Plotino - Tratado 27,18 (IV, 3, 18) — O uso do raciocínio

18. ¿Podremos decir acaso que el alma se sirve del razonamiento antes de entrar en el cuerpo, y luego, una vez salida de él? Aquí, en esta morada, el alma usa, en efecto, del razonamiento, por ejemplo en sus estados de incertidumbre, de inquietud y, sobre todo, en sus períodos de debilidad; porque la necesidad de razonar le viene dada por la disminución de su inteligencia, que ya ni siquiera se basta a sí misma. Acontece lo mismo en las artes, donde se hace presente el razonamiento por la perplejidad misma de los artistas; y tanto es así que, cuando no existe dificultad, el arte se nos muestra en toda su fuerza y sazón. Ahora bien, si las almas que radican en el mundo inteligible no se sirven para nada del razonamiento, ¿cómo puede llamárselas almas razonables? Podría contestarse tal vez que, si la ocasión es llegada, estas almas son capaces también de una seria reflexión. Pero convendría, para ello, que tomásemos la palabra razonamiento en el sentido que nosotros le damos; pues si se considera el razonamiento como una disposición interna que deriva siempre de la inteligencia y, a la vez, como un acto estable que es reflejo de ella, tendremos que afirmar que las almas se sirven, en efecto, del razonamiento, incluso en el mundo inteligible.

En mi opinión, sin embargo, no debe creerse que las almas se sirven del lenguaje, en tanto permanezcan en el mundo inteligible o con sus cuerpos apegados al cielo. Todas cuantas necesidades o incertidumbres nos obligan en este mundo a hacer uso del lenguaje, no existen realmente en el mundo inteligible. Las almas que en él se encuentran actúan conforme a un orden y a su propia naturaleza y no tienen, por tanto, que disponer o aconsejar nada, ya que lo conocen todo unas de otras por su misma inteligencia. Aun aquí conocemos a los hombres sin necesidad de que ellos hablen; cuánto más ocurrirá en el mundo inteligible, donde todo cuerpo es puro y cada uno conoce como si fuera un ojo, sin que nada se le oculte o desfigure. Allí, al ver a alguno, ya se le conoce sin necesidad de que hable.

En cuanto a los demonios y a las almas que me dan en el aire, no resulta extraño que se sirvan del lenguaje, porque al fin y al cabo son también seres animados.

XVIII. (101). L’âme emploie-t-elle le raisonnement avant d’en- 299 trer dans le corps et après en être sortie ? Non : c’est quand elle est dans un corps qu’elle raisonne, parce qu’elle est incertaine, embarrassée, affaiblie : car, avoir besoin de raisonner pour arriver à une connaissance complète trahit toujours l’affaiblissement de l’intelligence (102). Le raisonnement intervient dans les arts quand l’artiste hésite devant quelque obstacle; mais, là où il n’y a pas défaut dans la mati  ère, l’art la maîtrise et produit son œuvre instantanément (103).

Mais [dira-t-on], si les âmes ne raisonnent pas là-haut, elles ne seront plus raisonnables. — Elles sont raisonnables, parce qu’elles peuvent bien pénétrer l’essence d’une chose, quand l’occasion l’exige. Voici d’ailleurs l’idée qu’il faut se faire du raisonnement : si l’on admet qu’il consiste dans une disposition qui dérive toujours de l’Intelligence, dans un acte immanent, un reflet de cette puissance dans les âmes, celles- ci raisonnent aussi dans le monde intelligible; mais alors elles n’ont aucun besoin du langage (104). De même, quand elles 300 habitent dans le ciel, elles n’ont pas non plus recours à la parole, comme le font celles qui sont ici-bas, par suite de leurs besoins et de leurs incertitudes. Elles agissent avec ordre et conformément à la nature, sans rien prescrire, sans délibérer. Elles se connaissent les unes les autres par une simple intuition (ἐν συνέσει), comme il nous arrive ici-bas de connaître nos semblables sans qu’ils nous parlent et par la seule vertu du regard (105). Là-haut, tout corps est pur et transparent : chacun est tout œil ; rien n’est caché ni simulé ; avant que vous ayez parlé, votre pensée est déjà connue (106). Quant aux démons et aux êtres animés qui habitent l’air, on peut croire qu’ils se servent de la voix : car ils sont des êtres vivants (ζῶα) (107). »

C. DOES THE SOUL EMPLOY DISCURSIVE REASON WHILE DISCARNATE?

THE SOUL DOES NOT USE DISCURSIVE REASON EXCEPT WHILE HINDERED BY THE OBSTACLES OF THE BODY.

18. Does the soul ratiocinate before entering upon the body, and after having left it? No: she reasons only while in a body, because she is uncertain, embarrassed and weakened. To need to reason in order to arrive at complete knowledge always betrays weakening of intellect. In the arts reasoning occurs only when the artist hesitates before some obstacle. Where there is no difficulty in the matter, art masters it, and produces its work instantly.

THE SOUL CAN REASON INTUITIONALLY WITHOUT RATIOCINATION.

(It might be objected) that if the souls on high do not reason, they will no longer be reasonable. They remain reasonable, however, because they are well able to penetrate into the essence of something, whenever the occasion demands it. Ratiocination should be considered as follows. If it consist in a disposition that is always derived from Intelligence, in an immanent act, a reflection of this power in souls, these must also reason in the intelligible world; but then they have no further need of language. Likewise, when they inhabit heaven, neither do they need to take recourse to speech, as do the souls here below, as a result of their needs and uncertainties. They act in an orderly manner, and in conformity with nature, without premeditation or deliberation. They know each other by a simple intuition, as even here below we know our like without their talking to us, by a mere glance. On high every body is pure and transparent. Each person there, is, as it were, an eye. Nothing is hidden or simulated. Before you have spoken, your thought is already known. It is probable that speech is used by the guardians and other living inhabitants of the air, for they are living beings.

XVIII. Again, shall we say that the soul employed the discursive energy of reason, before she came into body, and will also after her departure from it ? Or shall we say that a reasoning process is employed by her here, in consequence of her being involved in doubt and filled with care, through which she becomes debilitated in a greater degree ? For through a diminution of intellect, she requires the discursive energy of reason in order to be sufficient to herself ; just as reasoning is requisite in the arts, through the artists being involved in doubts. But when there is no difficulty, then art-subdues [its subject matter] and operates. If, however, souls live in the intelligible world without reasoning, how can they he any longer rational ? In answer to this, it may be said, that they are still rational, because they are able to employ a reasoning process whenever circumstances render it necessary. It is necessary, however, to assume a ratiocination of this kind; since if some one should consider the discursive energy of reason as a disposition always subsisting from intellect in souls, and a stable energy which is as it were an evolution of intellectual light, and if in the intelligible souls also use the reasoning power, yet as it appears to me, we must not think that voice is employed by them there, so long as they entirely subsist in the intelligible world. But when they have bodies in the heavens, they do not use the dialect which they employ here through indigence or ambiguity; but performing every thing in an orderly manner, and according to nature, they neither command any thing to be done, nor consult about it. They also mutually know the objects of their knowledge through a consciousness of perception; since even here likewise we know many things through the eyes, pertaining to those that are silent. There, however, every body is pure, and each inhabitant as it were an eye. Nothing likewise is there concealed, or fictitious, but before one can speak to another, the latter knows what the former intended to say. But there is no absurdity in admitting that daemons and souls that dwell in the air use voice; for such as these are animals.

18. There remains still something to be said on the question whether the soul uses deliberate reason before its descent and again when it has left the body.

Reasoning is for this sphere; it is the act of the soul fallen into perplexity, distracted with cares, diminished in strength: the need of deliberation goes with the less self-sufficing intelligence; craftsmen faced by a difficulty stop to consider; where there is no problem their art works on by its own forthright power.

But if souls in the Supreme operate without reasoning, how can they be called reasoning souls?

One answer might be that they have the power of deliberating to happy issue, should occasion arise: but all is met by repudiating the particular kind of reasoning intended [the earthly and discursive type]; we may represent to ourselves a reasoning that flows uninterruptedly from the Intellectual-Principle in them, an inherent state, an enduring activity, an assertion that is real; in this way they would be users of reason even when in that overworld. We certainly cannot think of them, it seems to me, as employing words when, though they may occupy bodies in the heavenly region, they are essentially in the Intellectual: and very surely the deliberation of doubt and difficulty which they practise here must be unknown to them There; all their act must fall into place by sheer force of their nature; there can be no question of commanding or of taking counsel; they will know, each, what is to be communicated from another, by present consciousness. Even in our own case here, eyes often know what is not spoken; and There all is pure, every being is, as it were, an eye, nothing is concealed or sophisticated, there is no need of speech, everything is seen and known. As for the Celestials [the Daimones] and souls in the air, they may well use speech; for all such are simply Animate [= Beings].