Plotino - Tratado 18,1 (V, 7, 1) — Há uma Ideia dos seres individuais?

1. ¿Existen ideas de las cosas particulares? Porque si yo cada uno de nosotros podemos elevarnos a lo inteligible que mi principio y el de cada uno se encuentran presente ahí. Si Sócrates   y el alma de Sócrates existiesen siempre, tendría que existir en el mundo inteligible, tal como se dice, un verdadero Sócrates en sí, e igualmente el principio de su propia alma. Pero, si Sócrates no existe siempre, puesto que el ser que antes era Sócrates se convierte luego en un nuevo ser, como Pitágoras   o algún otro, puede darse el Sócrates eterno en el mundo inteligible. Sin embargo, si el alma de cada uno de nosotros contiene razones de todos los seres que recorre, es claro que todos individuos podrán encontrarse en el mundo inteligible. En nuestra opinión, cada alma contiene tantas razones como mundo en su totalidad; lo cual quiere decir que si el mundo contiene no sólo las razones del hombre sino también las de los otros animales, lo mismo ocurrirá con el alma. Así, pues, el alma contendría una infinidad de razones si (el mundo) no volviese sobre sus pasos en períodos fijos; de este modo, la infinitud queda limitada al sucederse los mismos seres. Pero, si en el conjunto general de los períodos los seres engendrados son más numerosos que sus modelos, ¿por qué ha de haber en un solo período tantos modelos como cosas engendradas? Porque (según lo dicho), basta un solo modelo de hombre para todos los hombres, lo mismo que un número limitado de almas actúa sobre una infinidad de hombres. Se trata, no obstante, de dos cosas diferentes a las cuales no puede aplicarse el mismo razonamiento; porque, verdaderamente, un solo modelo de hombre no es bastante para varios individuos si éstos difieren entre sí, no sólo por la materia sino también por mil diferencias específicas. No se da entre ellos, respecto a su modelo, la misma relación que guardan las estatuas de Sócrates con Sócrates, sino que su diferente composición habrá de armonizar también con las distintas razones. Un período completo contiene todas las razones, de tal modo que en el período siguiente se producen las mismas cosas según las mismas razones. No hemos de sentir temor, sin embargo, respecto a la infinitud del mundo inteligible; porque toda esta infinitud se apoya realmente en algo indivisible y, cuando actúa, camina hacia adelante.

I. Y a-t-il des idées des individus [aussi bien que des espèces]? Si je suis, avec un autre homme, ramené au monde intelligible, y trouverons-nous le principe individuel de chacun de nous?

[Première hypothèse.] Si l’individu nommé Socrate est éternel, si l’âme individuelle de Socrate est Socrate même, l’âme de chaque individu est contenue dans le monde intelligible.

[Deuxième hypothèse.] Si au contraire l’individu nommé Socrate n’est pas éternel, si la même âme peut appartenir successivement à plusieurs individus, à Socrate, à Pythagore, etc., chaque individu n’a pas son idée dans le monde intelligible [1].

[Démontrons que la première hypothèse peut seule être admise.]

Si l’âme particulière de chaque homme contient les raisons séminales de toutes les choses qu’elle fait, chaque individu a son idée dans le monde intelligible : car nous admettons que chaque âme renferme autant de raisons séminales que le monde entier. Dans ce cas, comme l’âme contiendra non seulement les raisons séminales des hommes, mais encore celles de tous les animaux, le nombre de ces raisons sera infini, à moins que le monde ne recommence la même série d’existences par des périodes fixes : car, le seul moyen de borner l’infinité des raisons, c’est que les mêmes choses se reproduisent.

Mais, dira-t-on, si les choses produites peuvent être plus nombreuses que leur type (παράδειγμα), quelle nécessité y a-t-il qu’il y ait des raisons et des types de tous les individus engendrés pendant une période? Il semble qu’il suffise de l’homme même pour expliquer l’existence de tous les hommes, et que des âmes d’un nombre fini puissent animer successivement des hommes d’un nombre infini. — Non : il est impossible que des choses différentes aient une même raison [séminale]. U ne suffît pas de l’homme même pour être le modèle d’hommes qui différent les uns des autres non seulement par la mati  ère, mais encore par des différences spécifiques (εἰδικαῖς διαφοραῖς). Ils ne peuvent être comparés aux images de Socrate qui reproduisent leur modèle (ἀρχέτυπον). La production des différences individuelles ne peut provenir que de la différence des raisons [séminales]. La période tout entière comprend toutes les raisons [2]. Quand elle recommence, les mêmes choses renaissent par les mêmes raisons. Il ne faut pas craindre qu’il y en ait 104 un nombre infini dans le monde intelligible: car la multitude [des raisons séminales] est contenue dans un principe indivisible [l’Âme], et arrive à l’existence par son action [3].

TWO POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES OF IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS.

1. Do ideas of individuals (as well as of classes of individuals), exist? This means that if I, in company with some other man, were to trace ourselves back to the intelligible world, we would there find separate individual principles corresponding to each of us. (This might imply either of two theories.) Either, if the individual named Socrates be eternal, and if the soul of Socrates be Socrates himself, then the soul of each individual is contained in the intelligible world. Or if, on the contrary, the individual named Socrates be not eternal, if the same soul can belong successively to several individuals, such as Socrates or Pythagoras, then (as Alcinoous, e. g., and other Platonists insist), each individual does not have his idea in the intelligible world.

THE FIRST (NON-PLATONIC) HYPOTHESIS ALONE RIGHT.

If the particular soul of each man contains ("seminal) reasons" of all the things she does, then each individual corresponds to his idea in the intelligible world, for we admit that each soul contains as many ("seminal) reasons" as the entire world. In this case, the soul would contain not only the ("seminal) reasons" of men but also those of all animals, the number of these reasons will be infinite, unless (as the Stoics teach) the world does not re-commence the identical series of existences in fixed periods; for the only means of limiting the infinity of reasons, is that the same things should reproduce themselves.

DIFFERENCE OF THINGS DEPEND ON THEIR SEMINAL REASONS.

But, if produced things may be more numerous than their specimens, what would be the necessity for the "reasons" and specimens of all individuals begotten during some one period? It would seem that the (idea of) the "man himself" to explain the existence of all men, and that the souls of a finite number of them could successively animate men of an infinite number. (To this contention we demur: for) it is impossible for different things to have an identical ("seminal) reason." The (idea of) the man himself would not, as model, suffice (to account) for men who differ from each other not only by matter, but also by specific differences. They cannot be compared to the images of Socrates which reproduce their model. Only the difference of the ("seminal) reasons" could give rise to individual differences. (As Plato said),1 the entire period contains all the ("seminal) reasons." When it recommences, the same things rearise through the same "reasons." We need not fear that, as a consequence, there would be an infinite (number or variety) of them in the intelligible world; for the multitude (of the seminal reasons) constitutes an indivisible principle from which each issues forth whenever active.

1. We have to examine the question whether there exists an ideal archetype of individuals, in other words whether I and every other human being go back to the Intellectual, every [living] thing having origin and principle There.

If Socrates, Socrates’ soul, is external then the Authentic Socrates - to adapt the term - must be There; that is to say, the individual soul has an existence in the Supreme as well as in this world. If there is no such permanent endurance and what was Socrates may with change of time become another soul and be Pythagoras or someone else - then the individual Socrates has not that existence in the Divine.

But if the Soul of the individual contains the Reason-Principles of all that it traverses, once more all men have their [archetypic] existence There: and it is our doctrine that every soul contains all the Reason-Principles that exist in the Kosmos: since then the Kosmos contains the Reason-Principles not merely of man, but also of all individual living things, so must the Soul. Its content of Reason-Principles, then, must be limitless, unless there be a periodical renovation bounding the boundlessness by the return of a former series.

But if [in virtue of this periodic return] each archetype may be reproduced by numerous existents, what need is there that there be distinct Reason-Principles and archetypes for each existent in any one period? Might not one [archetypal] man suffice for all, and similarly a limited number of souls produce a limitless number of men?

No: one Reason-Principle cannot account for distinct and differing individuals: one human being does not suffice as the exemplar for many distinct each from the other not merely in material constituents but by innumerable variations of ideal type: this is no question of various pictures or images reproducing an original Socrates; the beings produced differ so greatly as to demand distinct Reason-Principles. The entire soul-period conveys with it all the requisite Reason-Principles, and so too the same existents appear once more under their action.

There is no need to baulk at this limitlessness in the Intellectual; it is an infinitude having nothing to do with number or part; what we may think of it as its outgoing is no other than its characteristic Act.