Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 29,8 (IV, 5, 8) — Luz e Corpo Exterior

ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 29,8 (IV, 5, 8) — Luz e Corpo Exterior

Enéada IV, 5, 8

sexta-feira 13 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Capítulos 6-8: Questões diversas.

  • Cap. 6: Há luz sem ar?
  • Resposta  : A luz   não é nem qualidade   do corpo iluminado nem substância  , mas atividade   da fonte   luminosa.
  • Cap. 7: A luz morre?
  • Resposta: A luz é um incorporal que não morre, retorna a sua fonte; a cor pode igualmente deixar o corpo, mas não morre no sentido estrito.
  • Cap. 8: Se existisse, poderia se perceber um corpo exterior a nosso mundo?
  • Resposta: A hipótese engendra consequências contraditórias, não é aceitável.
    

Míguez

8. Si existiese un ojo exterior al cielo   y que mirase desde él sin obstáculo   alguno que se lo impidiese, ¿podría contemplar todo aquello que no simpatiza consigo, siendo así que la simpatía se justifica por la misma naturaleza del animal   universal  ? Si la simpatía descansa en el hecho de que quienes sienten y lo que ellos sienten pertenecen a un ser animado único, no podrá haber sensación   si el cuerpo no forma parte de este universo  , parte exterior ciertamente. En este caso sería, tal vez, algo sentido. Pero si, no siendo una parte de él, se aparece como un cuerpo coloreado y dotado de otras cualidades, esto es, como un cuerpo igual a los de aquí, ¿sería también algo sentido? Esto no es posible, desde luego, si nuestra hipótesis es correcta. Salvo que se intente destruir la hipótesis con esta misma consecuencia, aduciendo para ello que es absurdo admitir que un ojo no alcanza a ver el color   que se le presenta, cosa que se extiende también a los demás sentidos en relación con las cosas sensibles a ellos presentes. Pero entonces preguntaríamos: ¿de dónde proviene este absurdo? Porque actuamos y sufrimos en este mundo como integrantes y participantes de un universo único. Tratemos de encontrar, pues, otras razones y quedará esto demostrado si las pruebas son suficientes, porque, de otro modo, habrá que acudir a nuevas pruebas.

Lo que sin duda resulta evidente   es que todo animal simpatiza consigo mismo. Basta para ello que sea realmente un animal, en el que sus partes tendrán que simpatizar entre sí como partes que son de un animal único. Pero podría argumentarse también con la semejanza de las partes, con lo cual la percepción y la sensación tendrían lugar en el animal por su semejanza con lo que percibe, ya que el órgano ha de guardar semejanza con el objeto percibido. La sensación, en este caso, sería una percepción por medio de órganos semejantes a las cosas percibidas. Y, entonces, si el ser animado se da cuenta de los objetos, no porque estén en él, sino por la semejanza que mantienen con las cosas que hay en él, este ser percibirá como tal ser animado que es; pero, a su vez, las cosas percibidas tendrán este carácter, no porque estén en el animal, sino por ser semejantes a las cosas que hay en él. Mas, las cosas percibidas por nosotros no son semejantes a nuestros órganos sino en la medida en que el alma   del universo las ha hecho semejantes, por razón de su misma conveniencia. De modo que, si admitimos un alma completamente diferente, que actuase en una región distinta a la nuestra, las cosas semejantes a las de aquí que se supone creadas por ella no serán nada para nuestra alma. Este absurdo descubre como causa   verdadera la contradicción que se encierra en la hipótesis. Porque se habla aquí de algo que es y no es un alma. Y se dice de las mismas cosas que son y no son del mismo género, y a la vez semejantes y desemejantes. De modo que dicha hipótesis no merece tal nombre por las contradicciones que en sí misma encierra. Pues da por supuesto que existe un alma en esa región distinta y llega a la consecuencia de que el universo es y no es un todo, que es algo diferente y no diferente, que la nada no es realmente la nada y que ese mismo universo de que hablamos está y no está concluido. Habrá por tanto que prescindir de esta hipótesis y no tratar de buscar sus implicaciones, puesto que esta claro que la hipótesis se destruye a sí misma.

Bouillet

VIII. S’il y avait un corps hors de notre monde, et qu’un œil le considérât d’ici, sans obstacle, il est douteux qu’il pût le voir, parce qu’il ne serait pas en communauté d’affection avec lui : car la communauté d’affection a pour cause la nature de l’animal un [l’unité du monde]. Puisque la communauté d’affection [la sympathie] suppose que les choses sensibles et les sens appartiennent à l’animal un, le corps placé hors du monde ne serait pas senti, à moins qu’il ne fût une partie du monde. S’il en était une partie, il pourrait être senti. S’il n’en était pas une partie, mais que par sa couleur et ses autres qualités il fût conforme à l’organe qui doit le percevoir [serait-il senti]? Non, il ne serait pas senti, si toutefois cette hypothèse [d’un corps placé hors du monde] est admissible, Mais peut-être refuserait-on d’admettre cette hypothèse en prétendant qu’il est absurde que l’œil ne voie pas la couleur placée devant lui et que les autres sens ne perçoivent pas les qualités qui sont en leur présence. Voici pourquoi cela paraît absurde : c’est que nous sommes actifs et passifs parce que nous sommes dans l’animal un et que nous en consti- 424 tuons des parties. Y a-t-il encore quelque chose à considérer? Si ce que nous avons dit suffit, notre démonstration est terminée; sinon, il faut donner encore d’autres preuves à l’appui de ce que nous avançons.

Tout animal est sympathique à lui-même. Si ce que nous avons nommé forme un seul animal, notre démonstration suffit, et toutes choses éprouveront des affections communes en tant qu’elles constituent des parties de l’animal un. Si l’on avance qu’un corps extérieur au monde pourrait être senti à cause de sa ressemblance, nous dirons que la perception appartient à l’animal, parce que c’est l’animal qui possède la ressemblance : car son organe est semblable [à la chose perçue] ; ainsi, la sensation sera la perception que l’âme aura au moyen d’organes semblables aux choses perçues. Si donc l’animal sent, non seulement ce qui est en lui, mais encore des choses semblables à ce qui est en lui, il percevra ces choses en tant qu’il est animal, et ces choses seront perçues, non en tant qu’elles lui appartiennent, mais en tant qu’elles ressemblent à ce qui lui appartient. Il semble plutôt que les choses perçues doivent être perçues en tant qu’elles sont semblables parce que l’âme se les est rendues semblables et familières. Si donc l’âme qui se rend ces choses semblables est tout autre qu’elles, les choses qu’on suppose lui devenir semblables lui resteront tout à fait étrangères. L’absurdité de la conséquence montre qu’il y a une contradiction dans l’hypothèse : car on affirme à la fois que l’âme existe et n’existe pas, que les choses sont conformes et différentes, semblables et dissemblables. Par conséquent, puisque l’hypothèse implique contradiction, elle n’est pas admissible : car elle suppose que l’âme existe dans ce monde, par suite que le monde est et n’est pas universel, est et n’est pas autre, est et n’est pas parfait. Il faut donc abandonner l’hypothèse que nous discutons : car on ne saurait en tirer une conséquence raisonnable puisqu’elle implique contradiction.

Guthrie

A WORLD OUTSIDE OF OUR WORLD WOULD NOT BE VISIBLE.

8. If there were a body outside of our world, and if an eye observed it from here without any obstacle, it is doubtful that the eye could see that body, because the eye would have no affection common to it; for community of affection is caused by the coherence of the single organism (that is, the unity of the world). Since this community of affection (or, sympathy), supposes that sense-objects and that the senses belong to the single organism, a body located outside of the world would not be felt, unless it were part of the world. In this case, it would be felt. If it were not a part of the world, but yet by its color and other qualities it was conformed to the organ that was to cognize it, would it be felt? No, it would not be felt, that is, if such a hypothesis   (of a body located outside of the world) were at all admissible. If however, anyone should refuse to admit such a hypothesis, he would pretend that it is absurd that the eye should not see the color located in front of it, and that the other senses do not perceive the qualities before them. That is the reason of its absurdity. For we are active or passive only because we are integral parts of the single organism, and are located within it. Is anything still left to be considered ? If what we have said suffices, our demonstration is finished; otherwise we shall have to give still further proofs to support our proposition.

SENSATION IS LIMITED TO COMMON INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE.

Every organism is coherent (that is, is sympathetic with itself). In the case of a single organism, our demonstration suffices, and all things will experience common affections so far as they constitute parts of the single organism. The plea that a body exterior to the world could be felt because of its resemblance (is ill-founded because perception is characteristic of an organism and because it is the organism that possesses perception. For its organ resembles (the perceived object); thus sensation would be the perception presented to the soul by means of organs similar to the perceived objects. If then the organism feel not only its contents, but also objects resembling them, it will perceive these things by virtue of its organic nature; and these things will be perceived not because they are contents thereof, but by virtue of their resemblance thereto. It seems rather that perceived objects must be perceived in the measure of their resemblance, because the soul has familiarized herself with them, and has assimilated them to herself. If then the soul which has assimilated these objects to herself differ from them, the things which were supposed to have become assimilated to her will remain entirely foreign to her. The absurditv of this consequence shows us that there is a flaw in the hypothesis; for it affirms simultaneously that the soul exists, and does not exist, that the things are both conformable and different, similar and dissimilar. Since then this hypothesis implies contradictories, it is not admissible; for it supposes that the soul exists in this world, as a result of the world, both being and not being universal, both being and not being different, both being and not being perfect. The above hypothesis must therefore be abandoned; and since it implies a contradiction, no reasonable consequence could be deduced therefrom.

MacKenna

8. Imagine that beyond the heavenly system there existed some solid mass, and that from this sphere there was directed to it a vision utterly unimpeded and unrestricted: it is a question whether that solid form could be perceived by what has no sympathetic relation with it, since we have held that sympathetic relation comes about in virtue of the nature inherent in some one living being.

Obviously, if the sympathetic relationship depends upon the fact that percipients and things perceived are all members of one living being, no acts of perception could take place  : that far body could be known only if it were a member of this living universe of ours - which condition being met, it certainly would be. But what if, without being thus in membership, it were a corporeal entity, exhibiting light and colour and the qualities by which we perceive things, and belonging to the same ideal category as the organ of vision?

If our supposition [of perception by sympathy] is true, there would still be no perception - though we may be told that the hypothesis is clearly untenable since there is absurdity in supposing that sight can fail in grasping an illuminated object lying before it, and that the other senses in the presence of their particular objects remain unresponsive.

[The following passage, to nearly the end, is offered tentatively as a possible help to the interpretation of an obscure and corrupt place.]

[But why does such a failing appear impossible to us? We answer, because here and now in all the act and experience of our senses, we are within a unity, and members of it. What the conditions would be otherwise, remains to be considered: if living sympathy suffices the theory is established; if not, there are other considerations to support it.

That every living being is self-sensitive allows of no doubt; if the universe is a living being, no more need be said; and what is true of the total must be true of the members, as inbound in that one life.

But what if we are invited to accept the theory of knowledge by likeness (rejecting knowledge by the self-sensitiveness of a living unity)?

Awareness   must be determined by the nature and character of the living being in which it occurs; perception, then, means that the likeness demanded by the hypothesis is within this self-identical living being (and not in the object) - for the organ by which the perception takes place is in the likeness of the living being (is merely the agent adequately expressing the nature of the living being): thus perception is reduced to a mental   awareness by means of organs akin to the object.

If, then, something that is a living whole perceives not its own content but things like to its content, it must perceive them under the conditions of that living whole; this means that, in so far as it has perception, the objects appear not as its content but as related to its content.

And the objects are thus perceived as related because the mind   itself has related them in order to make them amenable to its handling: in other words the causative soul or mind in that other sphere is utterly alien, and the things there, supposed to be related to the content of this living whole, can be nothing to our minds.]

This absurdity shows that the hypothesis contains a contradiction which naturally leads to untenable results. In fact, under one and the same heading, it presents mind and no mind, it makes things kin and no kin, it confuses similar and dissimilar: containing these irreconcilable elements, it amounts to no hypothesis at all. At one and the same moment it postulates and denies a soul, it tells of an All that is partial, of a something which is at once distinct and not distinct, of a nothingness which is no nothingness, of a complete thing that is incomplete: the hypothesis therefore must be dismissed; no deduction is possible where a thesis cancels its own propositions.