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Plotino - Tratado 44,10 (VI, 3, 10) — Divisão da realidade sensível em espécies: novos

Enéada VI, 3, 10

sábado 18 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Igal

10 También es posible hacer la división en el criterio de caliente y seco, seco y frío, húmedo y frío, o cualquier otro par, y luego componer y mezclar a partir de estos, y o quedarse aquí, deteniéndose en el compuesto, o seguir dividiendo en animal   dentro de la tierra y animal sobre la tierra, o por sus formas, o por las diferencias de los animales, no dividiendo los animales, sino dividiendo según sus cuerpos como órganos. Mas la división por sus formas no es absurda, puesto que tampoco lo es la división por sus cualidades, calor, frialdad y otras por el estilo. Y si alguien objeta: «Pero por las cualidades son activos los cuerpos», responderemos que también son activos por las mezclas, por los colores y por las figuras. Porque como estamos tratando de la sustancia sensible  , no sería absurda la división si la basáramos en las diferencias relativas a la sensación. Y es que dicha sustancia no es ente   sin más, sino que este conjunto   es ente sensible.

Decíamos, efectivamente, que aun su aparente realidad consistía en un encuentro de las cosas relativas a la sensación, y la garantía de su ser nos venía de la sensación. Ahora bien, si la combinación de los sensibles varía infinitamente, hay que dividirlos por sus formas, por ejemplo la forma de hombre presente   en un cuerpo, ya que ésta, la tal forma, es cualidad de un cuerpo. Pero dividirlos por su cualidad no es absurdo. Por otra parte, si hemos hablado de cuerpos simples y compuestos contradistinguiendo el compuesto del simple, también hemos hablado de cuerpos más materiales y de cuerpos orgánicos, sin tener en cuenta la composición. Ahora bien, no es una contradistinción el comparar lo que es compuesto con lo que es simple, sino el determinar, en una primera división, los cuerpos simples, y luego, partiendo de otro principio subordinado, mezclarlos entre sí y diferenciar los compuestos por lugares o formas, por ejemplo los celestes y los terrestres.

Esto es lo que hay acerca de las sustancias, o mejor, del devenir de las cosas sensibles.

Bouillet

X. On peut encore diviser les corps en chauds et secs, 266 secs et froids, froids et humides, ou de toute autre manière qu’on voudra en prenant deux qualités à la fois, puis faire de ces choses une composition et une mixtion, et s’arrêter au composé ; ou bien encore distinguer les corps en terrestres et nabi   tant sur la terre ; ou bien les distribuer d’après leurs formes et les différences des animaux, en classant non les animaux mêmes, mais leurs corps, qui sont comme leurs instruments (41). Il est convenable d’établir une différence d’après les formes, comme il est également raisonnable de diviser les corps d’après les qualités, la chaleur, le froid, etc. Si l’on objecte que les corps sont constitués plutôt par leurs qualités, nous répondrons qu’ils sont constitués aussi par leurs mixtions, leurs couleurs et leurs figures. Lorsqu’on traite de la substance sensible, il n’est pas déraisonnable de la diviser d’après les différences qui tombent sous les sens. Cette substance ne possède pas l’existence véritable ; c’est l’ensemble de la mati  ère et des qualités qui constitue l’être sensible, puisque nous avons dit que sou   existence apparente consiste dans l’union de choses qui sont perçues par les sens (42), et que c’est d’après le témoignage de leurs sens que les hommes croient à l’existence de ces choses.

La composition des corps étant très-variée, on peut les classer d’après les formes spécifiques des animaux; telle est, par exemple, la forme spécifique de l’homme unie à un corps : car cette forme est une qualité du corps et il est raisonnable de diviser d’après les qualités. Si l’on nous objecte que nous avons dit plus haut que les corps sont les uns simples, les autres composés, opposant ainsi les simples aux composés, nous répondrons que nous avons dit aussi qu’ils sont bruts ou organisés, sans avoir égard à leur composition. On ne doit pas fonder la division des corps sur l’opposition du simple au composé, mais on peut, comme nous l’avons fait d’abord, placer au premier rang les corps simples, puis, considérant leurs mixtions, partir d’un autre principe pour déterminer les différences qu’offrent les composés sous le rapport de leur figure ou de leur lieu ; de cette manière, on les partagerait en corps célestes  , par exemple, et corps terrestres.

Nous terminerons ici ce que nous avions à dire de la substance sensible ou génération.

Guthrie

BODIES MAY BE CLASSIFIED NOT ONLY BY FORMS; BUT BY QUALITIES; ETC.

10. Bodies may also be distinguished by heat or dryness, wetness or cold, or in any other desired manner, by taking two qualities simultaneously, then considering these things as a composition and mixture, and ceasing at the combination thereof. Or, bodies may be divided in terrestrial bodies, that dwell on the earth, or distribute them according to their forms, and the differences of animals; by classifying not the animals themselves, but their bodies, which are their instruments, as it were. It is proper to establish a classification according to the forms, as it is equally reasonable to classify bodies according to their qualities, such as heat, cold, and so forth. If it be objected that bodies are constituted rather by their qualities, it may be answered that they are just as much classified by their blends, their colors, and their figures. When analyzing sense-being, it is not unreasonable to classify it according to the differences that appear to the senses. This (”being”) does not possess absolute (Essence); it is the totality of the matter and qualities which constitutes the sense-being, since we have said that its hypostatic existence consists in the union of the things perceived by the senses, and that it is according to the testimony of their senses that men believe in the existence of things.

BODIES ARE CLASSIFIABLE ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC FORMS.

The composition of the bodies being varied, they may also be classified according to the specific forms of the animals. Such, for instance, would be the specific form of a man united to a body; for this form is a quality of body, and it is reasonable to analyze it according to the qualities. If it should be objected that we have said above that some bodies are simple, while others are composite, thus contrasting the simple and the composite, we shall answer that, without regarding their composition, we have also said that they are either brute or organized. The classification of bodies should not be founded on the contrast between the simple and the composite, but, as we first did, we may classify the simple bodies in the first rank. Then, by considering their blendings, one may start from another principle to determine the differences offered by the composites under the respect of their figure or their location; thus, for instance, bodies might be classified in celestial and terrestrial. This may close our consideration of sense-being, or generation.

MacKenna

10. Another method of division is possible: substances may be classed as hot-dry, dry-cold, cold-moist, or however we choose to make the coupling. We may then proceed to the combination and blending of these couples, either halting at that point and going no further than the compound, or else subdividing by habitation - on the earth, in the earth - or by form and by the differences exhibited by living beings, not qua living, but in their bodies viewed as instruments of life.

Differentiation by form or shape is no more out of place than a division based on qualities - heat, cold and the like. If it be objected that qualities go to make bodies what they are, then, we reply, so do blendings, colours, shapes. Since our discussion is concerned with Sensible Substance, it is not strange that it should turn upon distinctions related to sense-perception: this Substance is not Being pure and simple, but the Sensible Being which we call the Universe.

We have remarked that its apparent subsistence is in fact an assemblage of Sensibles, their existence guaranteed to us by sense-perception. But since their combination is unlimited, our division must be guided by the Form-Ideas of living beings, as for example the Form-Idea   of Man implanted in Body; the particular Form acts as a qualification of Body, but there is nothing unreasonable in using qualities as a basis of division.

We may be told that we have distinguished between simple and composite bodies, even ranking them as opposites. But our distinction, we reply, was between material and organic bodies and raised no question of the composite. In fact, there exists no means of opposing the composite to the simple; it is necessary to determine the simples in the first stage of division, and then, combining them on the basis of a distinct underlying principle, to differentiate the composites in virtue of their places and shapes, distinguishing for example the heavenly from the earthly.

These observations will suffice for the Being [Substance], or rather the Becoming, which obtains in the Sensible realm.