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Plotino - Tratado 10,10 (V, 1, 10) — Toda alma individual guarda nela mesma uma imagem das três hipóstases

Enéada V, 1, 10

domingo 19 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulo 10: Toda alma individual guarda nela mesma uma imagem das três hipóstases

  • 1-10. O Uno, o Intelecto e a Alma se encontram não somente na realidade, mas também "em nós", na nossa alma.
  • 10-21. A faculdade racional de nossa alma permanece sempre no mundo inteligível, mesmo quando o "resto" da alma desce ao corpo. eis porque ela é "em si", "no exterior" do corpo.
  • 21-31. É preciso que a alma em seu conjunto se separe do corpo em eliminando toda "inclinação" para os os sensíveis, para poder ascender inteira no mundo inteligível de onde provém.

Míguez

10. Convendrá pensar, pues, que más allá del ser está el Uno, tal como hemos querido mostrarlo con nuestro razonamiento y en la medida en que es posible hacerlo. A continuación habrá que colocar el Ser y la Inteligencia, y, en tercer lugar la naturaleza del alma, según lo que ya se ha dicho. Dado que estas tres realidades están en la naturaleza de las cosas hemos de pensar que se dan también en nosotros. Y digo que se dan, no en lo que hay de sensible en nosotros -verdaderamente estas realidades están separadas de todo lo sensible-, sino en lo que es exterior a las cosas sensibles, tomado el término exterior como cuando se dice que esas mismas realidades son exteriores al cielo. Así han de entenderse las partes del hombre que Platón   considera como “el hombre interior” [1]. Nuestra alma es, entonces algo divino, algo de naturaleza diferente y que es tal como el alma universal. El alma que posee la inteligencia es perfecta, aunque deba distinguirse entre la inteligencia que razona y la que proporciona los principios del razonamiento. En cuanto a la facultad de razonar del alma no tiene necesidad de un órgano corpóreo para verificar su operación, ya que conserva su acción en un estado puro al objeto de poder razonar también puramente. Se mantiene, por tanto, separada y libre de todo contacto con el cuerpo, con lo que no deberemos engañarnos si la colocamos en el primer inteligible. Porque no hay motivo para preguntarse dónde hemos de situarla, sino que, por el contrario, la colocaremos fuera de todo lugar. Así, pues, el ser en sí mismo, exterior e inmaterial ha de entenderse como un ser aislado del cuerpo y que nada tiene que ver con su naturaleza. Por ello dice (Platón  ) al referirse al universo que el demiurgo puso el alma fuera y con ella rodeó el mundo, queriendo designar con esto la parte del alma que permanece en lo inteligible [2]. En cuanto a nosotros, dice que nuestra alma “se yergue por su cabeza hasta las alturas” [3]. De ahí que su exhortación para que nos apartemos del cuerpo no se refiera a una separación local -porque esta separación ya ha sido establecida por la naturaleza-, sino que haya de entenderse, como una no inclinación al cuerpo, ni siquiera en imaginación, como ser extraño que es a nosotros. Es ciertamente lo que acontece si se sabe remontar y llevar hasta lo alto esa parte del alma situada en este mundo, a la cual corresponde el cometido de fabricar y modelar el cuerpo, así como el de estar al cuidado de él.

Bouillet

[10] Ainsi, il faut admettre qu’au-dessus de l’Être est l’Un : nous l’avons démontré autant que la raison le désirait, autant qu’il est possible de démontrer quand on traite de pareilles questions. Au second rang sont l’Être et l’Intelligence; au troisième, l’Âme. Mais, s’il y a dans la nature trois principes, comme nous venons de le dire, l’Un, l’Intelligence, l’Âme, il doit y avoir aussi en nous trois principes. Je ne veux pas dire que ces trois principes soient dans les choses sensibles : car ils en sont séparés; ils sont hors du monde sensible, comme les trois principes divins sont hors de la sphère céleste, et ils constituent l’homme intérieur, selon l’expression de Platon   (51). Notre âme est donc quelque chose de divin : elle a une nature autre [que la nature sensible] et conforme à celle de l’Âme universelle. Or, l’âme parfaite possède l’intelligence; mais il y a l’intelligence qui raisonne [la raison discursive], et l’intelligence qui fournit tous les principes du raisonnement [l’intelligence pure]. La raison discursive de l’âme n’a besoin pour s’exercer d’aucun organe corporel (52); dans ses opérations, elle conserve toute sa pureté, en sorte qu’elle est capable de raisonner purement. Séparée du corps, elle doit sans hésitation être mise au premier rang des choses intelligibles. Il n’est pas besoin de la placer dans un lieu; il faut la concevoir hors de tout lieu : car, si elle existe par elle-même, hors du corps, d’une manière immatérielle, c’est qu’elle n’est pas mélangée au corps, qu’elle n’a rien de sa nature. Aussi Platon   dit-il : « Dieu a répandu l’Âme autour du monde (53). » Il veut faire entendre qu’une partie de l’âme demeure dans le monde intelligible. Il dit aussi, en parlant de notre âme : « elle cache sa tête dans le ciel (54). » Il recommande également de séparer l’âme du corps (55) ; il ne parle pas d’une séparation locale, que la nature seule établit; il veut que l’âme n’incline pas vers le corps, ne s’abandonne pas aux fantômes de l’imagination, et ne devienne pas ainsi étrangère à la raison ; il veut qu’elle tâche d’élever avec elle au monde intelligible sa partie inférieure, qui est établie dans le monde sensible et qui est occupée à façonner le corps (56).

Guthrie

TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSE MUST CORRESPOND THREE PRINCIPLES IN US.

10. Above existence, therefore, is the One. This has by us been proved as far as could reasonably be expected, and as far as such subjects admit of demonstration. In the second rank are Existence and Intelligence; in the third, the Soul. But if these three principles, the One, Intelligence, and the Soul, as we have said, obtain in nature, three principles must also obtain within us. I do not mean that these three principles are in sense-objects, for they are separate therefrom ; they are outside of the sense-world, as the three divine principles are outside of the celestial sphere, and, according to Plato  ’s expression, they constitute the "the interior man." Our soul, therefore, is something divine; it has a nature different (from sense-nature), which conforms to that of the universal Soul. Now the perfect Soul possesses intelligence; but we must distinguish between the intelligence that reasons (the discursive reason), and the Intelligence that furnishes the principles of reasoning (pure intelligence). The discursive reason of the soul has no need, for operation, of any bodily organ; in its operations, it preserves all its purity, so that it is capable of reasoning purely. When separated from the body, it must, without any hesitation, be ranked with highest intellectual entities. There is no need of locating it in space; for, if it exist within itself, outside of body, in an immaterial condition, it is evidently not mingled with the body, and has none of its nature. Consequently Plato   says, "The divinity has spread the Soul around the world." What he here means is that a part of the Soul remains in the intelligible world. Speaking of our soul he also says, "she hides her head in heaven." He also advises us to wean the soul from the body; and he does not refer to any local separation, which nature alone could establish. He means that the soul must not incline towards the body, must not abandon herself to the phantoms of imagination, and must not, thus, become alienated from reason. He means that the soul should try to elevate to the intelligible world her lower part which is established in the sense-world, and which is occupied in fashioning the body.

Taylor

X. It has been shown, however, as far as it is possible to demonstrate about things of this kind, that it is requisite to think that beyond being there is the one, such as reason wishes to unfold ; that next to this, being and intellect subsist; and that, in the third place, follows the nature of soul. But, as in the nature of things there are these three hypostases, so likewise it is proper to think, that the above mentioned three subsist with us. I do not mean to assert that they are to be found in sensibles; for they have a separate subsistence; but that they are external to sensibles, and external after the same manner in man also, as the three which we have been considering are external to all heaven. This, however, is such a man as Plato   calls the inward man. Our soul, therefore, is likewise something divine, and of a nature different from sensibles, such as is the whole nature of soul. But the soul is perfect which possesses intellect. With respect to intellect, however, one kind is a reasoning intellect, but another imparts the power of reasoning. He, therefore, will not err who places in the intelligible order of things this reasoning intellect of the soul, which is not in want of any corporeal organ to the subsistence of its discursive energy, but which possesses the energy of itself in purity, in order that it may reason purely, in as great perfection as possible. For we must not inquire after a place where we may establish it, but it must be arranged external to all place. For thus that which is from itself, the external, and the immaterial subsist, when they are alone, and have nothing from a corporeal nature. On this account, also, Plato   in the Timaeus   says, " that the Demiurgus surrounded the body of the universe with soul," indicating that part of the mundane soul which abides in the intelligible. Concerning our soul, likewise, concealing his meaning, he says, in the Phaedrus  , that it sometimes hides its head in the heavens, and sometimes elevates it beyond them. [4] The exhortation, too, in the Pinado, to separate the soul from the body, does not relate to a local separation, which is effected by nature, but insinuates that the soul should not verge to imaginations, and to an alienation from itself, by a tendency to body. He also indicates that we should elevate the remaining [i.e. the irrational] form of the soul, and lead it on high together with the superior part of it; and that the part which is established in the sensible region, and is alone the fabricator and plastic maker of body, should likewise be engaged in an employment of this kind.

MacKenna

10. We have shown the inevitability of certain convictions as to the scheme of things:

There exists a Principle which transcends Being; this is The One, whose nature we have sought to establish in so far as such matters lend themselves to proof. Upon The One follows immediately the Principle which is at once Being and the Intellectual-Principle. Third comes the Principle, Soul.

Now just as these three exist for the system of Nature, so, we must hold, they exist for ourselves. I am not speaking of the material order - all that is separable - but of what lies beyond the sense realm in the same way as the Primals are beyond all the heavens; I mean the corresponding aspect of man, what Plato   calls the Interior Man.

Thus our soul, too, is a divine thing, belonging to another order than sense; such is all that holds the rank of soul, but [above the life-principle] there is the soul perfected as containing Intellectual-Principle with its double phase, reasoning and giving the power to reason. The reasoning phase of the soul, needing no bodily organ for its thinking but maintaining, in purity, its distinctive Act that its thought may be uncontaminated - this we cannot err in placing, separate and not mingled into body, within the first Intellectual. We may not seek any point of space in which to seat it; it must be set outside of all space: its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order. This is why we read of the universe that the Demiurge cast the soul around it from without - understand that phase of soul which is permanently seated in the Intellectual - and of ourselves that the charioteer’s head reaches upwards towards the heights.

The admonition to sever soul from body is not, of course, to be understood spatially - that separation stands made in Nature - the reference is to holding our rank, to use of our thinking, to an attitude of alienation from the body in the effort to lead up and attach to the over-world, equally with the other, that phase of soul seated here and, alone, having to do with body, creating, moulding, spending its care upon it.


[1El hombre interior -el alma- “es el hombre mismo” en el lenguaje del Sócrates platónico, del Alcibíades y de La República. “Si Sócrates conversa con Alcibíades -dícese en el diálogo de este nombre, 130 e- no lo hace con tu rostro de carne y hueso, como parece, sino que razona con Alcibíades mismo, es decir, con tu alma”.

[2Cf. Platón, Timeo, 36 e.

[3Cf. Platón, Timeo, 90 a.

[4This is called by Proclus, the one, flower, and summit of the soul, and is that in which our truest being consists.