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Plotino - Tratado 44,5 (VI, 3, 5) — Os caracteres mencionados são caracteres comuns

Enéada VI, 3, 5

sábado 18 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Os caracteres que acabam de ser mencionados são caracteres comuns, mas não caracteres próprios

Igal

5 Esto debe ser entendido con referencia a la supuesta sustancia de acá. ¿Conviene también, en cierto modo, a la de allá? Tal vez si, en sentido análogo y equívoco. Porque también lo «primero» se predica en comparación con lo que le sigue: «primero» no se predica simplemente, sino que hay cosas que son últimas: comparación con las inteligibles, pero primeras después de aquellas. Así también, «sujeto» se predica allá en sentido distinto. Es dudoso que se dé allá el padecer; pero si se da, el padecer de allá es distinto. El «no estar en un sujeto» se predica de toda sustancia, si por «estar en un sujeto» debe entenderse en el sentido de «no estar a modo de parte de aquello en que está», ni estar de tal manera que «tampoco contribuya junto con ello a la formación de algo uno», ya que no puede estar como en un sujeto en aquello con lo que contribuye «a la formación de una sustancia compuesta». En consecuencia, ni la forma está en la materia como en un sujeto ni el hombre está en Sócrates  , pues forma parte de Sócrates  .

Así, pues, lo que no está en un sujeto es sustancia. Pero si decimos «ni está en un sujeto ni se predica de un sujeto», hay que añadir «en cuanto otro», a fin de que aun el hombre que se predica de un hombre particular pueda ser comprendido en la fórmula gracias a la añadidura «no en cuanto otro». Porque cuando predico «hombre» de Sócrates  , lo predico no en el sentido en que digo que el leño es blanco, sino en el que digo que lo blanco es blanco. Porque cuando digo que Sócrates   es hombre, digo que un hombre particular es hombre; predico «hombre» del hombre que hay en Sócrates  , y esto equivale a decir que Sócrates   es Sócrates   y a predicar además «animal» de tal animal racional. Y si alguno objetara que «el no estar en un sujeto no es propio de la sustancia, ya que la diferencia misma tampoco es de las cosas que están en un sujeto», es que tomando, por ejemplo, bipedidad como parte de la sustancia, dice que no está en un sujeto. Porque si no tomara la bipeidad que es la diferencia de la sustancia, sino que hablara de la bipedidad que no es sustancia, sino cualidad, ésta estará en un sujeto.

—Pero tampoco el tiempo está en un sujeto, ni tampoco el lugar.

—Pero si la «medida del movimiento» se toma en el sentido de «lo medido» la medida estará en el movimiento como en un sujeto, y el movimiento en el móvil. Y si se toma en el sentido de «lo mensurante», la medida estará en el mensurante. El lugar, siendo «límite del continente», estará en el continente. Por lo que se refiere a la sustancia sensible, de la que estamos tratando, sucede al contrario que la tal sustancia puede ser considerada en relación con una, varias o todas las notas indicadas, ya que las notas indicadas convienen tanto a la materia como a la forma y al compuesto de ambas.

Bouillet

V. Tels sont les caractères de la substance sensible. S’ils conviennent aussi sous quelque rapport à la substance intelligible, ce n’est que par analogie et par homonymie (20). C’est ainsi que le premier est appelé de ce nom par rapport au reste : car il n’est pas premier absolument, mais plutôt à l’égard des choses qui tiennent un rang inférieur; bien plus, les choses qui suivent le premier sont aussi appelées premières à l’égard de celles qui viennent après elles. De même, en parlant des choses intelligibles, le mot sujet se prend dans un autre sens. On se demande également si celles-ci peuvent pâtir, et l’on conçoit que si elles pâtissent, c’est d’une tout autre manière (21).

N’être pas dans un sujet est donc le caractère commun de toute substance, si, par n’être pas dans un sujet, on entend ne pas faire partie d’un sujet et ne pas concourir avec lui à former une unité. En effet, ce qui concourt avec une chose à former une substance composée ne saurait être dans cette chose comme dans un sujet : la forme n’est donc pas dans la matière comme dans un sujet, et l’homme n’est pas non plus dans Socrate   comme dans un sujet parce que l’homme fait partie de Socrate   (22). Ainsi, la substance est ce qui n’est pas dans un sujet. Si l’on ajoute que la substance ne se dit d’aucun sujet, il faut ajouter encore en tant que ce sujet est autre chose qu’elle : autrement l’homme, affirmé de tel homme, ne se trouverait pas compris dans la définition delà substance, si [en affirmant que la substance ne se dit d’aucun sujet] nous n’ajoutions : en tant que ce sujet est autre chose qu’elle. Quand je dis : Socrate   est homme, c’est comme si je disais : Le blanc est blanc, et non : Le bois est blanc ; en affirmant en effet que Socrate   est homme, j’affirme qu’Un certain homme est homme, que L’homme qui est dans Socrate   est homme; c’est la même chose que si je disais : Socrate   est Socrate  , ou : Tel animal raisonnable est animal.

Mais, objectera-t-on peut-être, la propriété de la substance ne consiste pas à n’être pas dans un sujet : car la différence [bipède, par exemple] est aussi une des choses qui ne sont pas dans un sujet (23). — Si l’on considère bipède comme une partie de la substance, on est forcé de reconnaître que bipède n’est pas dans un sujet ; si l’on n’entend pas par bipède telle substance, mais la propriété d’être bipède, alors on ne parle plus d’une substance, mais d’une qualité, et bipède sera dans un sujet. — Mais le temps et le lieu ne paraissent pas être dans un sujet. — Si l’on définit le temps « la mesure du mouvement (24), » ou le temps sera le mouvement mesuré, et alors il sera dans le mouvement comme dans un sujet, tandis que le mouvement sera luimême dans la chose mue ; ou bien le temps sera ce qui mesure [l’âme ou l’instant présent (25) ], et alors il sera dans ce qui mesure comme dans un sujet. Quant au lieu, comme il est la limite de ce qui contient, il sera également dans ce qui contient (26). Il en est tout autrement de la substance que nous considérons ici. Il faut donc faire consister la substance, soit dans une, soit dans plusieurs, soit dans toutes les propriétés dont nous parlons, parce que ces propriétés conviennent à la fois à la matière, à la forme et au composé.

Guthrie

RELATION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND INTELLIGIBLE TERMS ARE MERELY VERBAL.

5. Such are the characteristics of sense-being. If in any way they also suit intelligible “being,” it is only by analogy, or by figure of speech (homonymy). So, for instance, the “first” is so called in respect of the remainder; for it is not absolutely first, but only in respect to the things which hold an inferior rank; far more, the things which follow the first are also called first in respect to those which follow. Likewise, in speaking of intelligible things, the word “subject” is used in a different sense. It may also be doubted that they suffer (”experience”), and it is evident that if they do suffer, it is in an entirely different manner.

PHYSICAL BEING IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN A SUBJECT.

Not to be in a subject is then the common characteristic of all “being,” if, by “not being in a subject,” we mean “not to form part of any subject,” and “not to contribute to the formation of a unity therewith.” Indeed, that which contributes to the formation of a composite being, with something else, could not be in that thing as in a subject; form therefore is not in matter as in a subject, and neither is “man” in Socrates   as in a subject, because “man” forms part of Socrates  . Thus, “being” is that which is not in a subject. If we add that “being” is not predicated of any subject, we must also add, “insofar as this subject is something different from itself;” otherwise “man,” predicated of some one man, would not be comprised within the definition of “being,” if (in asserting that “being” is not predicated of any subject), we did not add, “so far as this subject is something different from itself.” When I say, “Socrates   is a man,” I am practically saying, “White is white,” and not, “wood is white.” While actually asserting that “Socrates   is a man,” I am asserting that a particular man is a man, and to say “The man who is in Socrates   is a man,” amounts to saying “Socrates   is Socrates  ,” or, “that particular reasonable living organism is a living organism.”

ALL THE OTHER PHYSICAL CATEGORIES REFER TO MATTER, FORM OR COMBINATION.

It might however be objected that the property of “being” does not consist in being a subject; for the difference (as, for instance, a biped), is also one of those things which are not in a subject. If “biped” be considered as a part of being, we are compelled to recognize that “biped” is not in a subject; but if by “biped” we do not mean some particular “being” but the property of being a biped, then we are no longer speaking of a being, but of a quality, and “biped” will be in a subject.

But time and place do not seem to be in a subject! If we define time as “the measure of movement,” (there are two possibilities). First, time might be measured movement; and then it will be in movement as in a subject, while movement itself will be in the moved thing. Or, time will be what measures (the soul, or the present moment), and then it will be in what measures as in a subject. As to space, as it is the limit of what contains, it will also reside in what contains. It is otherwise with the “being” that we are here considering. “Being,” then, will have to be considered as consisting in either one, or in several, or in all the properties of which we are speaking; because these properties simultaneously suit matter, form, and the combination.

MacKenna

5. These are incontrovertible facts in regard to the pseudo-substance of the Sensible realm: if they apply also in some degree to the True Substance of the Intellectual, the coincidence is, doubtless, to be attributed to analogy and ambiguity of terms.

We are aware that "the first" is so called only in relation to the things which come after it: "first" has no absolute significance; the first of one series is subsequent to the last of another. "Substrate," similarly, varies in meaning [as applied to the higher and to the lower], while as for passivity its very existence in the Intellectual is questionable; if it does exist there, it is not the passivity of the Sensible.

It follows that the fact of "not being present in a subject [or substrate] is not universally true of Substance, unless presence in a subject be stipulated as not including the case of the part present in the whole or of one thing combining with another to form a distinct unity; a thing will not be present as in a subject in that with which it co-operates in the information of a composite substance. Form, therefore, is not present in Matter as in a subject, nor is Man so present in Socrates  , since Man is part of Socrates  .

Substance, then, is that which is not present in a subject. But if we adopt the definition "neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject," we must add to the second "subject" the qualification "distinct," in order that we may not exclude the case of Man predicated of a particular man. When I predicate Man of Socrates  , it is as though I affirmed, not that a piece of wood is white, but that whiteness is white; for in asserting that Socrates   is a man, I predicate Man [the universal] of a particular man, I affirm Man of the manhood in Socrates  ; I am really saying only that Socrates   is Socrates  , or that this particular rational animal is an animal.

It may be objected that non-presence in a subject is not peculiar to Substance, inasmuch as the differentia of a substance is no more present in a subject than the substance itself; but this objection results from taking a part of the whole substance, such as "two-footed" in our example, and asserting that this part is not present in a subject: if we take, not "two-footed" which is merely an aspect of Substance, but "two-footedness" by which we signify not Substance but Quality, we shall find that this "two-footedness" is indeed present in a subject.

We may be told that neither Time nor Place is present in a subject. But if the definition of Time as the measure of Motion be regarded as denoting something measured, the "measure" will be present in Motion as in a subject, while Motion will be present in the moved: if, on the contrary, it be supposed to signify a principle of measurement, the "measure" will be present in the measurer.

Place is the limit of the surrounding space, and thus is present in that space.

The truth is, however, that the "Substance" of our enquiry may be apprehended in directly opposite ways: it may be determined by one of the properties we have been discussing, by more than one, by all at once, according as they answer to the notions of Matter, Form and the Couplement.