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Plotino - Tratado 5,14 (V, 9, 14) — Há Formas das coisas sem valor e compostos acidentais?

Enéada V, 9, 14

quarta-feira 15 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulo 14: Há Formas das coisas sem valor e compostos acidentais?

  • 1-6. Se o primeiro princípio é uno e absolutamente simples, como explicar a multiplicidade? Porque o Intelecto é todas as coisas e de onde ele vem? Para responder estas questões, será preciso um outro ponto de partida da análise.
  • 7-13. Há Formas das coisas em putrefação, da sujeira e da lama? Resposta negativa.
  • 14-19. Há Formas dos compostos acidentais? Resposta negativa.
  • 20-22. A hierarquia da alma: há uma alma individual, uma alma universal e uma alma em si; esta última é no Intelecto antes que a alma venha à existência, ou melhor, para que ela aí venha.

Míguez

14. Hemos de establecer, pues, como principio esa naturaleza de la Inteligencia que comprende todos los seres en el mundo inteligible. Pero, ¿cómo es esto posible, si este principio es realmente uno y simple y en los seres se da la multiplicidad? ¿Cómo puede unirse la multiplicidad a la unidad y cómo existen todos estos seres? ¿Por qué, además, la Inteligencia comprende todos estos seres y de dónde proviene todo ello? He aquí lo que conviene explicar, pero partiendo ya de otro principio.

En cuanto a si en el mundo inteligible hay ideas de las cosas de la putrefacción y de cualesquiera otras cosas indignas, si la hay, por ejemplo, de la suciedad y del barro, hemos de decir que la Inteligencia sólo extrae del primer principio las cosas que son mejores. Entre ellas, ciertamente, no se incluyen éstas, pues la Inteligencia no las posee, sino que el alma, que recibe mucho de la Inteligencia, recibe también de la materia otras muchas cosas entre las cuales están las ya dichas.

De todo ello se hablará con más claridad en cuanto volvamos a la dificultad propuesta, esto es, cómo la multiplicidad proviene de la unidad.

Digamos ahora que los seres compuestos accidentalmente, no por la Inteligencia, sino por la reunión de objetos sensibles (que actúan) por sí mismos, no se encuentran en las ideas; así, los productos de la putrefacción provienen tal vez de que el alma no puede producir otra cosa, porque, sí ocurriese de otro modo, hubiera producido también los seres naturales, ya que ella produce cuanto puede.

En cuanto a las artes, todas aquellas que son referidas por el hombre a las cosas que están de acuerdo con la naturaleza, se hallan en el hombre en sí.

Y en cuanto al alma (hemos de decir) que, con anterioridad al alma universal, existe un alma en sí que, o es la vida (en general), o es esa otra vida que se da en la Inteligencia antes de que el alma haya nacido y, precisamente, para que ella nazca.

Bouillet

XIV. Admettrons-nous que l’essence qui contient tous les intelligibles [c’est-à-dire l’Intelligence] est le Principe suprême? Comment pourrions-nous le faire? Le Principe suprême doit être essentiellement un, absolument simple, et les essences forment une multitude. — Mais, si les essences forment ainsi une multitude, comment cette multitude, comment toutes ces essences peuvent-elles exister? Comment l’Intelligence est-elle toutes ces choses ? D’où procède-t-elle? C’est une question que nous traiterons ailleurs (44).

On demandera peut-être encore si le monde intelligible comprend les idées des objets qui proviennent de la corruption, qui sont nuisibles ou désagréables (45), de la boue et des ordures, par exemple. Voici notre réponse : Toutes les choses que l’Intelligence universelle reçoit du Premier sont excellentes ; or, parmi elles, on ne trouve pas les idées de ces objets vils et sales qu’on a cilés; l’Intelligence ne les comprend pas. Mais, en recevant de l’Intelligence les idées, l’Ame reçoit aussi de la matière d’autres choses, parmi lesquelles se trouvent les accidents dont on parle. Du reste, pour bien résoudre cette objection, il faut recourir au livre où nous expliquons comment de l’Un procède la multitude des idées (46).

Concluons. Les composés accidentels où l’Intelligence n’est pour rien, et qui sont formés par un concours fortuit d’objets sensibles, n’ont pas d’idées qui leur correspondent dans le monde intelligible. Les choses qui proviennent de la corruption ne sont engendrées que parce que l’Ame est incapable de rien faire de meilleur dans ce cas ; sinon elle eût produit plutôt quelque objet conforme à la nature; elle produit donc ce qu’elle peut.

Quant aux arts, tous ceux qui se rapportent aux choses naturelles à l’homme sont compris dans l’idée de l’homme même. L’art qui est universel est antérieur aux autres arts; mais il est lui-même postérieur à l’Ame même, ou plutôt à la vie qui est dans l’Intelligence avant de devenir âme, et qui, devenant âme, mérite d’être appelée l’Ame même.

Guthrie

THE SUPREME BEING ENTIRELY ONE DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF THE MANIFOLD.

14. Can we identify the nature that contains all the intelligibles (Intelligence) with the supreme Principle? Impossible, because the supreme Principle must be essentially one, and simple, while essences form a multitude. But as these essences form a multitude, we are forced to explain how this multitude, and all these essences can exist. How can (the single) Intelligence be all these things? Whence does it proceed? This we shall have to study elsewhere.

THE SOUL RECEIVES ACCIDENTS FROM MATTER. BUT DEFECTS ARE NOT IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

It may further be asked whether the intelligible world contains the ideas of objects which are derived from decay, which are harmful or disagreeable, such as, for instance, mud or excreta. We answer that all the things that universal Intelligence receives from the First are excellent. Among them are not found ideas of those dirty and vile objects mentioned above; Intelligence does not contain them. But though receiving from Intelligence ideas, the soul receives from matter other things, among which may be found the above-mentioned accidents. Besides, a more thorough answer to this question must be sought for in our book where we explain "How the Multitude of Ideas Proceeds from the One."

NOT ALL EARTHLY ENTITIES HAVE CORRESPONDING IDEAS.

In conclusion, the accidental composites in which Intelligence does not share and which are formed by a fortuitous complex of sense-objects, have no ideas corresponding to them in the intelligible world. Things that proceed from decay are produced only because the Soul is unable to produce anything better in this case; otherwise she would have rather produced some object more agreeing with nature; she therefore produces what she can.

EVEN THE ARTS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE SOUL.

All the arts concerned with things natural to man are contained within the ideas of Man himself. The Art that is universal is prior to the other arts; but Art is posterior to the Soul herself, or rather, to the life that is in Intelligence before becoming soul, and which, on becoming soul, deserves to be called the Soul herself.

Taylor

XIV. Is this nature, therefore, which comprehends all things in the intelligible, to be considered as the first principle of things ? But how is this possible, since that which is truly the principle is one, and entirely simple, hut multitude subsists in beings ? After what manner, however, this all-comprehending nature subsists besides the one, how multitude exists, and how all these subsist, and why and whence intellect is all these, must be shown by beginning the discussion from another principle. With respect, however, to things generated from putrefaction, and to things artificial, whether there are forms of these, and also of mud and clay in the intelligible world, it must be said, that such things as intellect derives from- the first principle, are all of them most excellent. But the above-mentioned particulars are not among the number of these, nor does intellect consist of the forms of such particulars. Soul, however, which is derived from intellect, receives from matter other things [besides what she receives from intellect], and such particulars as the above are in the number of these. The discussion of these, however, will be rendered clearer by recurring to the doubt, how multitude proceeds from the one. In the mean time it is evident that such composite natures as are casual are not derived from intellect, but from a concurrence of sensibles in themselves, and do not subsist in forms. Those things, also, which are produced from putrefaction, are the progeny of a soul which is perhaps incapable of effecting any thing else; for if this were not the case, it would produce something conformable to nature. It produces, therefore, where it is able. But with respect to the arts, such of them as are referred to things natural to man, are comprehended in [the soul of] man. The art also, which is universal, is prior to other arts, and soul itself is prior to universal art, or rather this must be asserted of the life which is in intellect, before it became soul and which is necessary to the generation of soul. And this life it is requisite to denominate soul itself.

MacKenna

14. There is, thus, a Nature comprehending in the Intellectual all that exists, and this Principle must be the source of all. But how, seeing that the veritable source must be a unity, simplex utterly?

The mode by which from the unity arises the multiple, how all this universe comes to be, why the Intellectual-Principle is all and whence it springs, these matters demand another approach.

But on the question as to whether the repulsive and the products of putridity have also their Idea - whether there is an Idea of filth and mud - it is to be observed that all that the Intellectual-Principle derived from The First is of the noblest; in those Ideas the base is not included: these repulsive things point not to the Intellectual-Principle but to the Soul which, drawing upon the Intellectual-Principle, takes from Matter certain other things, and among them these.

But all this will be more clearly brought out, when we turn to the problem of the production of multiplicity from unity. Compounds, we shall see - as owing existence to hazard and not to the Intellectual-Principle, having been fused into objects of sense by their own impulse - are not to be included under Ideas.

The products of putrefaction are to be traced to the Soul’s inability to bring some other thing to being - something in the order of nature, which, else, it would - but producing where it may. In the matter of the arts and crafts, all that are to be traced to the needs of human nature are laid up in the Absolute Man.

And before the particular Soul there is another Soul, a universal, and, before that, an Absolute-Soul, which is the Life existing in the Intellectual-Principle before Soul came to be and therefore rightly called [as the Life in the Divine] the Absolute-Soul.