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Plotino - Tratado 44,1 (VI, 3, 1) — Os gêneros do ser: problema geral

Enéada VI, 3, 1

sábado 18 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Segundo Guthrie   o capítulo trata de como os gêneros do físico são diferentes daqueles do inteligível. O mundo deve ser estudado assim como se analisaria a voz. Devemos primeiro dissecar a alma do corpo, para examiná-la.

Igal

1 Ya hemos dicho cuál es nuestro parecer sobre la Esencia y cómo parece estar en consonancia con la opinión de Platón  . Ahora bien hay que estudiar la otra naturaleza: ¿Hay que establecer los mismos géneros que los que establecíamos allá? ¿O acá más géneros que allá, añadiendo algunos otros a aquéllos? ¿O completamente distintos de los de allá? ¿O en parte los mismos y en parte distintos? Lo de «los mismos» hay que entenderlo, sin embargo, en sentido análogo y equívoco. Mas esto aparecerá más claro cuando los hayamos conocido.

Nuestro punto de partida es el siguiente: Puesto que nuestra discusión versa sobre los seres sensibles y puesto que todo lo sensible está circunscrito a este cosmos, forzosamente habrá que investigar sobre el cosmos analizando su naturaleza y, analizando sus componentes, clasificarlos por géneros, del mismo modo que si analizáramos la voz, que es indefinida, en un número determinado de sonidos, reuniendo en grupo una misma característica común a muchos, luego otra y después otra hasta que hubiéramos incluido cada sonido en un grupo, llamando especie a la característica común a los sonidos individuales, y género, a la común a las especies. En el caso de la voz era, pues, posible reducir a unidad cada especie, juntar todos los componentes detectados y predicar de todos ellos el término «elemento» o «Voz». Pero en el caso de las cosas que estamos investigando, esta reducción no es posible, como ya ha quedado demostrado. Por eso es preciso buscar más géneros, y géneros que, en el universo de acá, sean distintos de los de allá, puesto que el universo de acá es distinto del de allá, y no es unívoco, sino equívoco; es una imagen.

Pero como, además, en esta mezcla y en este compuesto de acá, uno de los componentes es cuerpo y el otro alma —pues el universo es un animal— y como la naturaleza del alma reside en el mundo inteligible y no encaja ni siquiera en el rango de lo que acá llamamos «sustancia», es preciso, por difícil que sea, dejar el alma fuera del presente estudio, del mismo modo que si uno quisiera clasificar a los ciudadanos de una ciudad determinada por su censo o por su oficio, dejaría aparte a los extranjeros residentes en ella. Por lo que toca a las afecciones que le sobrevienen al alma con el cuerpo o a través del cuerpo, más adelante, cuando investiguemos acerca de las cosas de acá, estudiaremos cómo deban ser clasificadas.

Bouillet

I. Nous avons traité de l’essence intelligible ; nous avons dit ce qu’elle nous paraît être et comment on doit la concevoir pour être d’accord avec la doctrine de Platon  . Il nous faut maintenant traiter de l’autre nature [de l’essence sensible] (1) : nous aurons à rechercher s’il convient d’établir ici les mêmes genres que pour l’essence intelligible, ou d’en admettre un plus grand nombre et d’en ajouter quelques-uns à ceux que nous avons déjà reconnus; ou bien si les genres diffèrent entièrement dans l’une et dans l’autre essence, ou si quelques-uns seulement sont différents, les autres restant identiques. S’il y en a qui soient identiques dans l’une et dans l’autre essence, cela ne peut s’entendre que par analogie et par homonymie; c’est ce qui deviendra évident quand on connaîtra bien chacune de ces essences.

Voici par quoi il nous faut commencer. Ayant à parler des choses sensibles et sachant que toutes sont contenues dans ce monde inférieur, nous devons d’abord porter nos recherches sur ce monde, y établir des divisions d’après la nature des êtres qui le composent et les distribuer en genres, comme nous ferions si nous avions à diviser la voix, 247 dont la nature est infinie [par la diversité des sons qu’elle comprend], en la ramenant à un nombre déterminé d’espèces (2). Remarquant ce qu’il y a de commun entre beaucoup de sons, nous les ramènerions à une unité, puis à une unité supérieure, et à une autre supérieure encore, jusqu’à ce que nous eussions réduit ces sons à un petit nombre de classes : alors, nous appellerions espèce ce qui se trouve dans les individus, et genre ce qui se trouve dans les espèces. Pour la voix, il est facile de trouver chaque espèce, de ramener toutes les espèces à l’unité et d’affirmer de toutes [en qualité de genre ou de catégorie] ce qui est l’élément général, c’est-à-dire la voix. Mais pour les choses que nous examinons ici, il n’est pas possible de procéder 248 ainsi [de tout ramener à un seul genre], comme nous l’avons déjà démontré. Il faut reconnaître dans le monde sensible plusieurs genres, et ces genres doivent différer do ceux du monde intelligible, puisque le monde sensible diffère lui-même du monde intelligible, qu’il n’en est pas le synonyme, mais seulement l’homonyme, c’est-à-dire l’image.

Comme ici-bas dans le mélange et le composé [qui nous constituent] il y a deux parties, l’âme et le corps, dont l’ensemble forme l’animal (3), que l’essence de l’âme appartient au monde intelligible, et par conséquent n’est pas du même ordre que l’essence sensible, il nous faut, quoique cela soit difficile, séparer l’âme (4) d’avec les choses sensibles que nous considérons seules présentement. C’est ainsi que celui qui voudrait diviser les habitants d’une ville d’après leurs dignités et leurs professions devrait laisser de côté les étrangers qui habiteraient cette ville. Quant aux passions qui naissent de l’union de l’âme avec le corps ou que l’âme éprouve à cause du corps (5), nous examinerons plus tard comment il faut les distribuer (6) : c’est ce que nous ferons lorsque nous aurons traité des choses sensibles.

Guthrie

GENERA OF THE PHYSICAL ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE.

1. We have thus declared our views about (intelligible) Being, and shown how they agree with the doctrines of Plato  . Now we have to study the "other nature" (the Being of the sense-world); and we shall have to consider whether it be proper to establish here the same genera as for the intelligible world, or to posit a greater number, by adding some to those already recognized; or whether the genera differ in each being entirely, or only partially, some remaining identical, while others differ. If any of them be identical in both beings, that can be understood only by analogy; that is what will become evident when each of these beings are fully understood.

THE WORLD MUST BE STUDIED, JUST AS ONE WOULD ANALYZE THE VOICE.

This is by what we must begin. Having to speak of sense-objects, and knowing that all of them are contained in this world here below, we must first scrutinize this world, establish within it divisions according to the nature of the (beings) which compose it, and then distribute them into genera, just as we would do if we had to analyze the voice whose nature is infinite (by the diversity of sounds it produces), reducing it to a definite number of kinds. Observing the elements common to many sounds, we would reduce them to one unity, then, to a superior unity, further to a supreme unity, in which these sounds appear as a small number of classes. Then, the elements common to these individuals would be called "species," and that common to various species would be called a genus. As to the voice, it is easy enough to discover each species, to reduce all the species to unity, and to predicate of all of them (as highest genus or category) the general element, the voice. But an analysis as summary as this is impossible with the (more complicated universe). In the sense-world we will have to recognize several genera, which will differ from those of the intelligible world, since the sense-world itself differs from the intelligible world so much that it is not its counterpart, but only its image, whose only element common (to its model) is the name.

WE MUST FIRST DISSECT AWAY THE SOUL FROM THE BODY, TO EXAMINE IT.

As here below in the "mixture" (or blend, the soul), and the composition (the body) (which form our nature) there are two parts, soul and body, the totality of which forms the living organism; as the nature of the soul belongs to the intelligible world, and consequently does not belong to the same order of things as the sense-world, we shall, however difficult it may be, have to separate the soul from the sense-objects which we are here alone to consider. (We shall illustrate this by a parable). He who would wish to classify the inhabitants of a town according to their dignities and professions, would have to leave aside the foreign residents. As to the passions which arise from the union of the soul with the body, or, that the soul experiences because of the body, we shall later examine how they should be classified.6 This however must follow our study of the sense-objects.

MacKenna

1. We have now explained our conception of Reality [True Being] and considered how far it agrees with the teaching of Plato  . We have still to investigate the opposed principle [the principle of Becoming].

There is the possibility that the genera posited for the Intellectual sphere will suffice for the lower also; possibly with these genera others will be required; again, the two series may differ entirely; or perhaps some of the sensible genera will be identical with their intellectual prototypes, and others different - "identical," however, being understood to mean only analogous and in possession of a common name, as our results will make dear.

We must begin on these lines:

The subject of our discussion is the Sensible realm: Sensible Existence is entirely embraced by what we know as the Universe: our duty, then, would seem to be clear enough - to take this Universe and analyse its nature, classifying its constituent parts and arranging them by species. Suppose that we were making a division of speech: we should reduce its infinity to finite terms, and from the identity appearing in many instances evolve a unity, then another and another, until we arrived at some definite number; each such unit we should call a species if imposed upon individuals, a genus if imposed upon species. Thus, every species of speech - and similarly all phenomena - might be referred to a unity; speech - or element - might be predicated of them all.

This procedure however is as we have already shown, impossible in dealing with the subject of our present enquiry. New genera must be sought for this Universe-genera distinct from those of the Intellectual, inasmuch as this realm is different from that, analogous indeed but never identical, a mere image of the higher. True, it involves the parallel existence of Body and Soul, for the Universe is a living form: essentially however Soul is of the Intellectual and does not enter into the structure of what is called Sensible Being.

Remembering this fact, we must - however great the difficulty - exclude Soul from the present investigation, just as in a census of citizens, taken in the interests of commerce and taxation, we should ignore the alien population. As for the experiences to which Soul is indirectly subject in its conjunction with Body and by reason of Body’s presence, their classification must be attempted at a later stage, when we enquire into the details of Sensible Existence.