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Plotino - Tratado 27,28 (IV, 3, 28) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (1)

Enéada IV, 3, 28

sexta-feira 14 de janeiro de 2022

Míguez

28. ¿Sobreviene acaso? por la facultad que nos sirve para sentir? y para aprender? ¿O tal vez? nos recordamos de los objetos? deseados por la facultad del deseo, y de los objetos irascibles por la facultad adecuada a ellos? Porque podrá decirse que no se trata aquí de dos cosas? distintas: de una cosa? que disfruta de un placer y de otra que se acuerda de él. El deseo del objeto del que se ha gozado se despierta de nuevo en nosotros cuando éste se manifiesta a la memoria. Lo cual no ocurriría así si se tratase de otro objeto. ¿Qué es lo que impide otorgar al deseo la sensación de sus propios objetos y atribuir asimismo el deseo a la facultad de sentir, de modo? que podamos afirmar que cada facultad sigue a su elemento predominante? ¿Acaso hemos de atribuir la sensación a cada facultad, pero en uno? u otro sentido?? No es, desde luego, el deseo quien ve, sino el ojo?. El deseo se siente movido a partir de la sensación por una especie de comunicación, de tal modo que sufre el efecto de aquélla, pero con plena inconsecuencia. Es así cómo la sensación percibe la injusticia y surge el impulso? propio del ánimo; de igual? manera, mientras el pastor que cuida de un rebaño ve al lobo, su joven cachorro se siente excitado por el olor y el ruido de algo que realmente no ha visto?. El deseo que se ha visto cumplido conserva una huella del objeto, pero no en calidad? de recuerdo, sino como disposición? y experiencia pasada. Lo prueba el hecho de que, con frecuencia, la memoria no tiene conocimiento? de los deseos del alma?, cosa que sí ocurriría si se encontrase en la parte? irascible de ella.

Bouillet

XXVIII. La mémoire? appartient-elle aux puissances? par? lesquelles nous sentons et nous connaissons ? Est-ce par la concupiscence que nous nous rappelons les choses qui excitent nos désirs, et par la colère, celles qui nous irritent ? Oui, dira quelqu’un. C’est bien la même? faculté? qui éprouve le plaisir et qui en conserve le souvenir : ainsi, lorsque la concupiscence, par exemple?, rencontre un objet qui lui a déjà fait éprouver? du plaisir, elle se rappelle ce plaisir en voyant cet objet. Pourquoi, en effet, n’est-elle pas émue de même par un autre objet ? Pourquoi n’est-elle pas émue d’une autre façon par cet objet même ? Pourquoi donc ne pas lui attribuer aussi la sensation des choses de cette espèce ? Pourquoi, enfin, ne pas rapporter aussi la concupiscence à la puissance de sentir, et ne pas faire? de même pour tout, en donnant à chaque chose son nom d’après ce qui prédomine en elle ?

Devons-nous attribuer à chaque puissance la sensation, mais d’une manière différente ? Dans ce cas ce sera la vue, par exemple, et non la concupiscence, qui percevra les choses sensibles ; mais la concupiscence sera ensuite éveillée par la sensation qui se trouvera transmise de proche? en proche, et, quoiqu’elle ne juge? pas la sensation, elle éprouvera, sans en avoir conscience? (ἀπαραϰολουθήτως), l’affection? qui lui est propre. Il en sera de même pour la colère : ce sera la vue qui nous montrera une injustice, mais ce sera la colère qui s’en irritera, comme, lorsqu’un berger aperçoit un loup près de son troupeau, il suffit de l’odeur ou du bruit du loup pour exciter le chien, quoiqu’il n’ait rien? aperçu lui-même. Il en résulte que c’est bien la concupiscence qui éprouve le plaisir et qui en garde une trace, mais que cette trace constitue une affection, une disposition, et non un souvenir ; c’est une autre puissance qui a vu goûter le plaisir et qui se souvient de ce qui a eu? lieu?. Ce qui le prouve, c’est que la mémoire ignore souvent les choses auxquelles a participé la concupiscence, quoique la concupiscence possède encore des traces.

Guthrie

MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE, BECAUSE IT MAY BE REDUCED TO SENSATION.

28. Does memory belong to the powers by which we feel and know? Is it by appetite that we remember the things that excite our desires, and by anger that we remember the things that irritate us ? Some will think? so. It is indeed the same faculty which feels pleasure, and retains remembrance thereof. Thus when, for instance, appetite meets an object which has already made it experience pleasure, it remembers this pleasure on seeing this object. Why indeed should appetite not be similarly moved by some other object? Why is it not moved in some manner by the same object ? Why should we not thus attribute to it the sensation of things of this kind? Further, why should appetite itself not be reduced to the power of sensation, and not do likewise for everything?, naming each thing, by what predominates therein?

WHAT APPETITE KEEPS IS AN AFFECTION, BUT NOT A MEMORY.

Must we attribute sensation to each power, but in a different manner? In this case, for instance, it will be sight, and not appetite, which will perceive sense-objects; but appetite will be later wakened by sensation which will be "relayed," (as the Stoics would say); and though it does not judge of sensation, it will unconsciously feel the characteristic affection. The same state of affairs will obtain with anger. It will be sight which will show? us an injustice, but it will be anger which will resent it. Just so, when a shepherd notices a wolf near his flock, the dog, though he have not yet observed anything, will be excited by the smell or noise of the wolf. It certainly is appetite which experiences pleasure, and which keeps a trace of it; but this trace constitutes an affection or disposition, and not a memory. It is another power which observes the enjoyment of pleasure, and which remembers what occurred. This is proved by the fact? that memory is often ignorant of the things in which appetite has participated, though appetite still preserve traces thereof.

MacKenna

28. Is memory vested in the faculty by which we perceive and learn? Or does it reside in the faculty by which we set things before our minds as objects of desire or of anger, the passionate faculty?

This will be maintained on the ground that there could scarcely be both a first? faculty in direct action? and a second to remember what that first experiences. It is certain that the desiring faculty is apt? to be stirred by what it has once enjoyed; the object presents itself again; evidently, memory is at work; why else, the same object with the same attraction?

But, at that, we might reasonably ascribe to the desiring faculty the very perception? of the desired objects and then the desire itself to the perceptive faculty, and so on all through, and in the end? conclude that the distinctive names merely indicate the function? which happens to be uppermost.

Yet the perception is very different from faculty to faculty; certainly it is sight and not desire that sees the object; desire is stirred merely as a result of the seeing, by a transmission; its act is not in the nature? of an identification of an object seen; all is simply blind? response [automatic reaction]. Similarly with rage; sight reveals the offender and the passion? leaps; we may think of a shepherd seeing a wolf at his flock, and a dog, seeing nothing, who springs to the scent or the sound.

In other words? the desiring faculty has had the emotion, but the trace it keeps of the event is not a memory; it is a condition, something passively accepted: there is another faculty that was aware of the enjoyment and retains the memory of what has happened. This is confirmed by the fact that many satisfactions which the desiring faculty has enjoyed are not retained in the memory: if memory resided in the desiring faculty, such forgetfulness could not be.

Taylor

XXVIII. Do we, therefore, remember through the powers by which we perceive sensibly and learn ? Or do we remember the objects of desire through the power by which we desire, and the objects of anger through the irascible power? For it may be said, that it is not one thing which enjoys, and another which remembers what that thing enjoyed. The epithymetic power, therefore, is again moved through memory to the objects which it once enjoyed, when they present? themselves to its view. For why is it not moved by another object, or not after the same manner ? What hinders us, therefore, from granting to it a sensation of things of this kind ? And why may we not, therefore, attribute desire to the sensitive power, and this in every respect?, so that every thing may be named according to that which predominates? Or shall we say, that we ascribe sense to each thing in a different manner ? Thus, for instance, it is sight indeed that perceives, and not the power which desires. But the power which desires is moved by sense, as it were in succession; yet not in such a way as that sense can tell what the quality is of the desire, but so as to suffer? without perceiving what it is. Thus also with respect to anger, sight sees the author of the injury?, but anger rises in opposition to the injurer; just as when a shepherd sees a wolf among his flock, the dog, though he does not himself see the wolf, yet is excited by impulse, or by the noise [which this circumstance produces]. For the power, indeed, which desires, possesses in itself a vestige of what it formerly enjoyed, not as memory, but as a disposition and passion. But it is another thing which perceives the enjoyment, and possesses in itself the remembrance of what has been done. That it is so, however, this is an argument, that memory frequently does not know what the things are of which desire participates, though they still reside in it.


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