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Plotino - Tratado 5,5 (V, 9, 5) — Que pensa o Intelecto?

Enéada V, 9, 5

quarta-feira 15 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulo 5: Que pensa o Intelecto?

  • 1-11. O Intelecto, que é sempre em ato, pensa por ele mesmo, e é ele mesmo aquilo que pensa.
  • 11-19. O Intelecto pensa as coisas que são realmente como sendo nele mesmo.
  • 19-26. O Intelecto, "produtor deste universo", não pode pensar aquilo que se encontra no universo que ainda não existe; Seus objetos de pensamento devem logo existir nele mesmo como arquétipos e realidade primeiras.
  • 26-36. O Intelecto é as coisas que são realmente e a lei mesma de seu ser; elas não estão sujeitas à geração e à corrupção.
  • 36-48. As coisas sensíveis são aquilo que elas são por participação; elas são apenas imagens das coisas que são realmente

Míguez

5. Si tomamos la inteligencia en su verdadero sentido, hemos de entender por ella no la inteligencia en potencia y que pasa del estado de insensatez al estado de inteligencia — de no ser así, tendríamos que buscar de nuevo una inteligencia que fuese anterior a ella —, sino la Inteligencia en acto y que existe eternamente. Porque si no tiene el pensamiento como algo extraño y si realmente piensa, debe pensar por sí misma y poseer a la vez, también por sí misma, todo lo que ella posee. Si piensa por sí misma y saca de sí misma sus pensamientos, ella misma es lo que piensa. Porque si ella fuese una realidad y lo que piensa otra realidad distinta, su propia realidad quedaría fuera de su pensamiento; estaría, por tanto, en potencia y no en acto. No conviene separar estas realidades una de otra. Aunque, ciertamente, tenemos la costumbre de separarlas con el pensamiento, de acuerdo con lo que pasa en nosotros.

¿Cuál es entonces el ser que actúa y que piensa, para que debamos admitir que es precisamente eso mismo que piensa? Es claro que se trata de la inteligencia verdadera, que piensa los seres y los hace existir. Y ella misma es estos seres, porque tendrá que pensarlos, bien como existentes en otra parte, bien como existentes en ella y siendo así no otra cosa que ella misma. Pero que existan en otra parte resulta imposible; porque, ¿dónde podrían existir? Así, pues, se piensa a si misma y los piensa en sí misma. Porque no los piensa en las cosas sensibles, como creen algunos; ya que para cada uno de los seres la existencia sensible no es lo primero. Antes bien, la forma que se da en las cosas sensibles y en la materia es una imagen de la forma real, y toda forma que se da en una cosa ha venido a ella de otra forma, ofreciéndose aquí como la imagen de esa forma. Por otra parte, si la Inteligencia debe ser la creadora del universo, no podrá pensar en los seres para producirlos en este universo, porque esos seres deben existir antes que el universo, y no como improntas de otros seres, sino como arquetipos y seres primeros, e incluso como la esencia de la Inteligencia. Podrá decirse que basta con las razones seminales, puesto que, evidentemente, son eternas. Pero si se las considera eternas e impasibles, debe colocárselas en una inteligencia que sea como ellas y anterior al hábito, a la naturaleza y al alma; porque estas tres cosas sólo existen en potencia. He aquí, pues, que la Inteligencia constituye los seres reales mismos, y no los piensa como existentes en otra parte; porque no se dan, ciertamente, ni antes ni después de ella, sino que ella es como su primer legislador, y aún mejor, la ley misma de su existencia. Son, por tanto, exactas las fórmulas siguientes: "el pensar y el ser son una y la misma cosa", "la ciencia de los seres sin materia es idéntica a su objeto" y "yo trato de encontrarme a mí mismo" como uno de los seres. También lo es la teoría de la reminiscencia. Porque es claro que ningún ser existe fuera, en un lugar del espacio, sino que los seres permanecen siempre en sí mismos, sin que admitan el cambio y la corrupción; por esto mismo son seres reales.

Las cosas que nacen y que perecen disponen de un ser que no es el suyo, y no son ellas sino él el que constituye el ser. Las cosas sensibles son por participación lo que se dice que son; su sustrato recibe su forma de otra parte, como ocurre con el bronce que la recibe del arte del escultor y con la madera que la recibe del arte del carpintero, en los que ha penetrado por medio de su imagen. No obstante, el arte permanece idéntico a sí mismo fuera de la materia y conserva la verdadera estatua y la (verdadera) cama e igual acontece con los cuerpos. Este universo participa de las imágenes de los seres, que se muestran diferentes a ellos. Porque los seres son inmutables, en tanto las imágenes cambian; e, igualmente, los seres permanecen en sí mismos y no tienen necesidad de espacio, puesto que no son magnitudes. Poseen, pues, una existencia intelectual e independiente, porque la naturaleza de los cuerpos desea ser conservada por un ser diferente, en tanto la Inteligencia, que sostiene con su maravillosa naturaleza todos esos seres que por sí mismos caerían, no busca para sí misma un lugar donde establecerse.

Bouillet

V. L’Intelligence, pour prendre ce mot dans son vrai sens, n’est pas seulement en puissance, n’arrive pas à être intelligente après avoir été inintelligente (sinon, nous serions obligés de chercher encore un autre principe supérieur à elle); elle est en acte, elle est éternelle (19). Si elle est intelligente par elle-même, elle pense par elle-même ce qu’elle pense, elle possède par elle-même ce qu’elle possède. Or, puisqu’elle pense d’elle-même et par elle-même, elle est elle-même ce qu’elle pense. Si autre chose était son essence, autre chose ce qu’elle pense, son essence serait inintelligente; elle serait en puissance, non en acte. Il ne faut donc pas séparer la pensée de son objet, quoique les choses sensibles nous aient fait prendre l’habitude de concevoir même les choses intelligibles séparées les unes des autres.

Quel est donc le principe qui agit, qui pense, et quel est donc l’acte, quelle est la pensée de l’Intelligence, pour que nous admettions qu’elle est ce qu’elle pense? Evidemment l’Intelligence, par cela même qu’elle est réellement, pense les êtres, et les fait exister; elle est donc les êtres. En effet, il faut que les êtres existent ou hors d’elle, ou en elle, et, dans le second cas, qu’ils lui soient identiques. Qu’ils existent hors d’elle, c’est impossible : où seraient-ils? Il faut donc qu’ils existent en elle, qu’ils lui soient identiques. Ils ne sauraient être dans les objets sensibles, comme le croît le vulgaire, parce que les objets sensibles ne sauraient être les premiers dans aucun genre. La forme qui est dans leur matière n’est que le simulacre de l’être; or, toute forme qui est dans une chose autre qu’elle-même y est mise par un principe supérieur et en est l’image. Enfin, s’il est nécessaire que l’Intelligence soit la puissance créatrice de l’u-nivers, elle ne saurait, en le créant, penser les êtres comme existant dans ce qui n’existe pas encore. Les intelligibles doivent donc exister antérieurement au monde, n’être pas des images des choses sensibles, être au contraire leurs archétypes et constituer l’essence de l’Intelligence. Dira-t-on qu’il suffit des raisons [séminales]? Ces raisons seront sans doute éternelles; or, si elles sont éternelles et impassibles, elles doivent exister dans l’Intelligence dont nous avons décrit les caractères, Intelligence qui est antérieure à l’habitude (20), à la nature et à l’âme (21), parce que ces choses sont en puissance.

L’Intelligence est donc essentiellement les êtres, et, quand elle les pense, ils ne sont pas hors d’elle; ils ne lui sont ni antérieurs, ni postérieurs. L’Intelligence est le premier législateur, ou plutôt elle est la loi même de l’existence. On a donc eu raison de dire: « La pensée est la même chose que l’être (22). » La science des choses immatérielles est identique à ces choses mêmes. C’est pourquoi je me reconnais moi-même pour un être et j’ai des réminiscences des choses intelligibles. En effet, aucun des êtres n’est hors de l’Intelligence, n’est renfermé dans un lieu : tous subsistent toujours en eux-mêmes immuables et indestructibles; c’est pour cela qu’ils sont réellement êtres; s’ils naissaient et périssaient, ils ne posséderaient l’existence que d’une manière adventice, ils ne seraient plus êtres; ce serait l’existence qu’ils posséderaient qui serait l’être. C’est seulement par participation que les choses sensibles sont ce qu’on dit qu’elles sont; la nature qui constitue leur substance reçoit sa forme d’ailleurs, comme l’airain reçoit la sienne du statuaire, le bois, de l’artisan : tandis que l’image de l’art pénètre dans la matière, l’art lui-même reste dans son identité et possède en lui-même la véritable essence de la statue et du lit. Ainsi, cette nécessité générale où sont les corps de participer à des images montre qu’ils sont autres que les êtres: car ils changent, tandis que les êtres sont immuables, ont en eux-mêmes leur propre fondement, et n’ont pas besoin d’exister dans un lieu, puisqu’ils n’ont pas d’étendue, qu’ils subsistent d’une existence intellectuelle et absolue. Enfin, l’existence des corps (23) a besoin d’être conservée par un autre principe, tandis que l’Intelligence, qui fait subsister des objets périssables par eux-mêmes, n’a besoin de rien qui la fasse elle-même subsister.

Guthrie

INTELLIGENCE IS IN ACTUALIZATION BECAUSE ITS THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH ITS ESSENCE OR EXISTENCE.

5. Taking it in its genuine sense, Intelligence is not only potential, arriving at being intelligent after having been unintelligent — for otherwise, we would be forced to seek out some still higher principle — but is in actualization, and is eternal. As it is intelligent by itself, it is by itself that it thinks what it thinks, and that it possesses what is possesses. Now since it thinks of itself and by itself, it itself is what it thinks. If we could distinguish between its existence and its thought, its "being" would be unintelligent; it would be potential, not in actualization. Thought, therefore, must not be separated from its object, although, from sense-objects, we have become accustomed to conceive of intelligible entities as distinct from each other.

REASONS, AS ARCHETYPES, MUST HAVE EXISTED BEFORE STOIC "HABIT," NATURE OR SOUL.

Which then is the principle that acts, that thinks, and what is the actualization and thought of Intelligence, necessary to justify the assertion that it is what it thinks? Evidently Intelligence, by its mere real existence, thinks beings, and makes them exist; it therefore is the beings. Indeed, the beings will either exist outside of it, or within it; and in the latter case they would have to be identical with it. That they should exist outside of Intelligence, is unthinkable; for where would they be located? They must therefore exist within it, and be identical with it. They could not be in sense-objects, as common people think, because sense-objects could not be the first in any genus. The form which inheres in their matter is only the representation of existence; now a form which exists in anything other than itself is put in it by a superior principle, and is its image. Further, if Intelligence must be the creative power of the universe, it could not, while creating the universe, think beings as existent in what does not yet exist. Intelligible entities, therefore, must exist before the world, and cannot be images of sense-objects, being on the contrary, their archetypes, and constituting the "being" of Intelligence. It might be objected that the (seminal) reasons might suffice. These reasons are, no doubt, eternal; and, if they be eternal and impassible, they must exist within the Intelligence whose characteristics we have described, the Intelligence which precedes the "habit," nature, and the soul, because here these entities are potential.

INTELLIGENCE IS POSTULATED BY THE GENERAL NECESSITIES OF THE WORLD.

Intelligence, therefore, essentially constitutes all beings; and when Intelligence thinks them, they are not outside of Intelligence, and neither precede nor follow it. Intelligence is the first legislator, or rather, it is the very law of existence. Parmenides   therefore was right in saying, "Thought is identical with existence." The knowledge of immaterial things is therefore identical with those things themselves. That is why I recognize myself as a being, and why I have reminiscences of intelligible entities. Indeed, none of those beings is outside of Intelligence, or is contained in any location; all of them subsist in themselves as immutable and indestructible. That is why they really are beings. If they were born, or perished, they would possess existence only in an incidental manner, they would no longer be beings; it would be the existence they possessed which would be essence. It is only by participation that sense-things are what they are said to be; the nature that constitutes their substance derives its shape from elsewhere, as the metal receives its shape from the sculptor, and wood from the carpenter; while the image of art penetrates into the matter, the art itself remains in its identity, and within itself possesses the genuine existence of the statue or of the bed. That is how the bodies general necessity of participating in images shows that they are different from the beings; for they change, while the entities are immutable, possess within themselves their own foundation, and have no need of existing in any location, since they have no extension, and since they subsist in an intellectual and absolute existence. Again, the existence of the bodies needs to be guarded by some other principle, while intelligence, which furnishes the existence for objects in themselves perishable, has need of nothing to make itself subsist.

Taylor

V. It is necessary, however, to consider intellect truly so called neither as intellect in capacity, nor as proceeding from the privation to the possession of intellect. For if we do not, we must again investigate another intellect prior to this. But we must assume intellect in energy, and and which is always intellect. If such an intellect, however, has not an adventitious intellection, whatever it intellectually perceives, it perceives from itself. And whatever it possesses, it possesses from itself. But if it perceives intellectually by and from itself, it is itself that which it perceives. For if the essence of it was one thing, but the objects of its perception different from it, its very essence would be destitute of intellection ; and again, it would be intellect in capacity, but not in energy. Neither of these, therefore, must be separated from the other. With us, however, it is usual, from the things with which we are conversant, to separate in our conceptions intellect, and the objects of its perception. What therefore is its energy, and what does it intellectually perceive, in order that we may admit it to be those things which it perceives ? Is it not evident, that being intellect, it intellectually perceives in reality, and gives subsistence to beings? Hence it is itself beings. For it either intellectually perceives them existing elsewhere, or it perceives them in itself as being itself. It is impossible, therefore, that it can perceive them existing elsewhere. For in what other place can they exist ? Hence it intellectually sees itself, and perceives them in itself. For it does not perceive these, as some fancy, in sensibles. For each of the things which have a primary subsistence, is not a sensible object. For the form which is in sensibles is in matter, and is truly an image. Every form, also, which is in another thing, is derived from another thing, proceeds to it, and is the image of it. If, .likewise, it is necessary that intellect should be the maker of this universe, it will not intellectually perceive things in that which does not yet exist, in order that it may produce it. Hence, it is necessary that these things should be prior to the world, not as impressions from other things, but as archetypes, and primary natures, and the essence of intellect. If, however, some should say that [seminal] productive principles are sufficient, it is evident that these must be perpetual. But if they are perpetual and impassive, it is necessary that they should subsist in intellect, and in such an intellect as is prior to habit, and nature and soul. For these are in capacity. Intellect, therefore, is truly beings, not intellectually perceiving such things as are situated out of itself. For the objects of its perception are not external to itself. But it is as it were the first legislator, or rather the law itself of existence. Hence it is rightly said, that it is the same thing to perceive intellectually and to be, and that the science of things without matter, is the same with the things themselves. I have also investigated myself as one among the number of beings. And the same thing is testified by reminiscence. For no one of [real] beings subsists out of intellect, nor is in place; but they always abide in themselves, neither receiving mutation nor corruption. Hence, also, they are truly beings ; since if they were generated and corrupted, they would have an adventitious existence; and they would no longer be [real] beings, but that which is adventitious to them would be being-Sensibles, therefore, are indeed by participation that which they are said to be, the subject nature [i.e. matter] receiving form externally derived; as for instance, brass receiving form from the art of the statuary, and wood from the tectonic art; in consequence of art proceeding into these materials through an image. Art itself, however, abides in sameness, external to matter, and possesses in itself the true statue, and the true bed. This also in bodies, this universe which participates of images, evinces that real beings are different from bodies; since the former are immutable, but the latter mutable. The former, likewise, are established in themselves, and are not in want of place. For they are not magnitudes, but have an hypostasis intellectual, and sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies is indebted to something else for its preservation. But intellect, since it sustains through an admirable nature things which are of themselves in a perishable condition, does not seek where it may be itself established.

MacKenna

5. This Intellectual-Principle, if the term is to convey the truth, must be understood to be not a principle merely potential and not one maturing from unintelligence to intelligence - that would simply send us seeking, once more, a necessary prior - but a principle which is intelligence in actuality and in eternity.

Now a principle whose wisdom is not borrowed must derive from itself any intellection it may make; and anything it may possess within itself it can hold only from itself: it follows that, intellective by its own resource and upon its own content, it is itself the very things on which its intellection acts.

For supposing its essence to be separable from its intellection and the objects of its intellection to be not itself, then its essence would be unintellectual; and it would be intellectual not actually but potentially. The intellection and its object must then be inseparable - however the habit induced by our conditions may tempt us to distinguish, There too, the thinker from the thought.

What then is its characteristic Act and what the intellection which makes knower and known here identical?

Clearly, as authentic Intellection, it has authentic intellection of the authentically existent, and establishes their existence. Therefore it is the Authentic Beings.

Consider: It must perceive them either somewhere else or within itself as its very self: the somewhere else is impossible - where could that be? - they are therefore itself and the content of itself.

Its objects certainly cannot be the things of sense, as people think; no First could be of the sense-known order; for in things of sense the Idea is but an image of the authentic, and every Idea thus derivative and exiled traces back to that original and is no more than an image of it.

Further, if the Intellectual-Principle is to be the maker of this All, it cannot make by looking outside itself to what does not yet exist. The Authentic Beings must, then, exist before this All, no copies made on a model but themselves archetypes, primals, and the essence of the Intellectual-Principle.

We may be told that Reason-Principles suffice [to the subsistence of the All]: but then these, clearly, must be eternal; and if eternal, if immune, then they must exist in an Intellectual-Principle such as we have indicated, a principle earlier than condition, than nature, than soul, than anything whose existence is potential for contingent].

The Intellectual-Principle, therefore, is itself the authentic existences, not a knower knowing them in some sphere foreign to it. The Authentic Beings, thus, exist neither before nor after it: it is the primal legislator to Being or, rather, is itself the law of Being. Thus it is true that "Intellectual and Being are identical"; in the immaterial the knowledge of the thing is the thing. And this is the meaning of the dictum "I sought myself," namely as one of the Beings: it also bears on reminiscence.

For none of the Beings is outside the Intellectual-Principle or in space; they remain for ever in themselves, accepting no change, no decay, and by that are the authentically existent. Things that arise and fall away draw on real being as something to borrow from; they are not of the real; the true being is that on which they draw.

It is by participation that the sense-known has the being we ascribe to it; the underlying nature has taken its shape from elsewhere; thus bronze and wood are shaped into what we see by means of an image introduced by sculpture or carpentry; the craft permeates the materials while remaining integrally apart from the material and containing in itself the reality of statue or couch. And it is so, of course, with all corporeal things.

This universe, characteristically participant in images, shows how the image differs from the authentic beings: against the variability of the one order, there stands the unchanging quality of the other, self-situate, not needing space because having no magnitude, holding an existent intellective and self-sufficing. The body-kind seeks its endurance in another kind; the Intellectual-Principle, sustaining by its marvellous Being, the things which of themselves must fall, does not itself need to look for a staying ground.