Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 27,16 (IV, 3, 16) — Os diferentes níveis de descida da alma (...)

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Plotino - Tratado 27,16 (IV, 3, 16) — Os diferentes níveis de descida da alma (2)

Enéada IV, 3, 16

quarta-feira 20 de abril de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Cap 12-19: As almas humanas

  • Cap 12: Sua descida não é total mas cíclica
  • Cap 13: Sua descida obedece a uma lei
  • Cap 14: As almas são o ornamento do mundo
  • Cap 15 a 17: Os diferentes níveis de descida
  • Cap 18: O uso do raciocínio
  • Cap 19: Um comentário do Timeu   35a-b

Míguez

16. Los castigos que, en orden a la justicia, acontecen a los malos, conviene referirlos a esta ordenación, que es la verdaderamente debida. Pero, ¿y en cuanto a los males que, en forma de castigos, de escasez de recursos o de enfermedades, suceden contra toda justicia a los hombres de bien? ¿No convendría atribuirlos a una falta anterior? Porque hemos de tener en cuenta que todos estos males, ligados de algún modo a las cosas y anunciados por ciertos signos, se manifiestan conforme a la razón del universo. Aunque también pudiera decirse que no se ajustan a razones naturales y que nada tienen que ver con los hechos precedentes, de los que son meros acompañantes. Esto es lo que ocurre cuando una casa se cae: perece realmente aquel que está debajo de ella, sea éste quien sea. Y lo mismo acontece cuando dos cosas, o simplemente una sola, avanzan según un cierto orden: deshacen y pisotean a todo el que encuentran en su camino. Tal vez pudiera pensarse que esto no constituye un mal para quien lo sufre, si miramos de modo general á la trama provechosa del universo. No hay entonces tal injusticia, sino más bien una justificación que se basa por entero en los hechos acaecidos anteriormente. Pero no deberemos creer, de todos modos, que unos hechos responden a un cierto orden, y otros, en cambio, quedan fuera de toda ley y determinación. Porque si todas las cosas han de ocurrir según causas y consecuencias naturales, y, asimismo, de acuerdo con una razón y un orden, tendremos que convenir en que este orden y esta trama deben extenderse hasta lo más pequeño. La injusticia cometida por un individuo es realmente una injusticia para el mismo que la comete, y éste, de cualquier modo que sea, no se ve descargado de su falta; ahora bien, considerada en el orden universal, la injusticia carece de sentido e incluso no lo tiene para el que la ha sufrido, porque se trata de algo que debía ocurrir así. Si es un hombre bueno el que la sufre, concluirá necesariamente en un bien. Pues no hemos de pensar que este orden sea injusto y extraño a la divinidad, sino que, al contrario, hace donación a cada uno de lo que es justo y conveniente. Es cierto que las causas no están del todo claras para nosotros, y el hecho de desconocerlas es motivo de que las censuremos.

Bouillet

XVI. Les châtiments qui frappent justement les méchants doivent donc être rapportés à cet ordre qui régit toutes choses comme la convenance l’exige. Quant aux maux qui semblent frapper les bons contre toute justice, accidents, misère, maladies, on peut dire que ce sont les conséquences de fautes antérieures. Car ces maux sont étroitement liés au cours des choses, et y ont même leurs signes (93), en sorte qu’ils paraissent arriver selon la Raison [de l’univers]. Il faut cependant admettre qu’ils ne sont, pas produits par des raisons naturelles (λόγοι φυσικοί), qu’ils ne sont pas dans les vues de la Providence, qu’ils en sont seulement les conséquences accidentelles (94) . Ainsi, qu’une maison vienne à tomber, elle écrase celui qui est dessous, quel qu’il soit d’ailleurs; ou bien encore, qu’un mouvement régulier fasse avancer deux choses ou même une seule, il brise ou écrase ce qu’il rencontre. Ces accidents, qui semblent injustes, ne sont pas des maux pour celui qui les souffre, si l’on considère comment ils se rattachent à l’ordre salutaire de l’univers ; peut-être même constituent-ils de justes peines, et sont-ils l’expiation de fautes antérieures. Il ne faut pas croire qu’il y ait dans l’univers une série d’êtres qui obéisse à l’ordre, et une autre série qui reste abandonnée au hasard et au caprice : si tout arrive par des causes et des conséquences naturelles, conformément à une seule raison, 296 à un seul ordre, les plus petites choses doivent rentrer dans cet ordre et s’y rattacher (95). L’injustice faite à autrui est une injustice pour celui qui la commet et doit lui attirer un châtiment ; mais, par la place qu’elle tient dans l’ordre universel, ce n’est pas une injustice, même pour celui qui la souffre (96); il fallait qu’il en fût ainsi : si c’est un homme vertueux qui est victime de cette injustice, elle ne peut avoir pour lui qu’une fin heureuse. On ne doit pas croire que cet ordre universel ne soit ni juste ni divin, mais admettre au contraire que la justice distributive s’y exerce avec une convenance parfaite. Si certaines choses semblent blâmables, c’est qu’elles arrivent par des causes secrètes que nous ignorons (97).

Guthrie

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MISFORTUNES AND PUNISHMENTS.

16. The punishments which justly overtake the evil must therefore be derived from that Order which rules all things with propriety. The unjust evils, accidents, misery and diseases which seem to overwhelm the good, may all be said to be consequences of anterior faults. These evils are intimately related to the course of events, and are even represented therein by their signs, so that they seem to happen according to the Reason (of the universe). We must however acknowledge that they are not produced by natural "reasons," that they are not within the purview of Providence, and that they are only its accidental consequences. Thus when a house happens to fall, it buries anybody below it, whoever he may happen to be; or again, whether some regular movement drives on some one thing, or even several things, it breaks or crushes anything that happens to lie in its path. These accidents which seem unjust, are not evils for those who suffer them, if you consider how they take their place within the legitimate order of the universe; perhaps even they constitute just chastisements and are the expiations of earlier faults. It would be incredible that one series of beings in the universe should obey its order, while another series should be subject to chance or caprice. If everything happen through causes and natural consequences, in conformity with a single "reason," and to a single order, the smallest things must form part of that order, and agree with it. Injustice practiced against somebody else is an injustice for him who commits it, and must attract a punishment to him; but by the place which it holds in the universal order, it is not an injustice, even for him who suffers it. It had to be thus. If the victim of this injustice was an honest man, for him it can have only a happy ending. This universal order must not be accused of being undivine and unjust, but we should insist that distributive justice exercises itself with perfect propriety. If certain things seem worthy of blame, it is because they are due to secret causes that escape our knowledge.

Taylor

XVI. The punishments, therefore, which are inflicted with justice on the wicked, it is proper to refer to the order which leads every thing in a becoming manner. Such things, however, as happen to the good without justice, as punishments, or poverty, or disease, may be said to take place through offences committed in a former life. For these things are woven together, and are pre-signified, so that they are also produced according to reason. Or shall we say that these are not effected according to physical reasons, nor to be ranked among things which have a precedaneous subsistence, but among such as are consequent to them ? As if some edifice should fall, the animal upon which it falls would he killed, whatever it might he. Or as if two certain things moving with an orderly motion, or even one thing thus moving, that which happens to fall at the time, should he broken or trampled on. Or it may be said, that this unjust circumstance is not an evil to him who suffers it, and is useful to the connexion of the whole of things. Or that neither is it unjust, things having a just retribution from antecedent transactions. For it is not proper to think that some things are co-ordinated, but that others are to be referred to the impulse of arbitrary will. For if it is necessary that things should be generated according to causes and physical consequences, and according to one reason and one order, it is also necessary to think that the smallest things are co-ordinated, and woven together. Hence the unjust conduct of one man towards another, is indeed unjust to the doer, and the agent is not without blame, yet being co-ordinated in the universe, it is not unjust with reference to it, nor to him who suffers the injury, but it was thus fit that it should take place. But if he who is injured is a worthy man, the end of these things is good, to him.4 For it is necessary to think, that this co-ordination of things is not without divinity, and is not unjust, but is accurate in the retribution of that which is appropriate; but that it has immanifest causes, and on this account is the occasion of blame to the ignorant.

MacKenna

16. The punishment justly overtaking the wicked must therefore be ascribed to the kosmic order which leads all in accordance with the right.

But what of chastisements, poverty, illness, falling upon the good outside of all justice? These events, we will be told, are equally interwoven into the world order and fall under prediction, and must consequently have a cause in the general reason: are they therefore to be charged to past misdoing?

No: such misfortunes do not answer to reasons established in the nature of things; they are not laid up in the master-facts of the universe, but were merely accidental sequents: a house falls, and anyone that chances to be underneath is killed, no matter what sort of man he be: two objects are moving in perfect order - or one if you like - but anything getting in the way is wounded or trampled down. Or we may reason that the undeserved stroke can be no evil to the sufferer in view of the beneficent interweaving of the All or again, no doubt, that nothing is unjust that finds justification in a past history.

We may not think of some things being fitted into a system with others abandoned to the capricious; if things must happen by cause, by natural sequences, under one Reason-Principle and a single set scheme, we must admit that the minor equally with the major is fitted into that order and pattern.

Wrong-doing from man to man is wrong in the doer and must be imputed, but, as belonging to the established order of the universe is not a wrong even as regards the innocent sufferer; it is a thing that had to be, and, if the sufferer is good, the issue is to his gain. For we cannot think that this ordered combination proceeds without God and justice; we must take it to be precise in the distribution of due, while, yet, the reasons of things elude us, and to our ignorance the scheme presents matter of censure.