Plotino - Tratado 10,8 (V, 1, 8) — Exame dos filósofos anteriores: Platão e Parmênides.

8. Así se explican los tres grados de la realidad de Platón  : “Todas las cosas -dice- se encuentran ya en el rey de todo, esto es, en la realidad primera; en cuanto al segundo (rey) está inmediato a las cosas de segundo rango, y el tercero a las cosas de tercer rango”. También habla Platón aquí del “padre   de la causa  ”, diciendo que “la causa es la inteligencia” [1]. La Inteligencia es para él el demiurgo  ; el demiurgo que, según dice [2]: “produce el alma   en una crátera”. Dice asimismo, que el padre de la causa, o de la Inteligencia, es el Bien y lo que está más allá de a inteligencia y del ser [3]. En otros lugares dice, en cambio, que el ser   y la inteligencia es la misma idea  . De modo que Platón sabe que la Inteligencia proviene del Bien y que el alma proviene de la Inteligencia, con lo cual las razones que nosotros exponemos no encierran en realidad nada nuevo y no son de nuestros días, sino que fueron enunciadas hace ya mucho tiempo, aunque no desenvueltas de manera explícita; somos, pues, ahora los exegetas de estas viejas doctrinas, cuya antigüedad queda atestiguada por los escritos del propio Platón. Sin embargo, ya antes que él Parménides   había formulado una doctrina semejante, por lo cual reunía en la unidad el ser y la inteligencia y afirmaba, asimismo, que el ser no se daba en las cosas sensibles. “Porque el pensar   y el ser –decía [4] - son una y la misma cosa”; pero el ser, según el cual, es inmóvil, aunque quiera añadirle el pensamiento y privarle por otra parte de todo movimiento corpóreo  . para que permanezca tal cual es. Imagina, pues, el ser como una masa en forma de esfera  , dado que incluye en sí mismo a todas las cosas y no tiene el pensamiento como algo exterior sino como algo que le es propio. Pero al considerarlo como Uno en sus escritos se exponía al reproche de que se le encontrase como múltiple. El Parménides de Platón es mucho más exacto, ya que distingue el primer uno o uno en sentido propio, el segundo uno, al que llama unidad múltiple, y el tercer uno, que es unidad y multiplicidad. Así se muestra de acuerdo con la teoría de las tres naturalezas [5].

[8] Voici comment Platon établit trois degrés dans la hiérarchie des êtres : « Tout est, dit-il, autour du Roi de tout (38). » Il parle ici des choses du premier ordre. Il ajoute : « Ce qui est du second ordre est autour du second principe, et ce qui est du troisième ordre est autour du troisième principe. » Platon dit encore que Dieu   est le père de la cause (39) ; par cause, il entend l’Intelligence : car, chez ce philosophe, c’est elle qui joue le rôle de Démiurge. Il ajoute que c’est lui qui forme l’Âme dans le cratère (40). La Cause étant l’Intelligence, Platon nomme Père le Bien absolu, le Principe supérieur à l’Intelligence et à l’Essence.

Dans plusieurs passages, il appelle Idée l’Être et l’Intelligence. Il enseigne donc que du Bien naît l’Intelligence; et de l’Intelligence, l’Âme. Cette doctrine n’est pas nouvelle : elle fut professée dès les temps les plus anciens, mais sans être développée explicitement; nous ne voulons ici qu’être les interprètes des premiers sages et montrer par le témoignage même de Platon qu’ils avaient les mêmes dogmes que nous (41).

Le premier qui ait professé cette doctrine est Parménide, qui identifie l’être et l’intelligence et ne place pas l’être dans les choses sensibles : « Car, dit-il, la pensée est la même » chose que l’être (42).» Il ajoute que l’être est immobile (43), tout en lui accordant la pensée; il refuse à l’être tout mouvement corporel, afin qu’il demeure toujours le même. Il le compare encore à une sphère (44), parce qu’il contient tout enveloppé dans son sein, et qu’il ne tire pas la pensée du dehors, mais de lui-même. Quand il le nomme un dans ses écrits, il veut parler de sa Cause, comme s’il reconnaissait que cette unité [de l’être intelligible] implique multiplicité. Il parle dans le dialogue de Platon avec plus d’exactitude et distingue trois principes : le premier, l’Un absolu; le second, l’Un multiple; le troisième, l’Un et multiple. Il reconnaît donc avec nous trois natures (45).

PLATO TEACHES THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE.

8. This is how Plato establishes three degrees in the hierarchy of being: "Everything is around the king of all." He is here speaking of first rank entities. He adds, "What is of the second order is around the second principle; and what is of the third order is around the third principle." Plato further says that "God is the father of the cause." By cause, he means Intelligence; for, in the system of Plato, it is Intelligence which plays the part of demiurgic creator. Plato adds that it is this power that forms the Soul in the cup. As the cause is intelligence, Plato applies the name of father to the absolute Good, the principle superior to Intelligence and superior to "Being." In several passages he calls the Idea "existence and intelligence." He therefore really teaches that Intelligence is begotten from the Good, and the Soul from Intelligence. This teaching, indeed, is not new; it has been taught from the most ancient times, but without being brought out in technical terms. We claim to be no more than the interpreters of the earlier philosophers, and to show by the very testimony of Plato that they held the same views as we do.

THIS DOCTRINE TAUGHT BY PARMENIDES.

The first philosopher who taught this was Parmenides, who identified Existence and Intelligence, and who does not place existence among sense  -objects, "for, thought is the same thing as existence." He adds that existence is immovable, although being thought. Parmenides thus denies all corporeal movement in existence, so as that it might always remain the same. Further, Parmenides compares existence to a sphere, because it contains everything, drawing thought not from without, but from within itself. When Parmenides, in his writings, mentions the One, he means the cause, as if he recognized that this unity (of the intelligible being) implied manifoldness. In the dialogue of Plato he speaks with greater accuracy, and distinguishes three principles: the First, the absolute One; the second, the manifold one; the third, the one and the manifold. He therefore, as we do, reaches three natures.

VIII. On this account all things are distributed by Plato in a triple order about the king of all. For he says, " that all things are about the king of all; "a second things about that which is second, and such as are third about that which ranks as the third." He also says that this king is the father of cause, denominating intellect cause. For with Plato, intellect is the demiurgus. But he says that this cause produced soul in that Grater [mentioned by him in the Timaeus  ]. The cause, however, being intellect, he says that the father is the good, and that which is beyond intellect, and beyond essence. In many places, also, he calls being and intellect idea; so that from Plato we may know that intellect and idea are from the good, but soul from intellect. These assertions, however, are not new, nor of the present time, but were delivered by the ancients, though not explicitly, and what has now been said by us is an interpretation of them. That these opinions also are ancient, is testified and confirmed by the writings of Plato. Parmenides, therefore, prior to Plato, adopted this opinion, so far as he collects into one and the same thing being and intellect. Being, likewise, he does not place among sensibles. For he says, that to perceive intellectually, and to be, are the same thing. He also says, that this is immoveable, though he adds, that it perceives intellectually, removing from it all corporeal motion in order that it may abide   invariably the same. And he assimilates it to the bulk of a sphere, because it contains all things involved in itself, and because its intellection is not external to but in its own essence. When, likewise, in his writings he calls it one, he alludes to the cause of it, as if this one [of intellect] was found to be many. The Parmenides, however, in Plato, speaking more accurately, divides from each other this and the first one, which is more principally one. He also calls the second one many, and the third, one and many. And after this manner, he likewise accords with the doctrine of the three [above mentioned] natures.

8. This is the explanation of Plato’s Triplicity, in the passage where he names as the Primals the Beings gathered about the King of All, and establishes a Secondary containing the Secondaries, and a Third containing the Tertiaries.

He teaches, also, that there is an author of the Cause, that is of the Intellectual-Principle, which to him is the Creator who made the Soul, as he tells us, in the famous mixing bowl. This author of the causing principle, of the divine mind  , is to him the Good, that which transcends the Intellectual-Principle and transcends Being: often too he uses the term "The Idea" to indicate Being and the Divine Mind. Thus Plato knows the order of generation - from the Good, the Intellectual-Principle; from the Intellectual-Principle, the Soul. These teachings are, therefore, no novelties, no inventions of today, but long since stated, if not stressed; our doctrine here is the explanation of an earlier and can show the antiquity of these opinions on the testimony of Plato himself.

Earlier, Parmenides made some approach to the doctrine in identifying Being with Intellectual-Principle while separating Real Being from the realm of sense.

"Knowing and Being are one thing he says, and this unity is to him motionless in spite of the intellection he attributes to it: to preserve its unchanging identity he excludes all bodily movement from it; and he compares it to a huge sphere in that it holds and envelops all existence and that its intellection is not an outgoing act but internal. Still, with all his affirmation of unity, his own writings lay him open to the reproach that his unity turns out to be a multiplicity.

The Platonic Parmenides is more exact; the distinction is made between the Primal   One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many and a third which is a One-and-many; thus he too is in accordance with our thesis   of the Three Kinds.