm things by their mere announcement, and that others deny them. It may perhaps be best not to include negations in the same genus as things themselves, since, to avoid mingling several genera, we often do not include affirmations.

As to privations, it may be remarked that if the things of which there are privations are qualities, then the privations themselves are qualities, as “toothless,” or “blind.” But “naked” and (its contrary) “clothed” are neither of them qualities; they rather constitute habits, and thus belong among relatives.

Passion, at the moment it is felt, does not constitute a quality, but a movement; when it has been experienced, and has become durable, it forms a quality; further, if the (being) which has experienced the passion have kept none of it, it will have to be described as having been moved, which amounts to the same thing as really being moved. However, in this case, the conception of time will have to be abstracted from that of movement; for we must not add the conception of the present to that of movement.

Finally, (the adverb) “well,” and the other analogous terms may be reduced to the simple notion of the genus of quality.

It remains to examine if we must refer to the genus of quality “being red” without also doing so for “reddening” for “blushing” does not belong to it, because he who blushes suffers (experiences), or is moved. But as soon as he ceases blushing, if he have already blushed, this is a quality; for quality does not depend on time, but consists in being such or such; whence it follows that “having blushed” is a quality. Therefore we shall regard as qualities only habits, and not mere dispositions; being warm, for instance, and not warming up; being sick, but not becoming sick.

MacKenna

19. With Quality we have undertaken to group the dependent qualia, in so far as Quality is bound up with them; we shall not however introduce into this category the qualified objects [qua objects], that we may not be dealing with two categories at once; we shall pass over the objects to that which gives them their [specific] name.

But how are we to classify such terms as "not white"? If "not white" signifies some other colour, it is a quality. But if it is merely a negation of an enumeration of things not white, it will be either a meaningless sound, or else a name or definition of something actual: if a sound, it is a kind of motion; if a name or definition, it is a relative, inasmuch as names and definitions are significant. But if not only the things enumerated are in some one genus, but also the propositions and terms in question must be each of them significative of some genus, then we shall assert that negative propositions and terms posit certain things within a restricted field and deny others. Perhaps, however, it would be better, in view of their composite nature, not to include the negations in the same genus as the affirmations.

What view, then, shall we take of privations? If they are privations of qualities, they will themselves be qualities: "toothless" and "blind," for example, are qualities. "Naked" and "dothed," on the other hand, are neither of them qualities but states: they therefore comport a relation to something else.

[With regard to passive qualities:]

Passivity, while it lasts, is not a quality but a motion; when it is a past experience remaining in one’s possession, it is a quality; if one ceases to possess the experience then regarded as a finished occurrence, one is considered to have been moved - in other words, to have been in Motion. But in none of these cases is it necessary to conceive of anything but Motion; the idea of time should be excluded; even present time has no right to be introduced.

"Well" and similar adverbial expressions are to be referred to the single generic notion [of Quality].

It remains to consider whether blushing should be referred to Quality, even though the person blushing is not included in this category. The fact of becoming flushed is rightly not referred to Quality; for it involves passivity - in short, Motion. But if one has ceased to become flushed and is actually red, this is surely a case of Quality, which is independent of time. How indeed are we to define Quality but by the aspect which a substance presents? By predicating of a man redness, we clearly ascribe to him a quality.

We shall accordingly maintain that states alone, and not dispositions, constitute qualities: thus, "hot" is a quality but not "growing hot," "ill" but not "turning ill."