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Plotino - Tratado 27,30 (IV, 3, 30) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (3)

Enéada IV, 3, 30

sexta-feira 14 de janeiro de 2022

Míguez

30. Pero, ¿y qué decir del recuerdo de nuestros pensamientos?? ¿Hay también una imagen? de ellos? Si es verdad? que una pequeña imagen acompaña todo pensamiento, su misma persistencia, que vendrá a ser como un reflejo del pensamiento, explicará el recuerdo del objeto? conocido; en otro caso, tendríamos que buscar una nueva explicación.

Tal vez? sea precisamente la expresión verbal del pensamiento la que deba ser recibida en la imaginación?. Porque el pensamiento es algo indivisible? y si no se formula? exteriormente y permanece en el interior?, es algo que permanece oculto? para nosotros; al lenguaje? corresponde su despliegue, y asimismo el hacerlo pasar de pensamiento que es a imagen, cual si lo reflejase en un espejo. Es así como se fija, se aísla y se recuerda el pensamiento. Porque si el alma? se mueve siempre hacia el pensamiento, la recepción de éste se verifica tan sólo en estas condiciones; pues una cosa? es el pensar? y otra muy distinta la percepción? del pensamiento. Y si en realidad? pensamos siempre, no percibimos siempre nuestro pensamiento, ya que quien recibe los pensamientos recibe también las sensaciones?.

Bouillet

XXX. Que dirons-nous des conceptions intellectuelles (διανοήσεις) ? Admettrons-nous qu’elles soient aussi conservées par? l’imagination ?

Si l’imagination accompagne toute pensée (νόησις?), si ensuite elle en conserve en quelque sorte? l’image, il y aura? ainsi souvenir? de l’objet connu ; sinon, il faut chercher une autre solution. Peut-être la raison? (λόγος?), dont l’acte accompagne toujours la pensée, a-t-elle la fonction? de la recevoir et de la transmettre à l’imagination. En effet, la pensée est indivisible, et, tant qu’elle n’est pas tirée des profondeurs de l’intelligence?, elle reste en quelque sorte cachée dans son sein. La raison la développe, et, la faisant passer de l’état de pensée à celui d’image, l’étale pour ainsi dire dans notre imagination comme dans un miroir ; c’est ainsi que la pensée est perçue, qu’elle dure et devient un souvenir. L’âme, qui est toujours en mouvement? pour arriver à la pensée [par la raison discursive?], nous la fait ainsi saisir quand elle en reçoit le reflet. Autre chose est la pensée, autre chose la perception de la pensée. Nous pensons toujours, mais nous ne percevons pas toujours notre pensée. Cela tient à ce que le principe? qui perçoit les pensées perçoit aussi les sensations, et s’occupe des unes et des autres tour à tour.

Guthrie

INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION.

30. What about intellectual conceptions? Are they also preserved by imagination? If imagination accompany every thought, and if later it, as it were, preserves its image, we should thus have the memory of the known object; otherwise some other solution will have to be sought. Perhaps reason, whose actualization always accompanies thought, has the function of receiving it and transmitting it to imagination. Indeed, thought is indivisible, and so long as it is not evoked from the depths of intelligence, it remains as it were hidden within it. Reason develops it, and making it pass from the state of thought to that of image, spreads it out as it were in a mirror, for our imagination. That is why we grasp (the thought) only when the soul, which always desires rational thought, has achieved a thought. There? is a difference between thought and the perception of thought. We are always thinking, but we do not always perceive our thought. That comes from the fact? that the principle that perceives the thoughts also perceives the sensations, and occupies itself with both in turn.

MacKenna

30. But what of the memory of mental acts?: do these also fall under the imaging faculty??

If every mental act is accompanied by an image we may well believe that this image, fixed and like a picture of the thought, would explain how we remember the object of knowledge? once entertained. But if there is no such necessary? image, another solution must be sought. Perhaps memory would be the reception, into the image-taking faculty, of the Reason-Principle which accompanies the mental conception: this mental conception - an indivisible thing, and one that never rises to the exterior? of the consciousness? - lies unknown? below; the Reason-Principle the revealer, the bridge? between the concept? and the image-taking faculty exhibits the concept as in a mirror; the apprehension by the image-taking faculty would thus constitute the enduring presence of the concept, would be our memory of it.

This explains, also, another fact: the soul is unfailingly intent upon intellection?; only when it acts upon this image-taking faculty does its intellection become a human? perception: intellection is one thing, the perception of an intellection is another: we are continuously intuitive but we are not unbrokenly aware: the reason is that the recipient in us receives from both sides, absorbing not merely intellections but also sense?-perceptions.

Taylor

XXX. What, however, shall we say of the conceptions of the dianoetic power? ? Does the phantastic? power pertain also to these? If, indeed, imagination followed every intellection, perhaps this imagination remaining, and being? as it were an image of the dianoetic conception, there will thus be a remembrance of the thing known; but if not, something else must be investigated. Perhaps, however, memory will be a reception into the phantastic power of reason following the conception. For a conception is impartible, and not yet having proceeded as it were outwardly, it latently remains within. But reason evolving and educing into the phantastic power from each conception, exhibits the conception as it were in a mirror: and thus the apprehension, permanency, and remembrance of it are effected. Hence, since the soul is always moved to intelligence, when it perceives intellectually, then the apprehension of what it perceives is produced in us. For intelligence is one thing, and the apprehension of intelligence another. And we always indeed perceive intellectually, but we do not always apprehend that we do so.

This, however, is because the recipient not only receives intellections, but also the senses, and this alternately.


Ver online : ENÉADAS III-IV (Gredos)

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