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Plotino - Tratado 42,25 (VI, 1, 25) — O "ti"

Enéada VI, 1, 25

sexta-feira 17 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Igal

25 En contra de los que establecen cuatro géneros y clasifican las cosas cuatripartitamente en sustratos, cualidades, estados y estados relativos, que ponen por encima de ellos algo común e incluyen todas las cosas en un solo género, se podrían decir muchas cosas respecto a que conciben algo común, o sea, un género superior a todos. A saber, que ese género que postulan es incomprensible e irracional y que no conviene a los incorporales y a los cuerpos; que no nos han legado las diferencias con las que diferencian ese «algo», y que ese «algo» es o ente o no-ente, y si es ente, es una de sus especies, y si es no-ente, el ente es no-ente. Y otras mil dificultades.

Pues bien, prescindamos por el momento de estas dificultades y examinemos la clasificación misma. Al poner los sustratos en primer término y anteponer aquí la materia a las otras cosas, coordinan lo que les parece ser el primer principio con las cosas que para ellos son posteriores al principio. Y así, en primer lugar, agrupan en unidad las cosas anteriores con las posteriores, siendo así que no puede haber en un mismo género una cosa anterior y otra posterior. Porque, en las cosas en las que se da lo anterior y lo posterior, lo posterior recibe su ser de lo anterior, mientras que, en las que caen bajo un mismo género, cada una recibe del género una aportación igual para su ser, puesto que el género debe ser eso que se predica en la quididad de las especies. Pues ellos mismos admitirán, creo yo, que de la materia es de donde les viene su ser a las demás cosas.

En segundo lugar, al enumerar el sustrato como uno, no están haciendo un recuento de los seres, sino una investigación de los principios de los seres. Ahora bien, una cosa es decir los principios de los seres y otra los seres mismos. Y si dijeren que sólo la materia es ente pero que las demás cosas son modalidades de la materia, no debieran anteponer un género al ente y a las demás cosas; sería mucho mejor que dijesen que lo primero es la sustancia y que las demás cosas son modalidades de la sustancia y que luego clasificasen estas modalidades. ¡Pero que digan que lo primero son los sustratos y luego las demás cosas, siendo así que el sustrato es uno solo y no admite diferenciación excepto por fraccionamiento en partes, como la masa! Aunque, puesto que afirman que la sustancia es continua, harían mejor en decir que al menos el sustrato ni siquiera se fracciona.

Bouillet

XXV. [CRITIQUE DES CATÉGORIES DES STOÏCIENS.]

Passons aux philosophes qui, ne reconnaissant que quatre catégories, divisent toutes choses en substances (ὑποκείμενα), qualités (ποιά), modes (πὼς ἔχοντα), relations (πρός τι πὼς ἔχοντα), et qui, attribuant à tous les êtres quelque chose de commun (κοινόν τι), les embrassent ainsi dans un seul genre (107).

Cette doctrine soulève une foule d’objections, surtout en ce qu’elle attribue à tous les êtres quelque chose de commun (108) et les embrasse ainsi en un seul genre. En effet, la raison ne saurait comprendre en quoi consiste ce quelque chose dont ils parlent, ni comment il pourrait s’adapter à la fois aux corps et aux êtres incorporels, entre lesquels ils ne laissent point de différences qui permettent d’établir une division dans ce quelque chose. D’ailleurs ce quelque chose est ou n’est pas un être : s’il est un être, il est une forme; s’il n’est pas un être, il en résulte mille absurdités, entre autres que l’être n’est pas être.

Laissons maintenant ce point et considérons la division en quatre catégories.

[Substance.] En assignant le premier rang aux substances et en plaçant la matière avant les autres substances, les Stoïciens (109) mettent ainsi au même rang leur premier Principe et les choses qui sont inférieures à ce Principe.

D’abord ils ramènent à un seul genre les choses antérieures et les choses postérieures, quoiqu’il soit impossible de les mettre ensemble. En effet, toutes les fois que des choses diffèrent les unes des autres en ce que les unes sont antérieures ut les autres postérieures, celles qui sont postérieures doivent leur existence à celles qui sont antérieures; au contraire, quand des choses sont comprises dans un seul et même genre, toutes doivent également leur être à ce genre, puisque le genre est ce qui est affirmé des espèces sous le rapport de l’essence (τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορούμενον), ainsi que les Stoïciens le reconnaissent eux-mêmes en disant que toutes choses tiennent leur essence de la matière. — Ensuite, en ne comptant qu’une seule substance, ils n’énumèrent pas les êtres mêmes, mais ils cherchent les principes des êtres. Or, il y a une grande différence entre traiter des principes et traiter des êtres. Si les Stoïciens ne reconnaissent point d’autre être que la matière et pensent que les autres choses sont des modifications de la matière (πάθη τῆς ὕλης),ils ont tort de ramener à un seul genre l’être elles autres choses; ils devraient plutôt dire que l’être est l’essence, que les autres choses sont des modifications, et diviser ensuite ces modifications. — Enfin, il est absurde d’avancer que, parmi les êtres, les uns sont les substances, et les autres les autres choses [les qualités, les modes, les relations], puisque les Stoïciens ne reconnaissent qu’une seule substance, laquelle ne contient aucune différence, à moins qu’on ne la divise comme une masse en parties ; encore les Stoïciens ne sauraient-ils diviser leur substance de cette manière, parce qu’ils enseignent qu’elle est continue. Ils devaient donc dire : la substance, et non : les substances.

Guthrie

B. CRITICISM OF THE STOIC CATEGORIES.

25. Let us now pass to the (Stoic) philosophers who, recognizing four categories only, divide everything into "substances," "qualities,"’ "modes," and "relations;" and who, attributing to all (beings) something common, thus embrace them into a single genus.

THE CATEGORY OF SOMETHING COMMON IS ABSURD.

This doctrine raises a great number of objections, especially in that it attributes to all beings something in common, and thus embraces them in a single class. Indeed, this "something" of which they speak is quite incomprehensible; as also is how it could adapt itself equally to bodies and to incorporeal beings, between which they do not allow for sufficient distinction to establish a distinction in this "something." Besides, this something either is, or is not an essence; if it be an essence, it must be a form; if it be not an essence, there result a thousand absurdities, among which would be that essence is not an essence. Let us therefore leave this point, and devote ourselves to the division into four categories.

1. SUBSTANCE; ACCORDING TO THEM IT IS SPLIT UP.

The Stoics assign the first rank to substances, and place matter before the other substances. From this it results that the Stoics assign to the same rank their first Principle, and with it the things which are inferior thereto. First, they reduce to a single class both anterior and posterior things, though it be impossible to combine them in this manner. In fact, every time that things differ from each other in that some are anterior, and others posterior, those which are posterior owe their essence to those which are anterior. On the contrary, when things are comprised within one and the same class, all equally owe their essence to this class, since a class is "what is affirmed of kinds of things in regard to essence." The Stoics themselves recognize this by saying that all things derive their essence from matter.

Besides, when they count but a single substance, they do not enumerate the beings themselves, but they seek their principles. Now there is a great difference between treating of principles and treating of beings. If the Stoics recognize no essence other than matter, and think that other things are modifications of matter, they are wrong in reducing essence and other things to a common class; they should rather say that essence is being, and that other things are modifications, and then distinguish between these modifications. Further, it is absurd to assert that (among essences), some should be substances, and others should be other things (such as qualities, modes and relations); for the Stoics recognize but a single substance, which does not contain any difference, unless by division as of mass into parts; besides, they should not attribute divisibility to their substance, because they teach that it is continuous. They should therefore say, "substance" (and not "substances").

MacKenna

25. There are those who lay down four categories and make a fourfold division into Substrates, Qualities, States, and Relative States, and find in these a common Something, and so include everything in one genus.

Against this theory there is much to be urged, but particularly against this posing of a common Something and a single all-embracing genus. This Something, it may be submitted, is unintelligible to themselves, is indefinable, and does not account either for bodies or for the bodiless. Moreover, no room is left for a differentia by which this Something may be distinguished. Besides, this common Something is either existent or non-existent: if existent, it must be one or other of its [four] species; - if non-existent, the existent is classed under the non-existent. But the objections are countless; we must leave them for the present and consider the several heads of the division.

To the first genus are assigned Substrates, including Matter, to which is given a priority over the others; so that what is ranked as the first principle comes under the same head with things which must be posterior to it since it is their principle.

First, then: the prior is made homogeneous with the subsequent. Now this is impossible: in this relation the subsequent owes its existence to the prior, whereas among things belonging to one same genus each must have, essentially, the equality implied by the genus; for the very meaning of genus is to be predicated of the species in respect of their essential character. And that Matter is the basic source of all the rest of things, this school, we may suppose, would hardly deny.

Secondly: since they treat the Substrate as one thing, they do not enumerate the Existents; they look instead for principles of the Existents. There is however a difference between speaking of the actual Existents and of their principles.

If Matter is taken to be the only Existent, and all other things as modifications of Matter, it is not legitimate to set up a single genus to embrace both the Existent and the other things; consistency requires that Being [Substance] be distinguished from its modifications and that these modifications be duly classified.

Even the distinction which this theory makes between Substrates and the rest of things is questionable. The Substrate is [necessarily] one thing and admits of no differentia - except perhaps in so far as it is split up like one mass into its various parts; and yet not even so, since the notion of Being implies continuity: it would be better, therefore, to speak of the Substrate, in the singular.