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Plotino - Tratado 28,21 (IV, 4, 21) — O desejo (2)

Enéada IV, 4, 21

domingo 8 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Capítulos 18-29: O prazer e a dor  , o desejo e a cólera   em sua relação à união   da alma   e do corpo.

  • Cap 18: A união da alma e do corpo comparada ao ar aquecido (alma vegetativa) ou iluminado (alma descida)
  • Cap 19: O prazer e a dor  
  • Cap 20-21: O desejo
  • Cap 22-27: Digressão. A questão da alma vegetativa posta em relação em relação a este vivente divino que é a terra  
  • Cap 22: Questão: É que a terra pode ter sensações?
  • Cap 23-26: Sabe-se que a sensação não pode se fazer sem órgãos e tem por meta a utilidade  
  • Cap 27: Resposta  . A terra tem um poder vegetativo   que ela dá não somente às plantas, mas também às pedras. Ela tem um poder sensitivo. E ela tem um intelecto   como os astros.
  • Cap 28: A cólera
  • Cap 29: A separação   da alma e do corpo. A alma descida deixa imediatamente o corpo como a luz   quando sua fonte   desaparece, então a alma vegetativa continua a agir durante um certo tempo como o color   no ar
    

Míguez

21. Que esto es así, en lo que concierne al origen   del deseo, lo muestran claramente las diferentes edades. Pues son muy distintos los deseos corporales de los niños, de los adolescentes y de los hombres maduros, como lo son también los de los hombres sanos o enfermos, aun siendo la misma la facultad del deseo. Porque es claro que son el cuerpo y las modificaciones que éste sufre los que producen tantas y tan variadas clases de deseos.

Si es verdad, por otra parte, que las llamadas inclinaciones del cuerpo no se corresponden siempre con el despertar   de un deseo completo y concluido, y si éstas se detienen antes incluso de que haya   actuado la voluntad reflexiva de no comer o de no beber, podrá decirse verdaderamente que el deseo tiene un límite, en tanto se mantiene en un determinado cuerpo, pero que la naturaleza no se une a él, ni le muestra buen ánimo o buena disposición, porque aquél no está de acuerdo con la naturaleza como para ser llevado hacia ella. La naturaleza vigila ciertamente si el deseo está o no conforme con ella.

En cuanto a lo que se decía anteriormente, que las diferencias existentes entre los cuerpos bastan para introducir deseos diferentes en la misma facultad de desear, no quiere afirmarse con ello que basta que los cuerpos sufran de manera diferente para que la facultad de desear experimente por ellos otros tantos deseos, cuando precisamente nada se procura con esto a la facultad misma. Porque el alimento  , el calor, la humedad, el movimiento, el alivio de la evacuación o la satisfacción plena de los deseos, son cosas que pertenecen totalmente al cuerpo.

Bouillet

XXI. L’observation des divers âges montre que c’est bien l’organisme qui est l’origine des appétits. En effet, ceux-ci varient selon que l’homme est enfant ou adolescent, malade ou bien portant. Cependant, la concupiscence (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) reste toujours la même. Donc ce sont les variations de l’organisme qui produisent les variations des appétits. Mais la concupiscence n’est pas toujours éveillée tout entière par l’excitation du corps, quoique celle-ci subsiste jusqu’à la fin. Souvent, avant même d’avoir délibéré, l’âme   ne veut pas permettre au corps de boire ni de manger, quoique l’organisme le désire aussi vivement que possible. Souvent aussi la nature elle-même ne consent point à satisfaire l’appétit du corps, parce que cet appétit ne lui semble pas naturel et que seule elle peut décider quelles choses sont conformes ou contraires à la nature. Si l’on répond que le corps par ses divers états suggère à la concupiscence des appétits divers, on n’explique pas comment les différents états du corps peuvent inspirer à la concupiscence des appétits différents, puisqu’alors ce n’est pas elle-même qu’elle travaille à satisfaire. Car ce n’est pas pour elle-même, c’est pour l’organisme que la concupiscence recherche les aliments, l’humidité ou la chaleur, le mouvement, les évacuations ou la satisfaction de la faim.

Guthrie

DESIRES ARE PHYSICAL, BECAUSE CHANGEABLE IN HARMONY WITH THE BODY.

21. The observation of the different ages shows that it is indeed the organism which is the origin of desires. Indeed, these change according as the man is a child or a youth, sick or well  . Nevertheless that part of the soul which is the seat of desires ever remains the same. Consequently the variations of desire must be traced back to the variations of the organism. But this desiring faculty of the soul is not always entirely wakened by the excitation of the body, although this subsists to the end. Often even before having deliberated, the soul will forbid the body to drink or eat, although the organism desires it as keenly as possible. Nature herself also often forbids the satisfaction of the bodily desire, because such desire may not seem to it natural, and because she alone has the right to decide what things are harmonious to or contrary to nature. The theory that the body, by its different states suggests different desires to the soul’s faculty of desire, does not explain how the different states of the body can inspire different desires in the soul’s faculty of desire, since then it is not itself that it seeks to satisfy. For it is not for itself, but for the organism, that the soul’s faculty of desire seeks foods, humidity or heat, motion, agitation, or the satisfaction of hunger.

MacKenna

21. That this is the phase of the human being in which desire takes its origin is shown by observation of the different stages of life; in childhood, youth, maturity, the bodily desires differ; health or sickness also may change them, while the [psychic] faculty is of course the same through all: the evidence is clear that the variety of desire in the human being results from the fact that he is a corporeal entity, a living body subject to every sort of vicissitude.

The total movement of desire is not always stirred simultaneously with what we call the impulses to the satisfaction even of the lasting bodily demands; it may refuse assent to the idea   of eating or drinking until reason gives the word: this shows us desire - the degree of it existing in the living body - advancing towards some object, with Nature [the lower soul-phase] refusing its co-operation and approval, and as sole arbiter between what is naturally fit and unfit, rejecting what does not accord with the natural need.

We may be told that the changing state of the body is sufficient explanation of the changing desires in the faculty; but that would require the demonstration that the changing condition of a given entity could effect a change of desire in another, in one which cannot itself gain by the gratification; for it is not the desiring faculty that profits by food, liquid, warmth, movement, or by any relief from overplenty or any filling of a void; all such services touch the body only.