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Plotino - Tratado 49,16 (V, 3, 16) — O Uno é superior ao Intelecto e à vida inteligível

Enéada V, 3, 16

terça-feira 14 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Cap 16-17: A condição do Uno e o acesso ao primeiro princípio

  • Cap 16, 1 a cap 17, 14: O Uno é superior ao Intelecto e à vida inteligível, e é por esta razão o Bem para as realidades que vêm após ele; é absolutamente suficiente a ele mesmo enquanto todas as realidades que vêm dele têm necessidade dele
  • Cap 17, 15-38: A alma não pode ter acesso ao Uno ao por meio de sua faculdade discursiva, pois esta não chega a apreender uma realidade simples e una; deve-se portanto a persuadir, como por uma "encantação", a se liberar de tudo o que lhe faz obstáculo, para subir assim até seu princípio

Míguez

16. Se ha dicho ya en otra parte que conviene que haya después del Primero, porque el Uno es, absolutamente hablando, una potencia inmensa. Además, esto mismo nos lo confirman todas las cosas, porque no hay ninguna, ni siquiera entre las últimas, que no disponga del poder de engendrar. Añadamos ahora que los seres engendrados no pueden remontar hacia lo alto, sino que se dirigen siempre hacia abajo haciéndose cada vez más múltiples, lo que prueba que el principio de una cosa es mucho más simple ella. El ser que ha producido el mundo sensible no es mismo mundo sensible, sino una Inteligencia y un mundo inteligible. Y lo que se encuentra antes de él y lo ha engendrado no es ni una Inteligencia ni un mundo inteligible sino algo más simple que la Inteligencia y que el mundo inteligible. Porque lo que es múltiple no viene de lo que es múltiple, sino que lo múltiple viene de lo no múltiple. Y si esto mismo es todavía múltiple, entonces no constituye un principio, que habrá que buscarlo en algo anterior a él. Conviene, pues, retrotraerse hasta el Uno verdadero, que es ajeno a toda multiplicidad y disfruta de toda simplicidad, si es realmente simple. Pero, ¿cómo pudo salir de él un verbo que es múltiple y universal, cuando está claro que él no es un verbo? Y si no es un verbo, ¿cómo pudo provenir un verbo de algo que no lo es? ¿Cómo, por ejemplo, procede del Bien algo con apariencia de Bien? ¿Y qué es lo que tiene el Bien para que se diga que guarda apariencia con el Bien? Posee, sin duda, identidad consigo mismo. Pero, ¿qué relación tiene esto con el Bien? Porque nosotros buscamos la identidad cuando ya somos seres buenos. Y tratamos de alcanzar, antes de nada, algo de lo que no debamos separarnos, precisamente, porque es el Bien; si no lo fuese, mejor sería que lo abandonásemos. Pero, esa semejanza con el Bien, ¿consiste en vivir una vida inalterable, permaneciendo voluntariamente cerca de El? Si es esto lo que hace que la vida sea digna de estimación, resulta evidente que nada tiene ya que buscar, pues, según parece, permanece idéntica a sí misma porque le basta con las cosas presentes. Y, en efecto, la vida es estimable con las cosas presentes, y más todavía cuando estas mismas cosas no difieren de ella. Si una vida así es la vida que consideramos plena, la vida clara y perfecta, tiene que encerrar en sí toda alma y toda inteligencia, y nada de lo que hay en ella estará privado de la vida y de la inteligencia. Así, pues, se bastará a sí misma y ya no tratará de buscar nada; pero si no busca nada, es porque tiene en sí misma lo que ella debiera buscar, caso de que no lo poseyese. Tiene en sí misma el Bien o algo semejante al Bien, que es lo que nosotros llamamos la vida y la inteligencia, o alguna otra cosa deducida de éstas. Si se trata del Bien, nada más allá seria concebible; porque si ese más allá existe, es claro que la vida de la Inteligencia tenderá hacia El, se suspenderá de El, recibirá de El su existencia y, en fin, se dirigirá hacia El, porque El es su principio.

Conviene, por tanto, que el Bien sea superior a la vida a la Inteligencia, pues así la segunda hipóstasis tornará hacia El la vida que se da en ella, vida que, ciertamente, es una imagen del ser que hay en el Bien y que la hace vivir. Y volverá, también, hacía El la inteligencia que se da en ella, que es como una imagen de lo que hay en el Bien, sea cual sea su ser.

Bouillet

XVI. Il a été démontré ailleurs qu’il doit y avoir quelque chose après l’Un, que l’Un est une puissance et une puissance inépuisable : ce qui le prouve, c’est que les choses placées même an dernier rang ont (a puissance d’engendrer. Pour le moment, remarquons que la génération des choses offre une procession descendante (πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν), que plus on s’avance, plus ta multiplicité augmente, que le principe est toujours plus simple que les choses qu’il produit (22). Donc, ce qui a produit le monde sensible n’est pas le monde sensible, mais l’Intelligence, le monde intelligible ; et ce qui a engendré l’Intelligence et le monde intelligible n’est pas l’Intelligence ni le monde intelligible, mais quelque chose de plus simple qu’eux.. Le multiple ne naît pas du multiple, mais de ce qui n’est pas multiple. Si ce qui est supérieur à l’intelligence était multiple, ce ne serait plus le Principe, il faudrait encore remonter plus haut. On doit donc ramener tout à Celui qui est essentiellement un, qui est en dehors de toute multiplicité, dont la simplicité est la plus grande possible. — Mais comment peut naître de l’Un la Raison multiple et universelle, quand évidemment l’Un n’est pas une raison? S’il n’est pas une raison, comment engendre-t-il la Raison? Comment encore le Bien engendre-t-il une hypostase dont la bonté soit la forme (ἀγαθοειδές)? Que possède cette hypostase? Est-ce l’identité? Hais quel rapport ce caractère a-t-il avec le Bien ? — C’est que nous cherchons l’identité el la permanence dès que nous possédons le Bien, et qu’il est le principe dont il ne faut pas se séparer : car si ce n’était pas le Bien, il vaudrait mieux l’abandonner. Nous devons donc vouloir demeurer unis au Bien. Puisque c’est là ce qu’il y a de plus souhaitable pour l’Intelligence, elle n’a rien à chercher au delà, et sa permanence indique qu’elle est satisfaite des choses qu’elle possède. Jouissant ainsi de leur présence de telle sorte qu’elle ne fasse qu’un avec elles, elle doit alors regarder la vie comme ce qu’il y a déplus précieux. Si l’Intelligence possède la vie dans son universalité et sa plénitude, cette vie est la plénitude et l’universalité de l’âme et de l’Intelligence. L’Intelligence se suffît donc, elle ne désire rien ; elle a en elle-même ce qu’elle aurait désiré si elle ne l’eût pas possédé ; elle a le bien qui consiste dans la vie et l’intelligence, comme nous l’avons dit, ou dans quelqu’une des choses qui y sont attachées. Si la vie et l’intelligence sont le Bien absolu, il n’y a rien au-dessus d’elles. Mais si le Bien absolu est au-dessus d’elles, le bien de l’intelligence est cette vie qui se rapporte au Bien absolu, qui s’y rattache, en reçoit l’existence et s’élève vers lui parce qu’il est son principe. Le Bien doit donc être supérieur a l’intelligence et a la vie. C’est à cette condition que se tourne vers lui la vie de l’Intelligence, image de Celui dont procède toute vie; c’est à cette condition que se tourne vers lui l’Intelligence, image de ce qui est dans l’Un, quelle qu’en soit la nature.

Guthrie

THE GOOD MUST BE SUPERIOR TO INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE.

16. We have shown elsewhere that something must follow the One, and that the One is a power, and is inexhaustible; and this is so, because even the last-rank entities possess the power of begetting. For the present we may notice that the generation of things reveals a descending procession, in which, the further we go, the more does manifoldness increase; and that th" principle is always simpler than the things it produces. Therefore, that which has produced the sense world is not the sense-world itself, but Intelligence and the intelligible world; and that which has begotten Intelligence and the intelligible world is neither Intelligence nor the intelligible world, but something simpler than them. Manifoldness is not born of manifoldness, but of something that is not manifold. If That which was superior to Intelligence were manifold, it would no longer be the (supreme) Principle, and we would have to ascend further. Everything must, therefore, be reduced to that which is essentially one, which is outside of all manifoldness; and whose simplicity is the greatest possible. But how can manifold and universal Reason be born of the One, when very evidently the One is not a reason? As it is not a reason, how can it beget Reason? How can the Good beget a hypostatic form of existence, which would be good in form? What does this hypostatic form of existence possess? Is it identity? But what is the relation between identity and goodness? Because as soon as we possess the Good, we seek identity and permanence; and because the Good is the principle from which we must not separate; for if it were not the Good, it would be better to give it up. We must, therefore, wish to remain united to the Good. Since that is the most desirable for Intelligence, it need seek nothing beyond, and its permanence indicates its satisfaction with the entities it possesses. Enjoying, as it does, their presence in a manner such that it fuses with them, it must then consider life as the most precious entity of all. As Intelligence possesses life in its universality and fulness, this life is the fulness and universality of the Soul and Intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, is self-sufficient, and desires nothing; it contains what it would have desired if it had not already possessed such desirable object. It possesses the good that consists in life and intelligence, as we have said, or in some one of the connected entities. If Life and Intelligence were the absolute Good, there would be nothing above them. But if the absolute Good be above them, the good of Intelligence is this Life, which relates to the absolute Good, which connects with it, which receives existence from it, and rises towards it, because it is its principle. The Good, therefore, must be superior to Life and Intelligence. On this condition only does the life of Intelligence, the image of Him from whom all life proceeds, turn towards Him; on this condition only does Intelligence, the imitation of the contents of the One, whatever be His nature, turn towards Him.

Taylor

XVI. That it is necessary, therefore, there should be something after the first, has been elsewhere asserted by us. And, in short, we have said that this which is next to the first [principle of things] is power, and an inestimable power. This, likewise, is rendered credible from all other things, because there is nothing even among the last of things which has not a generative power. Now, however, we must say, that in things which are generated, the progression is not to the upward, but to the downward, and to a greater multitude, and that the principle of particulars is itself more simple [than its effects]. Hence, that which produced the sensible world will not be itself the sensible world, but intellect and the intelligible world. Hence, too, that which is prior to the intelligible world, and which generated it, is something more simple than intellect and the intelligible world. For that which is multitudinous does not originate from multitude, but from that which is not multitude. For if the source of it was multitudinous, it would not be the principle, but the principle would be some other thing prior to it. It is necessary, therefore, to refer all things to that which is truly one, and which is superior to all multitude, and to every kind of [participable] simplicity, if it is truly simple. But how is that which is generated from it, multitudinous and universal reason, since it is evident it is not itself reason ? If however it is not reason, how can reason proceed from that which is not1 reason ? And how can that which is boniform proceed from the good ? For what does it possess in itself that can cause it to be denominated boniform ? Is it because it subsists with invariable sameness ? But what does this contribute to the good ? For we seek after a sameness of subsistence when good is present. Or do we not first investigate that from which it, is not proper to depart, because it is good ? But if it is not good, it is better to abandon the pursuit of it. Is it therefore considered by us as boniform, to live abiding in good voluntarily, and with invariable sameness? Hence, if intellect is satisfied with living after this manner, it evidently seeks after nothing else. It appears, therefore, that a sameness of subsistence is desirable, because what is present is sufficient. All things, however, being now present to intellect, to live is desirable; and this when all things are in such a manner present with it, as not to be different from it. But if all life is present with this, and a life perspicuous and perfect; in this, soul and every intellect subsist, and nothing is wanting to it either of life or intellect. Hence it is sufficient to itself, and seeks after nothing farther. But if this be the case, it possesses in itself, that which it would investigate if it were not present. It possesses, therefore, in itself the good, or a thing of such a kind as we call life and intellect, or something else which is accidental to these. If, however, this is the good, there will be nothing beyond these. But if the good is beyond these, a life tending to this, suspended from it, having its subsistence from, and living according to it, will evidently be good. For the good is the principle of intellect. It is necessary, therefore, that the good should be more excellent than life and intellect. For thus intellect, and the life which it contains, will be converted to it, since the life of intellect possesses in itself an imitation of the good, according to which intellect lives, and this is also the case with intellect itself, whatever this imitation may be.

MacKenna

16. We have, of course, already seen that a secondary must follow upon the First, and that this is a power immeasurably fruitful; and we indicated that this truth is confirmed by the entire order of things since there is nothing, not even in the lowest ranks, void of the power of generating. We have now to add that, since things engendered tend downwards and not upwards and, especially, move towards multiplicity, the first principle of all must be less a manifold than any.

That which engenders the world of sense cannot itself be a sense-world; it must be the Intellect and the Intellectual world; similarly, the prior which engenders the Intellectual-Principle and the Intellectual world cannot be either, but must be something of less multiplicity. The manifold does not rise from the manifold: the intellectual multiplicity has its source in what is not manifold; by the mere fact of being manifold, the thing is not the first principle: we must look to something earlier.

All must be grouped under a unity which, as standing outside of all multiplicity and outside of any ordinary simplicity, is the veritably and essentially simplex.

Still, how can a Reason-Principle [the Intellectual], characteristically a manifold, a total, derive from what is obviously no Reason-Principle?

But how, failing such origin in the simplex, could we escape [what cannot be accepted] the derivation of a Reason-Principle from a Reason-Principle?

And how does the secondarily good [the imaged Good] derive from The Good, the Absolute? What does it hold from the Absolute Good to entitle it to the name?

Similarity to the prior is not enough, it does not help towards goodness; we demand similarity only to an actually existent Good: the goodness must depend upon derivation from a Prior of such a nature that the similarity is desirable because that Prior is good, just as the similarity would be undesirable if the Prior were not good.

Does the similarity with the Prior consist, then, in a voluntary resting upon it?

It is rather that, finding its condition satisfying, it seeks nothing: the similarity depends upon the all-sufficiency of what it possesses; its existence is agreeable because all is present to it, and present in such a way as not to be even different from it [Intellectual-Principle is Being].

All life belongs to it, life brilliant and perfect; thus all in it is at once life-principle and Intellectual-Principle, nothing in it aloof from either life or intellect: it is therefore self-sufficing and seeks nothing: and if it seeks nothing this is because it has in itself what, lacking, it must seek. It has, therefore, its Good within itself, either by being of that order - in what we have called its life and intellect - or in some other quality or character going to produce these.

If this [secondary principle] were The Good [The Absolute], nothing could transcend these things, life and intellect: but, given the existence of something higher, this Intellectual-Principle must possess a life directed towards that Transcendent, dependent upon it, deriving its being from it, living towards it as towards its source. The First, then, must transcend this principle of life and intellect which directs thither both the life in itself, a copy of the Reality of the First, and the intellect in itself which is again a copy, though of what original there we cannot know.