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Plotino - Tratado 49,8 (V, 3, 8) — O Intelecto é a mesma coisa que a atividade e a visão inteligíveis (2)

Enéada V, 3, 8

segunda-feira 13 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Cap 7, 13 a cap 9, 2: O Intelecto é a mesma coisa que a atividade e a visão inteligíveis que lhe pertencem e que são idêntica a seus objetos inteligíveis

Míguez

8. Pero ¿cuál es el inteligible que ve la Inteligencia y cuál es la inteligencia que ve, como si se viese a sí misma? ¿No convendrá que busquemos un inteligible tal como el color o la forma que se da en los cuerpos? Porque los inteligibles realmente algo que les precede. La razón espermática produce estas cosas no es idéntica a ellas, por el carácter invisible de su naturaleza. Y esto hay que afirmarlo, con razón de los inteligibles, ya que su naturaleza es la misma que la de los seres que los poseen, al igual que la razón espermática resulta ser idéntica al alma en la que ella reside. Pero el alma no ve lo que tiene en sí misma. Sin duda, porque no lo ha engendrado y porque ella misma es una imagen, como lo son también las razones espermáticas. La claridad, la verdad y la primacía deben atribuirse al ser del que provienen, ser que se pertenece a sí mismo y que existe por sí mismo. Pero una imagen no puede subsistir sin un objeto del que provenga y un sujeto en el que resida, porque conviene a la imagen el serlo precisamente de un objeto diferente de ella y el residir en un sujeto también diferente, salvo que permanezca unida a su modelo . De ahí que no contemple, porque no posee una luz suficiente para hacerlo. Y, aunque esto mismo le fuese posible encontraría su perfección en otra cosa y no se vería nunca a sí misma.

Nada de ello acontece en el mundo inteligible, sino que allí la visión se confunde con el objeto visible, de tal modo que el objeto visible es tal como es la visión y la visión tal como es el objeto visible. ¿Quién podrá decir lo que es? Sin duda, quien ve lo inteligible, esto es, la Inteligencia. Incluso en este mundo la visión es luz y, como está unida a la luz, ve realmente la luz, porque ve los colores. Pero, en el mundo inteligible, la visión no se ejercita con algo extraño sino que se realiza por sí misma, porque no tiene que mirar hacia afuera. Contempla una luz por medio de otra luz y no valiéndose de algo extraño. Se trata, pues, de una luz que ve otra luz, o mejor, de la luz que se ve a sí misma.

Esta luz ilumina al alma y la distingue con sus rayos. E, igualmente, la hace inteligible y semejante a sí misma, esto es, semejante a la luz que proviene de lo alto. Tal como vemos en el alma la huella de esta luz, así podremos imaginárnosla nosotros, pero en un grado de belleza, de magnitud y de claridad mucho mayor, que la aproxime a la naturaleza de la Inteligencia y de lo inteligible. Esta iluminación proporciona al alma una vida mucho más clara, que no es, sin embargo, la vida generadora; porque, todo lo contrario, hace que el alma se vuelva hacia sí misma y no le permite que se disperse, sino que la inclina a amar la claridad que hay en la Inteligencia. No se trata, ciertamente, de la vida sensitiva, porque mira hacia fuera de lo que conoce mejor por los sentidos, y el que recibió la luz de las cosas verdaderas mira menos a las cosas visibles que a sus contrarias. Nos queda por considerar que haya podido adquirir la vida intelectual, que es como una huella de la vida de la Inteligencia, en la que se encuentra la verdad.

La vida de la Inteligencia es como un acto. Ella es la luz primera, que ilumina primitivamente por sí misma cual una claridad que se vuelve hacia sí o luz que a la vez ilumina y es iluminada, verdadero inteligible en suma, que piensa y pensado, y es visto por sí mismo, sin tener necesidad de a cosa, ya que se basta a sí mismo para ver. Porque, en definitiva, lo que hace es verse a sí mismo. También por sí mismo es conocido de nosotros, pues el conocimiento que nosotros tenemos de él lo obtenemos gracias a él. De otro celo, ¿cómo podríamos hablar de él? Es realmente tal que se percibe claramente a sí mismo, nosotros nos percibimos gracias a él. Según estos razonamientos nuestra alma se eleva hacia él y se manifiesta como su imagen, de tal manera que la vida del alma es una imagen y una semejanza de lo inteligible. Y así cuando piensa, se hace semejante a Dios y a la Inteligencia. Si alguien le pregunta cuál es esta inteligencia plena y perfecta, que se conoce ya desde su principio, se coloca primeramente en la Inteligencia o deja el sitio al acto de la Inteligencia, aunque conservando en sí misma su recuerdo. Muestra, pues, las mismas propiedades que la Inteligencia y, como es su imagen, puede verla de alguna manera, gracias a la exactísima semejanza que presenta con ella esa parte del alma que puede alcanzar la semejanza con la Inteligencia.

Bouillet

VIII. Quelle nature l’intelligence découvre-t-elle dans l’intelligible? Quelle nature découvre-t-elle en elle-même par la contemplation? — D’abord, pour l’intelligible, il ne faut pas se le représenter avec une figure ni avec des couleurs comme les corps. Il existe avant eux. Les raisons séminales (ὁ λόγος ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι) qui produisent la figure et la couleur ne leur sont pas identiques : car elles sont invisibles. Les choses intelligibles le sont à plus forte raison : leur nature est identique à celle des principes en qui elles résident, comme les raisons séminales sont identiques à l’âme qui les contient. Mais l’âme ne voit pas les choses qu’elle possède, parce qu’elle ne les a pas engendrées; elle n’est, ainsi que les raisons, qu’une image [de l’intelligence]. Le principe dont elle vient a une existence évidente, véritable, première : aussi existe-t-il de lui-même et en lui-même. Mais cette image [qui est dans l’âme] n’est même pas permanente si elle n’appartient à une autre chose et qu’elle y demeure. En effet, le propre d’une image est d’être en autrui, puisqu’elle appartient à autrui, à moins qu’elle ne reste attachée à son principe. Aussi ne contemple t-elle pas, parce qu’elle n’a pas une lumière suffisante, et, contemplât-elle, comme c’est en autrui qu’elle trouve sa perfection, c’est autrui qu’elle contemplerait au lieu de se contempler elle-même. U n’en est pas de même dans rintelligence : la chose contemplée et la contemplation y coexistent et y sont identiques (15). Qui affirme donc ce qu’est l’intelligible? La puissance qui le contemple, l’intelligence. Ici-bas, la vue voit la lumière parce qu’elle est elle-même lumière, ou plutôt parce qu’elle est unie à la lumière : car ce sont les couleurs qu’elle voit. Au contraire, l’intelligence ne voit pas par autrui, mais par elle-même, parce que ce qu’elle voit n’est pas hors d’elle. Elle voit une lumière avec une autre lumière, mais non par une autre lumière; elle est donc une lumière qui en voit une autre ; par conséquent, elle se voit elle-même. Cette lumière, en brillant dans l’âme, l’illumine, c’est-à-dire, la rend intellectuelle, la rend semblable à la lumière supérieure [savoir λ l’intelligence]. Si, par le rayon dont cette lumière éclaire l’âme, on juge de sa nature et qu’on la conçoive encore plus grande, plus belle, plus brillante, on s’approchera bien de l’intelligence et de l’intelligible : car, en illuminant l’âme, l’intelligence lui donne une vie plus claire, une vie qui n’est pas la vie générative (parce que l’intelligence convertit l’âme vers elle, et, au lieu de la laisser se diviser, lui fait aimer l’éclat dont elle brille) ; une vie qui n’est pas non plus la vie sensitive (car les sens s’appliquent à ce qui est extérieur et n’en connaissent pas mieux cependant, tandis que celui qui voit cette lumière supérieure des vérités voit beaucoup mieux les choses qui sont visibles, mais d’une façon différente). Reste donc que l’intelligence donne à l’âme la vie intellectuelle, qui est un vestige de sa propre vie : car elle possède les réalités. C’est dans la vie et l’acte qui sont propres à l’intelligence que consiste ici la lumière première qui s’illumine elle-même primitivement, qui se reflète sur elle-même, parce qu’elle est tout à la fois la chose illuminante et la chose illuminée ; elle est aussi le véritable intelligible, parce qu’elle est à la fois la chose pensante et la chose pensée. Elle se voit elle-même par elle-même, sans avoir besoin d’autrui; elle se voit donc d’une manière absolue, parce qu’en elle ce qui connaît est identique à ce qui est connu. Il en est de même en nous : c’est par l’intelligence que nous connaissons l’intelligence. Sans cela, comment en parlerions-nous? Comment dirions-nous qu’elle est capable de se saisir clairement elle-même, et que par elle nous nous saisissons nous-mêmes? Comment pourrions-nous, par ces raisonnements, ramènera l’intelligence notre âme qui s’en reconnaît l’image, qui regarde sa vie comme une imitation fidèle de celle de l’intelligence, qui croit que, lorsqu’elle pense, elle prend une forme intellectuelle et divine ? Si l’on veut savoir quelle est cette Intelligence parfaite, universelle, première, qui se connaît elle-même essentiellement, il faut que l’âme soit ramenée à l’intelligence, ou du moins qu’elle lui rapporte l’acte par lequel elle conçoit les choses dont elle a la réminiscence. C’est en se plaçant dans cet état que l’âme devient capable de démontrer qu’étant l’image de l’intelligence elle peut la voir par elle-même, c’est-à-dire par celle de ses puissances qui ressemble le plus exactement à l’intelligence [à savoir par la pensée pure], qui lui ressemble autant qu’une partie de l’âme peut approcher d’elle.

Guthrie

WHAT INTELLIGENCE LOOKS LIKE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

8. What qualities does Intelligence display in the intelligible world? What qualities does it discover in itself by contemplation? To begin with, we must not form of Intelligence a conception showing a figure, or colors, like bodies. Intelligence existed before bodies. The "seminal reasons" which produce figure and color are not identical with them; for "seminal reasons" are invisible. So much the more are intelligible entities invisible; their nature is identical with that of the principles in which they reside, just as "seminal reasons" are identical with the soul that contains them. But the soul does not see the entities she contains, because she has not begotten them; even she herself, just like the "reasons," is no more than an image (of Intelligence). The principle from which she comes possesses an evident existence, that is genuine, and primary; consequent that principle exists of and in itself. But this image (which is in the soul) is not even permanent unless it belong to something else, and reside therein. Indeed, the characteristic of an image is that it resides in something else, since it belongs to something else, unless it remain attached to its principle. Consequently, this image does not contemplate, because it does not possess a light that is sufficient; and even if it should contemplate, as it finds its perfection in something else, it would be contemplating something else, instead of contemplating itself. The same case does not obtain in Intelligence; there the contemplated entity and contemplation co-exist, and are identical. Who is it, therefore, that declares the nature of the intelligible? The power that contemplates it, namely, Intelligence itself. Here below our eyes see the light because our vision itself is light, or rather because it is united to light; for it is the colors that our vision beholds. On the contrary, Intelligence does not see through something else, but through itself, because what it sees is not outside of itself. It sees a light with another light, and not by another light; it, is therefore, a light that sees another; and, consequently, it sees itself. This light, on shining in the soul, illuminates her; that is, intellectualizes her; assimilates her to the superior light (namely, in Intelligence) . If, by the ray with which this light enlightens the soul, we judge of the nature of this light and conceive of it as still greater, more beautiful, and more brilliant, we will indeed be approaching Intelligence and the intelligible world; for, by enlightening the soul, Intelligence imparts to her a clearer life. This life is not generative, because Intelligence converts the soul towards Intelligence; and, instead of allowing the soul to divide, causes the soul to love the splendor with which she is shining. Neither is this life one of the senses, for though the senses apply themselves to what is exterior, they do not, on that account, learn anything beyond (themselves). He who sees that superior light of the verities sees much better things that are visible, though in a different manner. It remains, therefore, that the Intelligence imparts to the soul the intellectual life, which is a trace of her own life; for Intelligence possesses the realities. It is in the life and the actualization which are characteristic of Intelligence that here consists the primary Light, which from the beginning, illumines itself, which reflects on itself, because it is simultaneously enlightener and enlightened; it is also the true intelligible entity, because it is also at the same time thinker and thought.

It sees itself by itself, without having need of anything else; it sees itself in an absolute manner, because, within it, the known is identical with the knower. It is not otherwise in us; it is by Intelligence that we know intelligence. Otherwise, how could we speak of it? How could we say that it was capable of clearly grasping itself, and that, by it, we understand ourselves? How could we, by these reasonings, to Intelligence reduce our soul which recognizes that it is the image of Intelligence, which considers its life a faithful imitation of the life of Intelligence, which thinks that, when it thinks, it assumes an intellectual and divine form? Should one wish to know which is this Intelligence that is perfect, universal and primary, which knows itself essentially, the soul has to be reduced to Intelligence; or, at least, the soul has to recognize that the actualization by which the soul conceives the entities of which the soul has the reminiscence is derived | from Intelligence. Only by placing herself in that condition, does the soul become able to demonstrate that inasmuch as she is the image of Intelligence she, the soul, can by herself, see it; that is, by those of her powers which most exactly resemble Intelligence (namely, by pure thought); which resembles Intelligence in the degree that a part of the soul can be assimilated to it.

Taylor

VIII. What kind of intelligible, however, does intellect see, and what does it perceive itself to be ? With respect to the intelligible indeed, it is not proper to investigate such a thing as colour or figure in bodies : for intelligibles are prior to these. And the reason [or productive principle] in seeds which produces these, is not these. For these seminal principles also, are naturally invisible, and still more so are intelligibles. There is likewise the same nature of them and of the things that possess them, after the same manner as the reason which is in seed, and soul which participates of these. The vegetable soul however does not see the things which it possesses : for neither did it generate these, but both itself, and the reasons it contains are an image. But that from whence it came is manifest and true, and primary. Hence, also, it is of itself, and with itself. The vegetable soul however, unless it pertained to, and was in another thing, would not remain what it is. For it belongs to an image, since it is of another thing, to be generated in something different from itself, unless it is suspended from it. Hence, neither does it see as not having sufficient light for this purpose. And if it should see, since it is perfected in another thing, it would behold another thing, and not itself. Nothing, however, of this kind takes place with pure intellect; but vision is there, and that which is visible is consubsistent with it. Such also is the visible, as is the vision ; and the vision as the visible. Who is it therefore, that will speak of the visible such as it is ? He who sees it. But intellect sees it; since in the sensible region also, sight being light, or rather being united to light, sees light; for it sees colour. There, however, sight does not perceive through another thing, but through itself, because there is nothing external to it. With another light, therefore, and not through another, it sees another light. Hence, light sees another light; and therefore itself beholds itself. This light however, when it shines forth in the soul illuminates it, i.e., it causes it to be intellectual. And in consequence of this, the soul is in itself, similarly with supernal light. If such, therefore, is the vestige of light in generated in the soul, by conceiving supernal light1 to be of this kind, and to be still more beautiful and clear, you will approach nearer to the nature of intellect and the intelligible. For this when it shines forth, imparts to the soul a clearer, but not a generative life. For on the contrary it converts the soul to itself, and does not suffer it to be dissipated, but causes it to love and joyfully receive the splendour which is in it. Neither does it impart a sensitive life. For this looks to externals, but does not on this account perceive more acutely. He, however, who receives that light which is the fountain of truth, beholds as it were more acutely visible objects ; but the contrary is not true. It remains, therefore, for the soul to assume an intellectual life which is a vestige of the life of intellect. For there realities subsist. But the life and energy which are in intellect, are the first light primarily shining in itself, and a splendour directed to itself, which at one and the same time illuminates, and is illuminated. This also is that which is truly intelligible, is intellect, and the object of intellect, and is seen by itself. Nor is it in want of another thing in order that it may see, but for the purpose of perceiving is sufficient to itself. For that which sees is itself the thing which is seen. This very thing also takes place with us, so that the knowledge of it by us, is effected through it. Or whence should we be able to speak concerning it ? For it is a thing of such a kind as to have a clearer apprehension of itself, and we likewise more clearly perceive ourselves through it. Through arguments, however, of this kind, we should elevate our soul to it, considering also that our soul and its life are an image; a resemblance, and an imitation of it; and likewise that when it sees intellectually, it becomes deiform, and has the form of intellect. And if some one should inquire what the nature is of this perfect intellect, which is every intellect, and primarily knows itself, such a one should first become established in intellect, or should yield that energy of his soul to intellect, which is employed about things of which he retains the memory in himself. But it will be possible for the soul thus disposed, to show that it is able through itself as an image to behold after a certain manner that pure intellect, through [a life] more accurately assimilated to it, as far as a part of the soul is capable of arriving at a similitude to intellect.

MacKenna

8. Now comes the question what sort of thing does the Intellectual-Principle see in seeing the Intellectual Realm and what in seeing itself?

We are not to look for an Intellectual realm reminding us of the colour or shape to be seen on material objects: the intellectual antedates all such things; and even in our sphere the production is very different from the Reason-Principle in the seeds from which it is produced. The seed principles are invisible and the beings of the Intellectual still more characteristically so; the Intellectuals are of one same nature with the Intellectual Realm which contains them, just as the Reason-Principle in the seed is identical with the soul, or life-principle, containing it.

But the Soul (considered as apart from the Intellectual-Principle) has no vision of what it thus contains, for it is not the producer but, like the Reason-Principles also, an image of its source: that source is the brilliant, the authentic, the primarily existent, the thing self-sprung and self-intent; but its image, soul, is a thing which can have no permanence except by attachment, by living in that other; the very nature of an image is that, as a secondary, it shall have its being in something else, if at all it exist apart from its original. Hence this image (soul) has not vision, for it has not the necessary light, and, if it should see, then, as finding its completion elsewhere, it sees another, not itself.

In the pure Intellectual there is nothing of this: the vision and the envisioned are a unity; the seen is as the seeing and seeing as seen.

What, then, is there that can pronounce upon the nature of this all-unity?

That which sees: and to see is the function of the Intellectual-Principle. Even in our own sphere [we have a parallel to this self-vision of a unity], our vision is light or rather becomes one with light, and it sees light for it sees colours. In the intellectual, the vision sees not through some medium but by and through itself alone, for its object is not external: by one light it sees another not through any intermediate agency; a light sees a light, that is to say a thing sees itself. This light shining within the soul enlightens it; that is, it makes the soul intellective, working it into likeness with itself, the light above.

Think of the traces of this light upon the soul, then say to yourself that such, and more beautiful and broader and more radiant, is the light itself; thus you will approach to the nature of the Intellectual-Principle and the Intellectual Realm, for it is this light, itself lit from above, which gives the soul its brighter life.

It is not the source of the generative life of the soul which, on the contrary, it draws inward, preserving it from such diffusion, holding it to the love of the splendour of its Prior.

Nor does it give the life of perception and sensation, for that looks to the external and to what acts most vigorously upon the senses whereas one accepting that light of truth may be said no longer to see the visible, but the very contrary.

This means in sum that the life the soul takes thence is an intellective life, a trace of the life in the [divine] Intellect, in which alone the authentic exists.

The life in the Divine Intellect is also an Act: it is the primal light outlamping to itself primarily, its own torch; light-giver and lit at once; the authentic intellectual object, knowing at once and known, seen to itself and needing no other than itself to see by, self-sufficing to the vision, since what it sees it is; known to us by that very same light, our knowledge of it attained through itself, for from nowhere else could we find the means of telling of it. By its nature, its self-vision is the clearer but, using it as our medium, we too may come to see by it.

In the strength of such considerations we lead up our own soul to the Divine, so that it poses itself as an image of that Being, its life becoming an imprint and a likeness of the Highest, its every act of thought making it over into the Divine and the Intellectual.

If the soul is questioned as to the nature of that Intellectual-Principle - the perfect and all-embracing, the primal self-knower - it has but to enter into that Principle, or to sink all its activity into that, and at once it shows itself to be in effective possession of those priors whose memory it never lost: thus, as an image of the Intellectual-Principle, it can make itself the medium by which to attain some vision of it; it draws upon that within itself which is most closely resemblant, as far as resemblance is possible between divine Intellect and any phase of soul.