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Plotino - Tratado 49,11 (V, 3, 11) — A gênese do Intelecto a partir do Uno

Enéada V, 3, 11

segunda-feira 13 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Cap 11-15: O Intelecto conhecente e pensante e o Uno além do conhecimento e do pensamento

  • Cap 11, 1-30: A gênese do Intelecto a partir do Uno: O Intelecto nasce como visão que vê seu princípio e que é assim determinada; esta visão que é o Intelecto, vendo o Uno, o vê como uma realidade que se tornou múltipla nela mesma

Míguez

11. He aquí, pues, que la Inteligencia es múltiple cuando quiere pensar el principio que está más allá de ella. Y piensa, en efecto, pero, al querer aprehenderlo en su simplicidad, se aleja verdaderamente de él para recibir siempre sí misma una realidad que se multiplica. De modo que, tiende hacia él, no es aún una inteligencia, sino más una visión que todavía no tiene su objeto; y cuando se aleja de él, tiene ya lo que ella tenía, pero multiplicado. Deseaba, por tanto, una cosa de la que poseía una indeterminada representación. Con su alejamiento obtuvo ciertamente otra cosa, que ella hizo múltiple al tomarla en sí misma. Porque es claro que poseía ya un esbozo de su visión, sin el cual no habría podido acogerla en sí misma. Sin embargo, este objeto, de uno que era se ha vuelto múltiple, y es así como ella lo conoce para verlo, convirtiéndose, entonces, en visión en acto. Es, pues, inteligencia, en tanto posee el objeto y lo posee como inteligencia. Con anterioridad, era tan sólo deseo de ver y visión informe. Pero como tal inteligencia se lanza hacia su principio y se vuelve inteligencia cuando lo aprehende, conservando íntimamente y para siempre esta disposición y haciéndose inteligencia, esencia y pensamiento con el acto de su mismo pensar. Antes de esto no era ni un pensamiento, porque no poseía lo inteligible, ni tampoco una inteligencia, porque todavía no había pensado.

Antes que los inteligibles debemos colocar su principio, que no puede existir en ellos. Porque lo que se da en un ser no es precisamente el principio del que proviene sino aquello de que está hecho. El principio del que proviene un ser no es él mismo un ser, sino algo diferente de todos los seres. No es, pues, ninguno de ellos, sino algo que precede a todas las cosas e, incluso, a la propia Inteligencia. Como, además, todo ser es anterior a la Inteligencia, se confirma con ello que el principio de los seres es anterior a la Inteligencia. Y si, al hablar de todas las cosas, nos referimos a las que vienen después de la Inteligencia, también en este sentido será anterior a todas las cosas. No podrá ser, por tanto, ninguna de las cosas a las que él precede, esto es, no podrá designárselo como Inteligencia, ni tampoco como Bien, si con la palabra Bien se quiere significar algunas de esas cosas. Désele tal nombre, pero a condición de que designe algo que preceda a todas las cosas. Ya que si la Inteligencia es múltiple y el pensamiento que sobreviene en ella y sale de ella también la hace múltiple, lo que es absolutamente simple y la primera de todas las cosas, esto, naturalmente, deberá encontrarse más allá de la Inteligencia. Porque si pensase, ya no estaría más allá de la Inteligencia sino que sería la misma inteligencia. Y sí fuese la Inteligencia, entonces tendría que ser algo múltiple.

Bouillet

XI. L’Intelligence devient donc multiple quand elle veut penser le principe qui lui est supérieur. En voulant le saisir dans sa simplicité, elle s’écarte de cette simplicité, parce qu’elle reçoit toujours en elle cette nature différenciée et multipliée. En sortant de l’Un, elle n’était pas encore l’Intelligence ; elle se trouvait dans l’état de la vue qui n’est pas encore en acte. En émanant de l’Un, elle avait en elle ce qu’elle a rendu multiple. Elle aspirait vaguement à un objet autre qu’elle-même, et en même temps elle avait en elle une sorte de représentation de cet objet; elle possédait ainsi en elle une autre chose qu’elle a rendue multiple : car elle avait en elle une espèce d’empreinte produite par la contemplation [de l’Un]; sinon, elle ne recevrait pas l’Un en elle. C’est ainsi que l’Intelligence, en naissant de l’Un, est devenue multiple, et, possédant la connaissance, s’est contemplée elle-même; elle est devenue alors la vue en acte. L’Intelligence n’est vraiment intelligence que lorsqu’elle possède son objet, et qu’elle le possède comme intelligence. Auparavant, elle n’est qu’une aspiration, qu’une vue informe : en s’appliquant à l’Un et en le saisissant, elle devient intelligence. Or, toujours elle reçoit l’Un, toujours elle est intelligence, essence, pensée, du moment qu’elle pense. Antérieurement, elle n’est pas encore la pensée puisqu’elle ne possède pas l’intelligible, elle n’est pas encore l’intelligence puisqu’elle ne pense pas.

Ce qui est au-dessus de ces choses est leur principe sans leur être inhérent. Le principe d’où les choses procèdent (τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ) ne peut leur être inhérent; cela n’est vrai que des éléments qui les constituent (ἐξ ὧν). Le principe dont procèdent toutes choses [l’Un] n’est aucune d’elles; il diffère de toutes. L’Un n’est donc aucune des choses de l’univers ; il est antérieur à toutes choses, par conséquent, il est antérieur à l’Intelligence, puisque celle-ci embrasse toutes choses dans son universalité. D’un autre côté, comme les choses qui sont postérieures à l’Un sont universelles et qu’il est ainsi antérieur aux choses universelles, il ne doit pas être l’une d’elles. Ne l’appelle donc ni Intelligence ni Bien, si par Bien tu désignes quelque objet compris dans l’univers; ce nom ne lui convient que s’il indique qu’il est antérieur à tout. Si l’Intelligence n’est intelligence que parce qu’elle est multiple ; si la pensée, quoique l’Intelligence la trouve en soi, est également multiple, le Premier, le principe absolument simple, est au-dessus de l’Intelligence : car s’il pense, il est intelligence, et, s’il est intelligence, il est multiple.

Guthrie

HOW INTELLIGENCE BECAME MANIFOLD.

11. Intelligence, therefore, becomes manifold when it wishes to think the Principle superior to it. By wishing to grasp Him in his simplicity, it abandons this simplicity, because it continues to receive within itself this differentiated and multiplied nature. It was not yet Intelligence when it issued from Unity; it found itself in the state of sight when not yet actualized. When emanating from Unity, it contained already what made it manifold. It vaguely aspired to

an object other than itself, while simultaneously containing a representation of this object. It thus contained something that it made manifold; for it contained a sort of impress produced by the contemplation (of the One); otherwise it would not receive the One within itself. Thus Intelligence, on being born of Unity, became manifold, and as it possessed knowledge, it contemplated itself. It then became actualized sight. Intelligence is really intelligence only when it possesses its object, and when it possesses it as intelligence. Formerly, it was only an aspiration, only an indistinct vision. On applying itself to the One, and grasping the One, it becomes intelligence. Now its receptivity to Unity is continuous, and it is continuously intelligence, "being," thought, from the very moment it begins to think. Before that, it is not yet thought, since it does not possess the intelligible, and is not yet Intelligence, since it does not think.

THE ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL WITHOUT BEING LIMITED THEREBY.

That which is above these things is their principle, without being inherent in them. The principle from which these things proceed cannot be inherent in them; that is true only of the elements that constitute them. The principle from which all things proceed (the One) is not any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not any of the things of the universe: He precedes all these things, and consequently, He precedes Intelligence, since the latter embraces all things in its universality. On the other hand, as the things that are posterior to Unity are universal, and as Unity thus is anterior to universal things, it cannot be any one of them. Therefore, it should not be called either intelligence or good, if by "good" you mean any object comprised within the universe; this name suits it only, if it indicate that it is anterior to everything. If Intelligence be intelligence only because it is manifold; if thought, though found within Intelligence, be similarly manifold, then the First, the Principle that is absolutely simple, will be above Intelligence; for if He think, He would be Intelligence; and if He be Intelligence, He would be manifold.

Taylor

XI. Hence this intellect becomes manifold, when it wishes to understand that which is beyond intellect. Endeavouring, therefore, to come into contact with it as with that which is simple, it falls from it always receiving another multiplied nature in itself. Hence, it originates from it not as intellect, but as sight not yet seeing. But it proceeds from it containing in itself that which it has multiplied. Hence, it indefinitely desires another thing, possessing at the same time a certain phantasm in itself. It proceeds, however, receiving another thing in itself, which causes it to be multitudinous. For again, it has an impression1 of the vision [of that which is beyond itself], or it would never become the recipient of it. Thus, therefore, it becomes manifold from the one; and thus as intellect it sees itself, and then becomes sight perceiving. This, however, is then intellect when it possesses; and as intellect it possesses.1 But prior to this, it is desire alone, and a formless sight. This intellect, therefore, projects itself towards that which is beyond intellect: and when it receives it, it becomes [perceptive] "intellect. But it is always the recipient [of the ineffable], and always becomes intellect, essence, and intelligence, when it perceives intellectually. For prior to this it was not intelligence, in consequence of not possessing the intelligible; nor intellect, because it was not yet intellective. That, however, which is prior to these, is the principle of these, but not as inherent in them. For the first principle, or the from which, is not inherent in that of which it is the principle, but the things of which a thing consists, are inherent in that thing. That, however, from which each thing is derived, is not each thing, but is different from all things. Hence, it is not some one of all things, but is prior to all things; so that on this account, it is also prior to intellect. For again, all things are within intellect; so that for this reason likewise, it is prior to intellect. If, also, the natures which are posterior to it have the order of all things, and on this account likewise it is prior to all things, it is not proper that it should be a certain one of those things to which it is prior. You must not, therefore, denominate it intellect. Hence, neither must you call it the good, if the good signifies some one of all things. But if it signifies that which is prior to all things, let it be thus denominated. If, therefore, intellect is intellect because it is multitudinous, and the intellection of itself as it were intervening, though it is from itself, multiplies itself, it is necessary that the nature which is perfectly simple, and the first of all things, should be beyond intellect. For if it possessed intelligence, it would not be beyond, but would be intellect. But if it were intellect, it would also be multitude.

MacKenna

11. Thus the Intellectual-Principle, in the act of knowing the Transcendent, is a manifold. It knows the Transcendent in very essence but, with all its effort to grasp that prior as a pure unity, it goes forth amassing successive impressions, so that, to it, the object becomes multiple: thus in its outgoing to its object it is not [fully realised] Intellectual-Principle; it is an eye that has not yet seen; in its return it is an eye possessed of the multiplicity which it has itself conferred: it sought something of which it found the vague presentment within itself; it returned with something else, the manifold quality with which it has of its own act invested the simplex.

If it had not possessed a previous impression of the Transcendent, it could never have grasped it, but this impression, originally of unity, becomes an impression of multiplicity; and the Intellectual-Principle, in taking cognisance of that multiplicity, knows the Transcendent and so is realized as an eye possessed of its vision.

It is now Intellectual-Principle since it actually holds its object, and holds it by the act of intellection: before, it was no more than a tendance, an eye blank of impression: it was in motion towards the transcendental; now that it has attained, it has become Intellectual-Principle henceforth absorbed; in virtue of this intellection it holds the character of Intellectual-Principle, of Essential Existence and of Intellectual Act where, previously, not possessing the Intellectual Object, it was not Intellectual Perception, and, not yet having exercised the Intellectual Act, it was not Intellectual-Principle.

The Principle before all these principles is no doubt the first principle of the universe, but not as immanent: immanence is not for primal sources but for engendering secondaries; that which stands as primal source of everything is not a thing but is distinct from all things: it is not, then, a member of the total but earlier than all, earlier, thus, than the Intellectual-Principle - which in fact envelops the entire train of things.

Thus we come, once more, to a Being above the Intellectual-Principle and, since the sequent amounts to no less than the All, we recognise, again, a Being above the All. This assuredly cannot be one of the things to which it is prior. We may not call it "Intellect"; therefore, too, we may not call it "the Good," if "the Good" is to be taken in the sense of some one member of the universe; if we mean that which precedes the universe of things, the name may be allowed.

The Intellectual-Principle is established in multiplicity; its intellection, self-sprung though it be, is in the nature of something added to it [some accidental dualism] and makes it multiple: the utterly simplex, and therefore first of all beings, must, then, transcend the Intellectual-Principle; and, obviously, if this had intellection it would no longer transcend the Intellectual-Principle but be it, and at once be a multiple.